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Despite the current proliferation of research on slums, there remains an impasse in our 
ability to represent and understand informal residential settlements. This is largely due to 
the complexity and malleability of slums in the context of globalized flows of people, 
neoliberal economic and political restructuring, and processes of social marginalization and 
conflict. This thesis thus addresses the intellectual, representational, and political 
complexities associated with the global proliferation of slums so as to facilitate more just 
and egalitarian societies. As such, the aim of the study is to identify and examine emergent 
factors that contribute to social injustice and inequality in the context of ever transforming 
spatial, social, economic, and political processes. To do so, it examines the emergence, 
organization, and socio-spatial morphology of Ganesh Murthy Nagar, a squatter settlement 
in Mumbai, India. 
  
Conceptually, the framework guiding my study is based on Deleuzoguattarian thought and 
draws upon assemblage theory in relation to contemporary research in critical Urban 
Studies. My methodology is oriented towards thick empirical description and addresses 
historical, ethnographic, and developmental perspectives. This approach contributes to 
three specific objectives of the thesis: to identify the functional components of the 
settlement-assemblage and trace their emergence and evolution in time; to map the 
constitutive associations inherent in the ordering of these components in and beyond the 
settlement; and to determine the components’ constraining and enabling effects on other 
components in the assemblage.  
 
My findings suggest that State policies promoting participatory governance have triggered 
the emergence of social hierarchies and the centralization of power within the settlement. In 
collusion with other endogenous social networks and State actors, a defensible space of 
dominance has been established that continues to assemble power from diverse 
relationships with developmental partners. Rather than advancing the positive potential of 
interventions, weaknesses with slum policies and their implementation have contributed to 
a settlement with unequal and unjust relations, a fragmented populace, and pervasive 
feelings of fear. 
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This thesis engages in an attempt to address the intellectual, representational, and political 
complexities associated with the global proliferation of slum dwellers. In the context of 
planetary urbanization, where urban processes extend beyond city limits (Lefebvre 2003, 
[1970]; Schmid, 2005; Soja and Kanai, 2005; Madden, 2011), slums are rapidly 
proliferating and their presence and expansion have become undeniably important 
components of many contemporary cities. With the number of slum dwellers expected to 
triple to three billion people—or one third of humanity—by 2050 (UN Habitat, 2003), 
research into cities and slums has expanded dramatically. Yet, despite this research there 
remains an “urban impasse” (Thrift, 1993) in our ability to represent and understand cities 
and slums. This is largely due to their complexity and malleability within an evolving 
context characterized by economic restructuring, regulatory shifts, and social polarization, 
marginalization, inequality, and conflict. Thrift may have been the first to recognize that 
different and creative approaches to the way we understand and represent cities are 
necessary, but his call remains urgently relevant almost twenty years later (Brenner et al, 
2011; Hernández, Kellet, and Allen, 2009; Roy, 2009; Taylor, 2004; Sassen, 2000; Soja, 
2000). This thesis, then, heeds Thrift’s call by contributing to a new approach to, and 
conceptualization of, slums.   
The overall aim of the thesis is to understand how inequalities and injustice emerge and 
continue to evolve in a squatter settlement called Ganesh Murthy Nagar in Mumbai, India. 
To address this aim I examine the emergence, organization, and socio-spatial morphology 
of the squatter settlement. This broad examination entails an investigation of important 
components of the settlement such as residents and their social groupings, land, hutments, 
infrastructural provisions, politicians, policies, real estate developers, and State employees. 
The thesis brings these various actors and their operating logics together in an innovative 
approach to slums, which treats the settlement as an assemblage: or a constellation of 
heterogeneous components and their reciprocal relations that are gathered into a functional 
system. Ganesh Murthy is thus examined as a system that provides land, shelter, essential 
services, and societal regulation, amongst other things. The various components of the 
settlement assemblage are understood to have a degree of autonomy based on their inherent 
properties; however, the potential capacities of components are interlinked such that they 
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constrain or enable each other. It is this relational dynamic that localizes emergent 
processes of organization, which operationalize the settlement as a functional system. An 
assemblage approach to understanding Ganesh Murthy Nagar is thus oriented towards 
analysing processes of gathering, assembling, alignment, dissolution and realignment in the 
context of ever transforming flows of matter and energy. These processes are particularly 
relevant to slum dwellers who gather and align various sociomaterials towards creating 
their built environment. The empirical and intensive orientation of an assemblage approach, 
together with its understanding of processual relationships that cannot be reduced to 
individual properties, avoids over-generalized and reductionist pitfalls that limit the 
analytical purchase of much current research on slums. 
Contemporary research into slums is often characterized by exaggeration and 
overgeneralization (e.g. Davis, 2006; De Soto, 2000). A contemporary focus on 
globalization and related concerns of neo-liberalism and structural adjustment can tend to 
stretch observations in order to increase their explanatory power (Gilbert, 2009). In the 
past, these have spurred large multilateral funding agencies like the World Bank, UN-
Habitat, and others to adopt recommendations towards achieving global solutions, without 
adequate consideration of the diverse power relations in local contexts. The World Bank’s 
adoption of “community participation” as a prerequisite for funding infrastructural 
interventions (World Bank, 2003) in slums is an example of a well intentioned, but 
sometimes ill-fitting policy directive (See Chapter VII). At a more local level, broad 
definitions, policies, and policy implementation practices adopted by the State of 
Maharashtra may not be ideally formulated to address the large variation in slums found 
within the state. For example, the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance & 
Redevelopment) Act of 1971 defines a slum as (Section 2): "any area that is a source of 
danger to the health, safety and convenience of the public of that area, or by reason of the 
area having inadequate or no basic amenities, or being insanitary, squalid, overcrowded or 
otherwise.” In fact, there is a lot of variation in Mumbai’s slums in terms of land 
ownership, age of the settlement, nature of the built components, geographic location, and 
density. By failing to acknowledge this diversity, opportunities to address problems related 
to specific slums or groupings of slums may be squandered. The same lack of specificity 
may also cripple policies towards redeveloping and providing infrastructure to slums and 
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can result in dramatic cases of injustice as described in this thesis. As Gilbert (2009: 38) 
states, overgeneralization “perverts our understanding of the nature of poverty and distorts 
policy making.”  
Where over-generalized research observations may limit the production of appropriate local 
interventions, concurrently, contemporary research on slums often exhibits a narrow focus 
on individual components, which may lead to partial understandings of their functionality. 
Here, studies limit their focus to one or several components in a slum to the exclusion of 
other important causal factors. Many reasons contribute to the prevalence of narrowly 
focused studies, including budget and time constraints and ideological and theoretical 
positions that a priori limit the scope of studies. Whatever the causes may be, there appears 
to be a movement away from intensive engagements with slums (e.g. Pearlman, 1979; 
Lobo, 1992) that often result in more holistic accounts. Instead, much slum-based research 
focuses on one aspect of a slum, or more likely several slums, to produce thematically 
based research concerned with such things as water provision (Zérah, 2000; Crow and 
McPike, 2009), sanitation (McFarlane, 2008; Sharma and Bhide, 2005), gangs (Klein, 
2005; Moser, 2004), and policy implications (Patel, 2005; Sivam and Karuppannan, 2002) 
to name a few. These studies do generate important information toward our understanding 
of slums, however, in the course of this research it has become apparent that a more holistic 
approach that attempts to assemble the various functional components of a slum can 
contribute important observations that go unnoticed by more narrowly focused studies. As 
such, the assemblage approach adopted here facilitates an intensive and in depth 
investigation into many components of one settlement assemblage, thereby bringing 
together diverse strands of research and demonstrating their interrelations and emergent 
outcomes. This promises to contribute to better-informed policy decisions and 
implementation practices.  
The remainder of this introductory chapter thus begins by providing some context on 
Mumbai, the geographical focus of this study, and examining its slum related policies, 
emerging threats to slum dwellers, and local responses from civil society. I then situate this 
research among other academic studies on slums and discuss how the thesis contributes to 
this growing body of knowledge. Finally, the hypothesis, research questions, and 
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methodological considerations of the thesis are outlined, followed by a synopsis of 
subsequent chapters.  
1.2 Mumbai and slums 
Certainly, with 56 percent of its residents living in slums, Mumbai is in need of alternative 
perspectives and policies for addressing the many problems associated with slums (Census 
of India, 2001). Mumbai is situated on a peninsula that was fused from seven original 
islands. It is the capital of the State of Maharashtra and is the most populous city in India. 
With its 12.4 million people, it ranks as the fifth most populous city in the world (Census of 
India, 2011). It is also the financial and commercial capital of India, home to the Reserve 
Bank of India, the Bombay Stock Exchange, the National Stock Exchange, and the National 
Mint. Furthermore, it is the corporate headquarters of major domestic and international 
banks, insurance companies, as well as Indian conglomerates such as Tata Group and 
Reliance Industries Limited. Mumbai is also the transport hub of India, accommodating 
over half the country’s passenger traffic and 70 percent of its maritime trade (Pacione, 
2005). Thus, the city is fully integrated into the global economy. Unfortunately, however, it 
is saddled by an extremely uneven distribution of wealth. 
To leverage the city’s position in the global economy Mumbai is currently undergoing 
major restructuring that is shaped by two related economic and political currents. First, city 
administrators have embraced neoliberal management policies that are transferring control 
of civic management to market-based mechanisms, which increase the vulnerability of slum 
dwellers (Bhide, 2009). Concurrently, and stemming from this neoliberal position, the 
city’s elite seeks for Mumbai to mimic the transformation of Shanghai and become a 
“World Class City”, which is resulting in massive infrastructural works that have increased 
the displacement of slum and pavement dwellers. Thus, these two trajectories have resulted 
in new threats to, and increasing pressure on, existing slum areas.  
To put these currents in context, cities are currently at the centre of India’s national policies 
and discussions concerned with wealth creation and social transformation. Cities are 
considered the locus of economic generation and growth, and in India empirical evidence 
bears this out. In fact, 50 to 55 percent of the country’s Gross Domestic Production is 
produced by urban economies (Chopra et al., 2005). Research on “Global Cities” (Sassen, 
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1991) or “World Cities” (Friedman, 1996; Friedman and Wolfe, 1982) demonstrate the role 
of megacities in translating a nation’s economic interests to the rest of the world and 
connecting national economies to the global economy. The city as an “economic engine” is 
dependent on its ability to attract global capital, and in the case of many developing 
countries, this has meant large infrastructural restructuring projects (Mahadevia, 2005). The 
necessity to pay for these projects however, has ushered in a “new urban politics” informed 
by neoliberal policies of economic liberalization and policy deregulation (DeFilippis, 2004; 
Wilson, 2004). There is thus a shift in the urban mode of operation from a managerial to an 
entrepreneurial State (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; Swyngedouw, 2000; Harvey, 1989). 
This shift generally entails a focus on producing the right conditions for capital 
accumulation and an attendant disinterest in the fate of the poor and vulnerable.  
New built environments forged by the forces of globalization, economic liberalization, and 
policy deregulation, are uneven, “fragmented” (Harvey, 1996), and “contradictory” 
(Banerjee-Guha, 2006) and result in social differentiation and contestation (Balbo, 1993). 
Power and ideology together create socio-spatial formations with patterns of domination 
and repression emerging in the form of “spaces of difference” (Berner and Korff, 1995). 
For instance, these include class division (Cuthbert, 1991), which often results in gender 
and ethnic friction, greater unemployment, and homelessness (Banerjee-Guha, 2006). 
Recent policies and programmes put in place by the state government of Maharashtra and 
Mumbai’s municipal government have been more concerned with creating a World Class 
City than with attaining distributive justice (Mahadevia, 2005).  
1.2.1 Slum policy in Mumbai 
The effects of globalization, neoliberal policies, and the desire to transform Mumbai into a 
“World Class City” have increased the threats to, and placed greater pressure on, slum 
dwellers. Mumbai has historically struggled to find an adequate response to its shortage of 
housing; a problem that was already apparent in 1872 (Sundaram, 1989). In the 1930s 
modern slums emerged as the city faced an “acute housing crisis” (Bhide, 2009: 368) due to 
an influx of rural migrants seeking employment opportunities and ineffective or non-
existent policies to address the housing needs of these migrants. The disequilibrium 
between housing demand and supply resulted in five percent of the city’s population living 
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in slums by 1947 (David, 1996), and spurred a series of policies and programs that were 
instituted by all levels of government to combat these increasingly large housing shortfalls. 
The subsequent three decades, however, only intensified the housing disequilibrium. Rural 
migrants continued to make their way to the city to improve their livelihoods, and together 
with restricted land on the peninsula, questionable policy decisions,1 and limited activity in 
the housing sector, contributed to massive housing shortfalls peaking in the 1970s and 
1980s at 45,000 units per annum (Bhide, 2009). The mechanisms used to address the 
proliferation of slums in Mumbai may be divided into three chronological phases, discussed 
below: negation, tolerance, and acceptance (NIUA, 2009; Bhide, 2009). There are, 
however, signs that a new phase of increasing intolerance is emerging.  
1.2.2 Negation 
Varying levels of government legislation legalizing the State’s right to demolish slums 
marks the first ‘negation’ phase up to the 1970s. During this phase, slums were viewed as 
unfit housing and centres for illegal activities, such as alcohol production, smuggling, 
prostitution, and gambling (Weinstein, 2008; Sharma, 2003). As such, an amendment to the 
Bombay Municipal Corporation Act in 1954 permitted the city to legally demolish slums. 
Thereafter, demolitions were pursued as antidote to the city’s housing problems (Risbud, 
2003). Later, with the 1956 national Slum Clearance Plan, Mumbai was included amongst 
six cities vested with national authority to demolish slums and redevelop them. However, 
with limited resources available for the program, redevelopment fell behind the amount of 
demolitions that took place and the program could not keep up with the pace of slum 
proliferation (Bhide, 2009). This revelation marks the next phase of slum-related policies as 
authorities supposedly became reconciled towards the existence of slums. 
1.2.3 Tolerance 
The second phase of slum policy in Mumbai is characterized by a shift from demolition and 
redevelopment to in-situ environmental improvement and infrastructure provision. In 1972 
the Central Scheme of Environmental Improvement of Urban Slums (CSEIUS) was enacted 
by the national government with the intention of improving slum conditions with minimal 
                                                
1 For example the 1947 Mumbai Rent Control Act froze rent at 1940s prices, which is credited for limiting 
investments in private rental housing and adversely affecting property tax revenues (Risbud, 2003). 
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financial inputs. It was initially tested in India’s major cities, and extended to other cities in 
the 1980s. The Maharashtra government adopted CSEIUS in 1974 and created the 
Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) in 1977 to effect works. 
This included provisions to supply community taps and latrines, construct pathways and 
drains, and establish streetlights (Risbud, 2003). However, decidedly anti-slum legislation 
was concurrently enacted such as The Maharashtra Vacant Lands (Prohibition of 
Unauthorised Structures and Summary Eviction) Act of 1975. This act identified squatted 
land as vacant and thus subject to clearance, and effectively immobilized judicial 
proceedings underway to fight evictions (Risbud, 2003).  
1.2.4 Acceptance 
The phase of slum acceptance in Mumbai commenced in the 1980s and emerged due to 
international awareness of the proliferation of slums worldwide and unsatisfactory housing 
conditions. The policies and programmes that were put in place acknowledged that slum 
edifices constitute housing stock, rather than previous understandings that sought to 
demolish and build anew. As such, programmes in this phase are characterized by 
providing land tenure, and forms of perceived land tenure, as well as physical security to 
slum communities. Schemes such as the Mumbai Urban Development Programme 
(MUDP)(1985), and the Urban Basic Services Program (UBSP) (1985) were financed by 
multilateral organizations such as the International Development Agency of the World 
Bank and UNICEF (respectively) and by multiple levels of government.  
Up-gradation programmes, such as the MUDP, that were adopted by several Indian cities 
set out to optimize existing housing stock and infrastructure by providing services at an 
affordable price as well as providing incentives for owners to improve their houses over 
time (NIUA, 2009). The UBSP and other projects like the Slum Upgradation Programme 
(1983), and the Slum Sanitation Program (1997) made community participation integral to 
their programmes and focused on women’s development. The UBSP also emphasized the 
integration and convergence of services and programmes along with the creation of 
facilities. These principles of community participation, women’s development, and 
convergence continue to be on the development agenda as promoted by the National Slum 
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Development Programme introduced in 1996-1997, and the Draft National Slum Policy 
(2002).  
1.2.5 Emerging threats to slum dwellers 
Currently, slums and slum dwellers are coming under increasing pressure from many forces 
in the city. The guiding mantra espoused by the government, business interests, the upper 
and middle classes, the media, and the judiciary is that if there is to be economic 
development, slums must go. This sentiment is summed up by former Chief Minister of 
Maharashtra Vilasrao Deshmukh (Bharucha, 2009) when he said: “The proliferation of 
slums throughout the city has created obstacles for development…” Issuing forth from the 
cover of neoliberal conviction, similar statements and sentiments have increased 
government pressure on slum dwellers, which have multiplied from direct assault by way 
of eviction and demolition to silent and insidious forms of displacement. 
In terms of recent displacement, 1986 witnessed the State-led movement of all pavement 
dwellers to the outskirts of the city (Bhide, 2009). From 1999 to 2001 85,000 slum dwellers 
were ejected from Sanjay Gandhi National Park. This eviction was effected with a force 
and rigour heretofore unseen with the use of Special Reserve Police Force and helicopters 
(Bhide, 2009). A new wave of demolitions in Mumbai was initiated in December 2004. 
This was a brutal strike against slum dwellers that was well organized by multiple agencies 
and programmes to reduce the re-encroachment having been put in place preceding the 
demolitions. The government was unapologetic in its actions. The contemporaneous Chief 
Minister of Maharashtra Vilasrao Deshmukh (Bharucha, 2009) said:  
“There is no pressure on me to halt the ongoing demolition drive and I am not going to stop the BMC. 
Instead, we need to go further and investigate the people behind the growth of slums— for instance, 
the slumlords and officials who protect them. In the first phase, encroachers coming in the way of 
public utility projects will be removed. In the second phase, those who have taken over footpaths will 
be cleared.” 
From late 2004 to 2005, in what the newspapers dubbed “Operation Shanghai”, 94,000 
homes were demolished at over 44 sites in the city (Mahadevia, 2005). Estimates of lands 
cleared range from 216 acres according to Mid Day (A Mumbai daily newspaper) (Mid 
Day, June 7, 2005, as referenced in Mahadevia, 2005: 360) to 306 acres as claimed by the 
BMC (Indian Express, January 4, 2005, as referenced in Mahadevia, 2005: 361). In total, 
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seven percent of Mumbai’s slum dwellers were displaced equalling an astounding 450,000 
people. The targets of the demolitions were not only slum dwellers that had erected 
hutments after 1995, which are not officially sanctioned by the State, but all slum hutments. 
Surveys conducted by Youth for Voluntary Action and Unity (YUVA) and the Committee 
for Right to Housing (CRH) found that six percent (or 2,405 houses of 41,900 surveyed) of 
demolished houses had been erected before the 1995 cut-off date (IPTEHR, 2005)2. 
Beyond increased evictions and demolitions—which are visible forms of displacement that 
can upset the delicate balance between politicians and slum dwellers—are more insidious 
and less visible forms of displacement (Bhide, 2009). Slum dwellers are political assets for 
politicians as they form the majority of the electorate in all of Mumbai’s constituencies and 
are traditionally active voters. As such, politicians go to great lengths to secure these ‘vote 
banks’ through various slum branches operating in every political party, and through 
promises guaranteeing security of tenure in exchange for votes. However, the pressure to 
turn Mumbai into a World Class City, exerted on politicians by their colleagues, prominent 
businesses, real estate developers, eminent citizens, and citizen groups has started to erode 
the political patronage slum dwellers once relied upon. Due to such pressures, and with a 
will to retain the base of their political power in the form of vote banks, politicians are more 
supportive of silent forms of displacement than of direct forms of eviction and demolition 
(Bhide, 2009).  
Silent threats of displacement are related to the government’s changing role from urban 
manager to entrepreneur, and a concomitant shift of government as a force for human rights 
and protection of the poor, to a facilitator of capital accumulation. Thus, housing is seen in 
terms of real estate and measured in floor space, built-up area, size, and financial yield. The 
key players in this sector are financial institutions, developers, and landowners. Slum-
dwellers find little place in this shifting terrain, and the notion of housing as a right has 
gone by the wayside. The current housing debate in Mumbai centres not on land, housing, 
and service rights, but on rehabilitation and relocation. Displacement has thus become an 
accepted outcome of policies geared towards economic development.  
                                                
2 Various cut-off dates have been adopted by the State of Maharashtra over time to limit slum dweller’s 
access to services. The current date in force is 1995 and this indicates that residents living in hutments built 
after 1995 do not qualify for a host of municipal services.  
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One of the prime mechanisms for displacement is slum rehabilitation, under the aegis of the 
Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS). The SRS brings together State, private, and resident 
actors to redevelop slums and was initiated in 1995. In its role of entrepreneur, the State has 
embarked upon massive infrastructure improvements that entail the displacement of 
hundreds of thousands of slum dwellers that live in the path of development. Bhide (2009) 
estimates that 200,000 additional people will be displaced due to the SRS in pending 
projects. The SRS is also the mechanism used to redevelop officially sanctioned slums that 
existed prior to 1995 through participatory methods. However, because of the potential 
revenue to be generated from slum rehabilitation, developers, along with politicians and 
sometimes elements from gangs and mafia organizations, have used various types of force 
to circumvent community participation and push projects through. This is discussed further 
in Chapter VIII of this thesis. 
Finally, in terms of silent forms of displacement, the existence of slums does not show up 
on the official Development Plans produced for the city of Mumbai. That is, none of the 
2335 slum communities housing over 50 percent of Mumbai’s residents are represented by 
maps that are produced to chart the future growth and direction of the city. In fact, slums 
occupy land that the Development Plan has earmarked for specific uses in the future. This 
refusal to acknowledge slums on Development Plans is a form of future-proofing planning 
by providing flexibility (Roy, 2005). The unacknowledged territory otherwise used to 
house over eight million people are understood as a convenient pool of land to be used for 
public projects and commercial development (Das, 2003).  
1.2.6 Responses to threats from civil society  
Threats of displacement to Mumbai’s slum dwellers have been met by initiatives organized 
by multiple civil society organizations that mobilize communities in various ways. The 
earliest responses to threats of displacement took the form of housing rights struggles in the 
1970s led by political parties and unions such as the Hind Mazdoor Kisan Panchayat 
(Indian Farmer and Workers Forum) that worked to mobilize communities of pavement 
dwellers (Bhide, 2009). These efforts, however, often petered out soon after their inception. 
The field of civil society community mobilization in the 1970s was then largely relegated to 
small volunteer groups devoted to locality development (Bhide, 2009).  
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In the 1980s two related events in the city catalysed the formation of enduring civil society 
organizations that sought to politically engage with the development process. In 1981 large-
scale demolitions and the deportation of slum-dwellers from the city back to their places of 
origin, labelled “Operation Eviction” by the Chief Minister of Maharashtra, invoked 
widespread antipathy towards the grossly unjust treatment of human beings (Singh, 1987). 
“Operation Eviction” also spurred Olga Tellis, a journalist, and several slum and pavement 
dwellers to challenge the Bombay Municipal Corporation (BMC) under Article 21 of the 
Indian Constitution, which guarantees the right to life (Ramathan, 2005). The plaintiffs 
essentially argued that the right to life entails the right to livelihood, which necessitates a 
home. In its 1985 judgment, the Supreme Court ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, stating that 
the BMC had indeed violated the right to life. Nonetheless, it ultimately sided with the city 
by giving it the authority to evict slum dwellers one month after the monsoon subsided and 
by directing the government to attempt relocation if convenient.  
The judgment was understood by many as tantamount to sanctioning evictions and 
demolitions by the highest court in the country and the backlash that ensued brought several 
civil society groups into prominence. The Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti (NHSS), a network 
of individuals that “fight to protect the rights of the poor to shelter” (Interview with a 
founding member for the NHSS as quoted in Ramathan, 2005: 131) engaged in tactics of 
confrontation with the government. In subsequent years, the NHSS adopted co-optation and 
complementarity as further tactics, but their focus on the State as the source of injustice and 
exploitation has endured (Ramathan, 2005).3 Another civil society organization that rose to 
prominence after the Supreme Court ruling is the Youth For Unity and Voluntary Action 
(YUVA), which emerged between 1978 and 1984. YUVA is similar to the NHSS in 
initially adopting confrontational tactics towards the State in rights-based approaches to 
development and later introducing more complementarity tactics. YUVA differs from the 
NHSS through greater contacts with the slum community and especially working with 
youth towards self-empowerment (Ramathan, 2005).  
While the NHSS and YUVA continue to be strong advocates for rights-based development 
in Mumbai, probably the largest civil society organization based in Mumbai working in this 
                                                
3 For a further discussion on civil society – State relations see Najam (2000).  
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regard (in terms of geographic diversity and membership numbers) is The Alliance. The 
Alliance is composed of the National Federation of Slum Dwellers (NFSD), a women’s 
group Mahila Milan (Women Together), and an NGO called the Society for the 
Preservation of Area Resource Centres (SPARC). The 1985 Supreme Court ruling caused a 
great deal of anxiety in Mumbai’s civil society sector, including the founders of SPARC 
who had started their NGO in 1984. However, their anxiety was due partly to the mass 
protests being organized by the majority of other NGOs in the city (Ramanath, 2005). The 
founders were not convinced of the efficacy of direct confrontation to actually address 
problems faced by slum dwellers and find solutions. Their desire for alternative tactics from 
confrontation would come to serve the NGO well in a changing developmental context, 
which became oriented towards stakeholder inclusion and participation.  
SPARC’s response to the demolitions and evictions was to work with women pavement 
dwellers in various ways, including creating collective savings and credit groups, to reduce 
their vulnerability. These actions soon translated into the formation of Mahila Milan in 
1986 (Ramanath, 2005). Between 1986 and 1988 SPARC and Mahila Milan formed a 
mutually beneficial alliance with the NSDF that increased the number of women in the 
latter organization (which now stands at roughly 50 percent), expanded the reach of the 
former organizations across urban India, and created a robust pool of knowledge and 
expertise in development practice (Ramathan, 2005; Patel and Mitlin, 2001). The Alliance 
initially created educational and organizational strategies to promote community learning 
and empowerment, but has subsequently engaged in resettlement, housing, and 
infrastructural projects as well as developing exchanges with low-income communities in 
South Africa, Thailand, Cambodia and Laos (Patel and Mitlin, 2001). The Alliance, and 
more specifically SPARC, is differentiated from the NHSS and YUVA in its primary use of 
tactics of cooperation and compromise in achieving mutually beneficial solutions that 
provide slum dwellers with solutions for their primary needs of land, housing, and basic 
services (SPARC, 1998). These tactics have firmly established the Alliance in Mumbai’s 
developmental landscape through a vast network of political affiliations at various levels of 
government (Ramathan, 2005). 
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In sum, Mumbai’s slums are subject to diverse political and developmental forces. 
Participatory processes that are geared towards democratic participation and community 
mobilization (and which are often negotiated through civil society organizations), orient 
recent policies that aspire to change the livelihood conditions of slum dwellers and thereby 
facilitate the reduction of poverty. Concurrently, evictions, demolitions, silent forms of 
displacement and threats are being marshalled to push slum dwellers out of the city. These 
various forces are embedded in demographic and economic flows that proliferate 
settlements in and on the periphery of the city producing a conurbation, which is 
increasingly difficult to represent, understand, and address.  
1.3 Academic research on slums 
The proliferation of slums is due primarily to rapid urbanization and the urbanization of 
poverty (UN Habitat, 2003). In 1900, 14 percent of the world’s population lived in cities. 
Currently, that number is estimated to be over 50 percent. The number of people living in 
cities is expected to increase by 1.5 billion, mainly in developing countries through natural 
reproduction, the integration of formerly rural areas into geographically expanding cities, 
and through rural to urban migration (Mehta, 2010). Concurrently, the number of urban 
poor is expanding, with 1.3 billion people living on less than one dollar a day (UNDP, 
1999). Beyond economic indicators, poverty is also an expression of social, political, and 
cultural exclusion (Gareau and Sclar, 2004) from “opportunities, decent employment, 
security, capacity, and empowerment” (Mercado et al., 2007: 7). 
A slum is defined by UN Habitat (2003: 12) as an area that combines, to various extents, 
the following physical and legal characteristics: inadequate access to safe water, inadequate 
access to sanitation and other infrastructure, poor structural quality of housing, 
overcrowding, and insecure residential status. While slum populations may display a wide-
range spectrum of economic capacity, slums do have the highest concentrations of poor 
people in urban centres (Un Habitat, 2003). Poverty is linked to environmental degradation 
in land and water (UN Habitat/DFID, 2002), resulting from the proliferation of slums in 
and on the boundary of cities (Tewari et al, 1986). Expanding urban populations push built 
environments into green areas and croplands and eat away at urban nature preserves and 
coastal areas, thus upsetting the delicate balance humans have with nature for the recycling 
 28 
of waste products (Davis, 2006) and threatening food security (Fazal, 2000). Lack of 
sanitation facilities and garbage disposal in slums (Chaplin, 1999; Solinger, 1999) increases 
the spread of disease like rabies and malaria through increased rodent and mosquito 
populations (Davis, 2006), and contaminates water sources and food supply (Warah, 2002) 
leading to increased incidences of diarrhoea, enteritis, colitis, typhoid and paratyphoid: 
together the leading causes of death in the world (Thapar and Sanderson, 2004). Slum 
populations thus suffer from increased health issues and mortality as compared to other 
segments of the urban population (de Sousa, 2000). 
While much slum research focuses on disease, dystopia, and delinquency, alternative 
perspectives do exist. Stokes (1962) compared different modalities of slums as “slums of 
hope” and “slums of despair”, a comparison that is taken up by others such as Turner 
(1967; 1977) Ward (1976), Lloyd (1976), the UN’s Global Report on Human Settlements 
(2003), and recently by Roy (2011). Stokes refers to slums of hope as those where 
inhabitants are intent on self-betterment (mainly through employment) and positively 
estimate their success in this effort, which may lead to movement up a class hierarchy. 
Slums of despair refer to a lack of such intention and/or a negative assessment for their 
personal betterment for various reasons including insufficient language skills, education 
levels and other social and economic resources (Stokes, 1962). Such people may be denied 
in some way an escalation in class structure and remain caught in a cycle of poverty. In 
picking up on slums of hope from a post-colonial perspective, Ananya Roy (2011) 
elaborates upon subaltern urbanism, which focuses on slums as places of residence, 
livelihoods, and politics. For Roy (2011; 224), subaltern urbanism “seeks to confer 
recognition on spaces of poverty and forms of popular agency that often remain invisible 
and neglected in the archives and annals of urban theory.” As an example of subaltern 
urbanism the New York Times published an article entitled Taking the ‘Slum’ out of 
Slumdog (Echanove and Srivastava, 2009: 21), which argues that squatter settlements need 
to be reassessed as complex and dynamic areas with many positive attributes. The writers 
laud Dharavi, the largest slum in Mumbai, with a host of important references to urban 
management and planning. With “a million eyes on the street” (from Jane Jacobs’ seminal 
work The Death and Life of Great American Cities), Dharavi is safer than most cities. It is a 
“million dollar economic miracle” with annual aggregate revenues in the settlement 
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amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. Its robust economy recycles the waste of the 
city and supplies food to its inhabitants. “Mixed use habitats” create goods for export all 
over the world. Seemingly surprised to find these positive qualities, journalist Simon Crerar 
(2010) writes of his tour through Dharavi: 
Instead of a neighbourhood characterized by misery, I find a bustling and enterprising place, packed 
with small-scale industries defying their circumstances to flourish amidst the squalor.  
Academics and professionals working in the built environment are also starting to 
acknowledge the positive attributes of squatter settlements. Several academics have noted 
the entrepreneurial quality embodied by these places (Nijman, 2010; Benjamin, 2008), 
while De Soto (2000) has infamously cast residents of squatter settlements as “heroic 
entrepreneurs.” Bayat (2007: 579) characterizes the “informal life” of squatters as flexible, 
pragmatic, and as a struggle for self-development. Architects like Teddy Cruz and Rem 
Koolhaas (despite widely different approaches to slums) have oriented their practices to the 
built environment of squatter settlements and emergent spaces. Cruz designs structures in 
Mexico to accommodate the inventiveness and precariousness of squatter residences and 
has designed public spaces in settlements to adapt to the informal activities that invariably 
take place there. Koolhaas, leading the Harvard “Project on the City” in Lagos, Nigeria, 
found an uncommon degree of invention, resourcefulness, and self-organization there. 
These discoveries spurred Koolhaas to say, “Lagos is not catching up with us. Rather, we 
may be catching up with Lagos” (as quoted in van der Haak’s film Lagos / Koolhaus, 
2003).  
Thoroughly, the admiration attendant to squatter settlements is related to the self-organized 
inventiveness stemming from their autonomy from the State apparatus, and this has 
increasing relevance beyond the proliferation of slums. Squatter settlements seemingly 
come together without any “master plan, urban design, zoning ordinance, construction law 
or expert knowledge” (Echanove and Srivastava, 2009: 21). Indeed, their self-organized 
and distributed complexity is believed to contribute to creativity, resourcefulness, and 
resilience. Squatter settlements are not produced by some hierarchical structure; rather they 
emerge through heterarchical self-organization; akin to a self-generated city. Attributes like 
self-reliance and autonomy from the State may be further in demand in cities of the Global 
South as governments increasingly adopt neo-liberal policies that shift the urban mode of 
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operation from a managerial to an entrepreneurial state (Brenner and Theodore, 2002; 
Swyngedouw, 2000). This shift entails fiscal conservatism and facilitates the enrolment of 
private enterprise in, amongst other things, essential service distribution. In turn, this 
appears to beckon increasing distance and autonomy between communities and individuals 
from the State. From this perspective, understanding how slums self-organize and achieve 
functionality while remaining autonomous or semi-autonomous from the State is a pressing 
concern.  
This thesis intends to contribute to the debate between slums as places of disease and 
dystopia or as places of creative self-organization by advancing incipient efforts 
(McFarlane, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c; Farias, 2010; Farias and Bender 2010) to bring 
assemblage theory to bear on critical Urban Studies as explained in the following chapter. 
The approach is particularly suited to advance the debate because of the importance of the 
relationship in assemblage theory between extensive reality and that which is possible. The 
ontological framework of assemblage theory stipulates that the possible, or the virtual 
world of potentiality, is a real but not extensive dimension of reality along with that which 
is actualized in metric space. Potential is understood as a play of various actors and 
processes in an historically unfolding arena, where power is not absolute but dispersed and 
derived from the interrelationship of components comprising the assemblage. The 
contingency of power relations is thus always subject to disassembly and realignment and 
this has a particularly important dimension in the consideration of urban inequalities of 
which slums are particularly subject. As McFarlane (2011a: 209), paraphrasing Li (2007) 
says,  
assemblage thinking is concerned with how different spatio-temporal processes are historically drawn 
together at a particular juncture and often made stable through the work of particular powerful actors, 
but can then be able to disperse or realign through contestation, shifting power relations or new 
contexts.  
Beyond engaging in a renewed debate between “slums of hope” and “slums of despair”, 
and beyond addressing challenges related to overgeneralization and fragmentation, the 
thesis engages with a broad range of research on slums and aspires to overcome several 
dualities that may limit a more accurate representation and understanding of slums.  
Research on slums can be broadly divided into two categories: those that examine and 
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engage with the large structures of society that are thought to cause slums through recurrent 
patterned arrangements, and those that are more concerned with the cultural forms and 
dynamics of individual or sets of slums. The former category is the oldest, having been 
initiated with research in Latin America in the 1970s with Gilbert (1970), Ward (1976), 
Portes (1979) and others working in Asia and Africa. This branch of research tapered out in 
the early 1990s as the large structures became more interesting to study rather than the 
physical slums themselves. Recently, however, these types of studies have become more 
prevalent with the rise of political economy (Harvey 1978), and in relation to globalization 
(Mahadevia, 2005), neoliberalism (Weinstein, 2008), housing policy (Burra, 2005), rights 
(Zérah, 2007), the evolving role of NGOs (Ramanath, 2005), and others. The second 
category of research on slums largely derives from postmodern sensibilities attuned to 
forms of identity and the politics inherent in slums, but certainly has older antecedents such 
as Pearlman (1979). Contemporary studies address gender (Sen, 2006; 2007; Saigal, 2008), 
caste (Ayyar and Khandare, 2007), ethnicity (Gruber et al. 2005), community (Chatterji, 
2005), and violence (Gupte, 2008), among other topics. Within these subsections of 
research on slums the thesis addresses several gaps such as the assemblage of local 
organizational components of participatory water provision services in Mumbai, the role 
muscle gangs play in a slum assemblage, and the spatial morphology of slums. 
While the above certainly does not represent an exhaustive survey of slum research, and 
while there is a broad spectrum of overlap between the two approaches to the study of 
slums, it is illustrative of a general tendency for research to focus on either micro or macro 
concerns or ontological divisions between structure and agency. Here, assemblage theory 
mitigates against these dualities. The slum assemblage under study is used as an analytic 
entry point to a set of sociospatial processes such as the production of land, the construction 
of hutments, the delivery of essential services and the performance of societal regulation. 
These processes are understood to take place through functional networks that are enacted 
in practice. These networks are not only made up of people, but also tools (like architecture 
and infrastructure), natural elements (like marshes and tidal movements), and expressive 
elements (like policy and legislation). These networks are not conceived of as flat, isolated, 
or stagnant. Rather, networks form a cluster that are joined at multiple nodes much like the 
shape of a rhizome: from which the name of this type of network derives: rhizomatic. A 
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nodal element in one network may thus enable that network, and constrain or enable the 
functions of other networks as well.  
Understanding a slum as a dynamic multidimensional network out of which emerge desired 
outcomes, rather than perceiving it a resultant formation of agenic groupings of society on 
the one hand or the effect of large overarching structures on the other, in fact bridges these 
two opposing perspectives. The network consists of actors that perform enabling or 
constraining actions affecting other actors, the sum of which constitutes the network. This 
perspective connects both overarching structures, such as government legislation allowing 
limited water access to certain squatter settlements in Mumbai, to small micro-movements 
of power, such as the hand that opens the valve of the local distribution network. In this 
way, the perspective I adopt in this dissertation attempts to bridge dualities of micro and 
macro, structure and agency, and human and non-human by identifying associations 
between multiple heterogeneous actors and networks. In so doing, I provide a more 
representative and holistic account of micro level movements and flows in association with 
macro level structures in a dynamic and complex system.  
1.4 Hypothesis, research questions and methodological considerations 
Despite inequalities and injustices actualized through semi autonomous processes in the 
settlement, I hypothesize that Ganesh Murthy represents a slum of hope where residents 
self-organize in creative ways to assemble basic necessities, such as homes and essential 
services, and create a unified community conducive to life-affirming relationships. To 
examine this hypothesis, I follow three main lines of inquiry. These are: first, to identify the 
functional components of the settlement-assemblage and trace their emergence and 
evolution in time; then, to map the constitutive associations inherent in the ordering of 
these components in and beyond the settlement; and third, to determine the components 
constraining and enabling effects on other components in the assemblage. As subsequent 
chapters demonstrate, taken as a whole my findings both corroborate and challenge my 
hypothesis. 
In the context of existing scholarship concerning slums, the adoption of assemblage theory 
to addresses these lines of inquiry represents a novel approach. In relation to critical Urban 
Studies the thesis adds to nascent scholarship of urban assemblages being conducted by 
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McFarlane (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2009), Farias (2010), and Farias and Bender (2010). 
Assemblage theory is relevant to the intellectual, representational, and political 
complexities inherent in the proliferation of slums in various ways. Assemblage theory 
emphasizes thick empirical description on the relationship between history and potential 
(McFarlane (2011c). A slum assemblage is structured by multiple logics that are bound in 
social hierarchies that assemble sociomaterials and hold them stable until new assemblies 
rupture and reassemble them along new trajectories. Slums are a multiplicity of becomings; 
becoming settlement, becoming livelihoods, becoming formal real estate, becoming 
constituencies. Assemblage theory examines the emergence of multiple becomings and 
recognizes the distributed agency inherent in the assembling of slums.  
To investigate the aforementioned lines of inquiry the methodological strategy addresses 
three perspectives from which data will be mined. These are: an historical perspective 
through which the settlement and its functional components emerged and evolved; an 
ethnographic political perspective in which local relations of power unfold; and a 
developmental perspective which stems from outside the settlement, yet plays an important 
role in the settlement’s existence. Therefore, to extract data relevant to the three 
perspectives I employ both quantitative and qualitative methods. Archival analysis of 
public records is employed to establish historical data and reveal information that people 
might be reluctant to discuss. A socioeconomic survey of a representative sample of the 
settlement identifies networked components of the assemblage and potential interview 
candidates. The survey also sketches the broad lines of the settlement’s socio economic 
composition and the nature of the built environment. Participant observation is employed to 
garner information that people may be reluctant to share and to create a network of 
informants in the settlement. Semi-structured interviews are performed to derive in-depth 
information from residents of Ganesh Murthy about functional components of the 
settlement assemblage and allow for comparisons across interviews. Informal 
conversational interviews are undertaken with residents to add detail to information gleaned 
from semi-structured interviews (particularly about illegal matters), and with non-residents 
including urban planners, politicians, real estate developers, and others to acquire a wide 
range of perspectives on various issues. Finally, various mapping techniques are employed 
to record and convey information about the built environment. The wide variety of 
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methodologies are chosen to triangulate the veracity of information and to compound their 
relative strengths while minimizing their respective weaknesses. 
1.5 Chapter contents 
The dissertation is divided into nine chapters including the introduction and conclusion. 
Following the introduction are the conceptual framework and methodology chapters. The 
former chapter lays out the intellectual perspective through which data is assembled and 
analysed. Basic ideas of space and society are considered before examining the tripartite 
Delezoguattarian ontology consisting of the virtual, intensive and actual realms of reality. 
The perspective advanced by Delueze and Guattari is based on ideals about emergence and 
organization gleaned from complexity theories, but applied to social science scenarios with 
political underpinnings. The chapter also treats at length the notion of assemblage and other 
useful concepts for understanding Ganesh Murthy Nagar. The methodology chapter 
describes the various data-collecting techniques I employ in the field as described above, 
including methodological considerations specific to network-oriented social studies. This is 
a reflective chapter that records the various successes and failures I encountered in 
gathering data, and addresses ethical considerations, and challenges encountered with 
language and translation.  
Following the methodology chapter is a context chapter based on primary and secondary 
sources. The context chapter historically establishes the potential for land as a leading 
virtual attractor that shapes the Mumbai’s form and the political economy of urban 
planning. Out of the desire for land, and the enabling and constraining associations that 
came thereof, several important patterns of behaviour are apparent, including the 
reclamation of land from the sea, the close connections between government and private 
real estate developers, and the consolidation of power over development in the state 
government. Out of this dynamic system emerged the Back Bay Reclamation Scheme, 
which reclaimed land in South Mumbai on and off for 150 years, such that its ultimately 
unfinished form attracted the first settlers to the nascent Ganesh Murthy.  
Following the contextual chapter are four chapters based on original data collection. 
Chapter V focuses on the social and spatial makeup of the settlement by charting its 
emergence and growth from a temporary camp for construction workers in the 1970s to its 
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present day manifestation as home to over 10,000 people. The chapter examines various 
intensive generative processes contributing to informal land reclamation and housing 
construction. These processes are examined for their resilient, adaptive and redundant 
qualities that have contributed to a fluid sense of space adaptable to changes in the dynamic 
system.  
Chapter VI investigates the historical emergence and consolidation of the settlement’s four 
main water municipal distribution systems. Government policies intent on engaging 
community participation are understood to have triggered the first formally organized 
social consistencies in the settlement. Together with political associations and working with 
the state’s porous bureaucracy, Ganesh Murthy’s water networks changed the State-design 
water distribution structure in kind and captured the potential of water. The emergent socio-
space within which the distributors operate is characterized as nomadic, moving in between 
and beyond residents of the settlement and the State apparatus, where both social strata are 
engaged but also kept at a distance. While the nomadic practices of the networks have been 
successful in procuring more water they also demonstrate unjust, disruptive and sometimes 
violent behaviour in leveraging their power, which ultimately fragments and weakens the 
settlement’s society as a whole.  
Chapter VII builds upon the previous chapter by investigating other municipal services in 
the settlement as well as various social consistencies that interact with service provision. 
Sewer creation and administration, alley paving, waste management services, and toilet 
block management have all come under the power of CBOs that were initiated to 
administer water distribution. Alongside these infrastructure-based organizations are 
various social consistencies, including muscle gangs that enable and constrain various 
functional components of the settlement. Over the 40-year history of the settlement power 
over services have become consolidated in the hands of a few CBO conglomerates that 
ultimately leave little opportunity for new social consistencies to form and challenge their 
unjust and inequitable practices.    
Chapter VIII investigates the effects of Mumbai’s Slum Rehabilitation Scheme on Ganesh 
Murthy Nagar. Since 1995, when the SRS was created, at least ten real estate developers 
have operated in the settlement. The chapter focuses on one such developer and the 
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processes it engaged with to enrol multiple government actors and fend off competing 
developers intent on redeveloping the site. Amidst the scramble of developers to capture the 
settlement, residents are caught in the violent, unjust, and fearful crossfire triggered by 
legislation ostensibly designed to improve their lives.  
The conclusion consolidates the narrative of Ganesh Murthy, which emerged from failed 
plans to reclaim land from the sea and evolved through the remarkable efforts of slum 
dwellers in semi-autonomous processes of self-organization. To this end, I first reflect on 
the outcome of the research, which both corroborates and challenges my original 
hypothesis. Finally, my key findings are summarized and I explore their implications for 











Conceptual Framework: The Settlement as an Assemblage of Component 
Parts
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 2.1 Introduction 
This thesis examines the emergence, organization, and socio-spatial morphology of a 
squatter settlement called Ganesh Murthy Nagar in Mumbai, India. Specifically, I analyse 
the ordering of self-organized groups, the systems they control within the settlement, and 
their associations with political and developmental processes outside the settlement. In so 
doing, I employ a conceptual framework based on the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix 
Guattari, that considers the squatter settlement as an ever-shifting assemblage of component 
parts. The employment of this conceptual framework signals the necessity of 
acknowledging the open and relational character of space, the heterogeneous character of 
society, and the recognition of the role of desire and power in micro level movements and 
flows in association with macro level structures.  
This chapter first locates the thesis in the academic discipline of Urban Studies (2.2) with 
emphasis on the critical nature of the investigation and demonstrates how assemblage 
thinking may contribute to current debates about cities and the possibility of producing 
more socially just, equitable, and sustainable relations. The second section (2.3) delves into 
the particulars of Deleuzoguattarian assemblages by describing the ontological precepts of 
the system. The final section explains various elements of assemblage theory (2.4) that are 
utilized by the thesis including is political disposition (2.4.1), the State apparatus and the 
nomadic war machine (2.4.2), the roles of components as content and expression (2.4.3), 
the material processes these roles play in terms of territorialisation and deterritorialization 
(2.4.4), and finally the expressive processes components engage with in terms of coding 
and decoding (2.4.5.).  
2.2 Critical Urban Studies 
Broadly speaking, this dissertation is concerned with the interface between space and 
society. In academia, space is traditionally treated under the purview of geographical 
scholarship, while notions of society have been explored to the fullest in the discipline of 
Sociology. This study, however, investigates space and society within both a narrower 
context of the city and a broader landscape that includes political associations, policy 
frameworks, economic necessities, technical infrastructural networks, and the roles various 
actors play in enabling a slum as a functional residential enclave. With so many 
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disciplinary strands coming together, the study is truly interdisciplinary. As such, while the 
thesis could theoretically be performed under the auspices of any number of academic 
disciplines, it is Urban Studies that is the most appropriate. This is because Urban Studies 
demonstrates an overarching trajectory towards space and society and is a catchall for a 
diverse array of approaches to study cities and thus accommodates many disciplinary 
threads.  
Within Urban Studies the thesis pursues a trajectory attendant to critical urban thought. 
Rather than approaching the city as a resultant formation derived from laws of social 
organization, economic efficiency, and bureaucratic rationality, critical urban theory 
understands the city as a medium and site of on going historically specific relations of 
power between various social groups that are politically and ideologically mediated 
(Brenner, 2009). The city thus regarded is subject to potential transformations, and critical 
urban thought not only evaluates current forms of knowledge and sociospatial relations but 
also offers alternative formations towards a more democratic, just, and sustainable city.  
Critical theory emerged from Enlightenment antecedents of critical approaches to our 
understanding of the universe and our position within it. The term “critical theory” was 
introduced by Max Horkheimer (1982 [1937]) as an alternative to positivistic notions of 
social science and bourgeois philosophy. The notion of self-perpetuating, but not 
inevitable, forms of knowledge was pursued by other members of the Frankfurt School 
including Theodor Adorno, Walter Benjamin, Herbert Marcuse, and later Jürgen Habermas. 
However, it was Karl Marx’s sustained critique of political economy in the 19th century that 
initiated critical inquiry in the social sciences (Brenner, 2009; Postone, 1993). Brenner 
(2009) identifies three important contributions Marx made to critical theory by first; 
exposing forms of power and unequal relations that are concomitant with social relations 
under capitalism, second; that these sociopolitical formations are on going and emergent, 
and third; that critique offered theoretical and practice based modes to explore and create 
alternatives to capitalism. These contributions are prominent in the urban Marxist accounts 
that started in the 1970s in the work of several leading critical urban theorists such as David 
Harvey, Manuel Castells, and Henri Lefebvre.  
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The Deleuzian strain of assemblage thinking I employ in the thesis, as McFarlane (2011a), 
Tampio (2009), and Bonata and Protevi (2004) have argued, is politically oriented and thus 
broadly applicable to the goals of critical urban theory. This is so not only because of 
Deleuze’s left-leaning political views, affiliations, and aspirations, but because of the 
character of the Deleuzian assemblage. At its most basic, this assemblage refers to a 
constellation of heterogeneous components and their reciprocal relations that are gathered 
into a functioning system. The roles that components play are based both on their inherent 
properties and their potential capacities through relations with other components. No 
central authority a priori dominates an assemblage, but reciprocal relations between 
components with various properties and their emergent capacities can lead to hierarchical 
structures and profoundly uneven relations. The creation, evolution, and dissolution of 
relations between various parts in an assemblage are inherently political processes as they 
pertain to the enabling and constraining of action. Thus, assemblage thinking is broadly 
applicable to the project of critical urban studies and the following section details 
particulars of Deleuzian assemblage theory and how it may contribute to current debates in 
critical urban theory.  
2.2.1 Assemblage in South Asia and globally  
My use of assemblage theory stems from the work of Gilles Deleuze (1994 [1968], 1992) 
and his work with Guattari (1980 [1988]). Deleuzoguattarian assemblages emerged in a 
European context in response to structuralist currents of thought, which broadly posit that 
human cultures may be understood in relation to overarching systems or “structures” that 
determine individual cultural elements but are distinct from observable reality. In contrast, 
assemblage theory hypothesizes that the relations between individual actors (including non-
human actors) constitute material-semiotic networks from which reality emerges through 
the performance of individual roles in the network. While some aspects of assemblage 
theory have gained currency in the social sciences, such as a move towards material 
heterogeneity and practice (Delanda, 2009 [2006]), the theory’s acceptance in Urban 
Studies continues to be keenly contested. An assessment of assemblage theory and its 
applicability to critical urban studies follows in the next section, but first I would like to 
address the appropriateness of adopting a European-based theoretical perspective in the 
contexts of a South Asian field study and in the changing functionality of global cities. 
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Increasingly, calls are being voiced in Urban Studies to base theory in more locally 
appropriate contexts (Varley, 2010; McFarlane, 2008; Roy, 2005; Dear, 2002). Indeed, as 
urban sociologist Douglas Massey (2001, as referenced in Roy, 2005: 147) points out, the 
growth of cities in developing nations is re-orienting Urban Studies from the Chicago and 
Los Angeles schools to Rio de Janeiro, Mumbai, and Hong Kong. The most pressing urban 
concerns are emerging in developing countries, and it is only reasonable to assume that 
paying attention to the transformations occurring in these cities can yield important and 
novel insights into how they function. The problem is, as Robinson (2002) demonstrates, 
western “global cities” (understood as command centres for global capitalism) are often 
held out as exemplars for Third World “megacities” (which are understood in terms of 
crisis).  
Rather than analysing Mumbai as a Third World city in need of Western solutions to 
various problems, I follow the scholars above in my desire to learn from a slum settlement 
in Mumbai to understand how self organization can produce land, housing, infrastructure 
and community. Assemblage theory, as examined in detail below, is predicated on the idea 
of self-organization and is thus highly germane to the overall aim of the thesis. Moreover, 
the robust empirical commitment to observe micro-forms of power and movement inherent 
to assemblage theory is marshalled to narrowly focus on the ground-level reality of the 
study site. This micro-level observational methodology may not only produce novel 
insights, but can also guard against the projection of outside values to a degree (the 
following chapter discusses this at greater length). The empirical commitment inherent to 
assemblage theory calls for an open inquiry into potentially complex processes that may 
defy pre-defined social groupings and their relationships. As Farias (2011: 367) says, 
“inquiring into the urban involves recognizing that we, urban students, often confront 
radically uncertain situations in which we don’t know what we are looking for until we find 
it.” The empirical commitment into exploratory research is a major component in the 
employment of assemblage theory in this thesis. Finally, in the absence of robust 
indigenous theories that endeavour to explain self-organizational processes that engage 
both social and spatial elements, assemblage theory provides a full-bodied conceptual 
framework for addressing the concerns of the thesis.  
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Alternative theories that were considered for the framework, such as political economy and 
urban informality (especially in its postcolonial formulations: e.g. Varley, 2010; Roy and 
AlSayyad, 2004), have been deployed successfully in, respectively, identifying uneven 
sociospatial relations, and addressing processes that occur outside the strictures of the State, 
both of which are important to this study. Concurrently, however, these theories exhibit 
certain limitations towards the stated aims of the thesis. Political economy is generally 
oriented towards overarching structures that affect the actions of individuals, and this focus, 
while being valuable in other contexts, may not address the micro forms of power that are 
at the heart of this study. Urban informality, as an organizing logic governing urban 
processes (Roy and AlSayyad, 2004), may consider micro-forms of power but may also 
reduce complex processes and ignore the heterogeneity of phenomena (Sindzingre, 2006). 
Further, while urban informality has moved beyond dualistic notions of the informal and 
formal (Roy and AlSayyad, 2004), studies have generally generated limited theoretical 
insight into how formal and informal phenomena may interact and affect each other.4 
Assemblage theory, by contrast, does theorize how the mixing of these two types of 
processes (in terms of State and nomadic tendencies) can affect one another. These 
theoretical insights, once applied to urban processes, may contribute to expanding the 
theoretical reach of urban informality. Contrarily, the use of nomadic and State tendencies 
(to be explained at length below) in the thesis to understand processes in Mumbai may 
appear forced at times in an urban context where informality is the rule. In the final 
analysis, all systems of thought have their limitations, and despite the origin of assemblage 
theory among Western thinkers, its use to observe and analyse the micro movements of 
heterogeneous actors may reveal hitherto overlooked aspects of reality that can inform 
indigenous theoretical models as well as the understanding of slum settlements already 
generated by other conceptual perspectives.  
Beyond South Asia, the study takes place in the context of contemporary efforts to address 
the complexity and fluid character of cities within global networks. Assemblage theories 
have been recently marshalled in attempts to circumvent an “urban impasse” (Thrift, 1993) 
                                                
4 I am speaking here on a purely theoretical level. Studies such as Roy’s (2009) work on urban planning in 
India have yielded important insights into how informal processes have been integrated into the planning 
apparatus.   
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that challenge more traditional ways of understanding urban change and struggle due to the 
increasing complexity, interconnectedness, and changing parameters of what constitutes the 
urban. Lefebvre’s (2003 [1970]) claim that urbanism is no longer limited to spatial 
constructs delimited by large-scale urban regions, but as a process occurs on a planetary 
scale, appears prescient forty years after his formulation. To approach the multi-scalar and 
slippery concept of the contemporary city what is called for is an historically oriented 
formulation of critical social theory informed by changing possibilities for critiques of post-
Fordist and post-Keynesian capitalism resulting from, 
geoeconomic restructuring, market-driven regulatory change (including both privatization and 
liberalization), the worldwide flexibilization/informalization of labour, mass migration, environmental 
degradation, global warming, the creative destruction of large-scale territorial landscapes and the 
intensification of polarization, inequality, marginalization, dispossession and social conflict at all 
spatial scales (Brenner et al., 2011: 226. See also Brenner, 2009; Harvey 2005; Albriton et al., 2001; 
Postone, 1999, 1993). 
Thus, the process of urbanization includes, but also extends beyond, growing metropolises 
and their suburban residential enclaves to include sociospatial transformation of smaller 
and less dense human settlements that are increasingly connected to city centres around the 
world through infrastructure networks, settlement patterns, investment patterns, and land-
use patterns. The choice of assemblage theory in this context is an attempt to conduct a 
rigorous empirical study on the micro-level performances of individual actors, and doing so 
in a fashion that may help to position these micro-movements in the context of evolving 
global socio, cultural, political, spatial and economic links.  
2.2.2 Assemblage as a new foundation for Urban Studies? 
As the above discussion indicates, the use of assemblage theory is not necessarily 
straightforward. Moreover, there is no one dogmatic conception of the theory, and its 
precepts and applicability to critical urban studies continues to be hotly contested. A recent 
debate in the journal City (2011, volume 15, issues 2-6) focusing on the applicability of 
assemblage thinking to critical urban studies provides the most current academic articles 
published on the subject. The critical issue at stake is the potential value of assemblage 
theory ontology to critical urban studies, which, as noted above, is informed by Marxist 
economic determinism and political economy.  
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The ontology informing assemblage theory posits reality as flat, with every phenomena 
being only a thing in itself and performing some role along a functional network together 
with other performing actors. As such, assemblage theory rejects the political economy 
notions that power is a resource deployed by a ruling class, and knowledge is an ideological 
construct that needs to be unmasked (Farias, 2011). Rather, assemblage theory is radically 
relational, positing that power and knowledge emerge from relational links between actors 
in a performative chain.  
Brenner, Madden, and Wachsmuth (2011), who argue against the applicability of 
assemblage ontologies to critical urban studies in City, do assert the value of assemblage 
theory’s empirical focus and inquiry into heterogeneous actors. Here (Brenner et al., 2011: 
231), assemblage functions within an overall political economy framework such as a 
“political economy of urban assemblages” and “assemblage as a methodological extension 
of urban political economy.” However, they stop short of endorsing assemblage theory 
ontology for not placing enough attention on context, which may lead to “naïve 
objectivism.” Specifically, they (2011: 234) argue, “it is essential to consider the political-
economic structures and institutions in which they [whatever materials are at issue] are 
embedded.” Farias (2011: 366), in his response to Brenner et al. (2011), counters that 
conceptual frameworks like political economy promote a naïve objectivism because they do 
not inquire into the ground-level nature of urban reality but instead claim privileged access 
to “real facts, structures and contradictions of urban life.”  
Farias mounts a strong defence of assemblage theory ontology along these oppositional 
lines but there nonetheless remain questions about the ability of assemblage theory to 
account for the “context of contexts” as advanced by Brenner et al. (2011). Addressing the 
wider context of a phenomenon is theoretically possible with assemblage theory, but 
because this means investigating the interactions of each actor involved in the various 
processes that contribute to the phenomenon there are cases where this is practically 
impossible. To wit, as I investigated the local networks that enable the squatter settlement’s 
infrastructure, there emerged historical and contemporary ties to municipal, state, national 
and international actors, and investigating all of these links rigorously proved to be 
logistically impossible. A further challenge would be trying to represent these links and the 
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breadth of networks in their entirety. Thus, one challenge I faced in employing assemblage 
theory became a question of where to draw the investigative line. If reality is indeed 
ontologically flat, with actors connected together in sprawling functional chains of action, 
judging what is and what is not important to the performative chain is not necessarily a 
straightforward process. In response to these challenges I moved away from the polemical 
view advanced by Farias and adopted a position akin to McFarlane’s (2011a: 204), wherein 
“assemblage… [is not] an outright contrast to the complex and varied history of debates on 
critical urbanism, including urban political economy, capital accumulation, inequality, and 
so on.”  
For example, McFarlane (2011a) invokes a cosmopolitan “imaginary” that emerges 
between the play of extensive reality and virtual possibility, which is sympathetic to the 
goals of critical urbanism in general and broadly similar to Herbert Marcuse’s (1968) 
dialectical approach and Lefebvre’s (1991) notion of “spaces of representation,” or 
“thirdspace” as Soja (1996) calls it, where complex ideas and symbolisations occur from 
the synthesis of “spatial practices” and “representations of space.” There are also other 
overlapping concerns between dialectical and assemblage thinking, which point to potential 
synergies. For example, David Harvey (2009) draws explicit connections between 
assemblage and Marx’s “method of moments,” where “moment” represents an intertwining 
of components to produce spatial arrangements. For Harvey (2009: 244), dialectical 
thinking embraces “coevolving ecological moments within what Lefebvre would call an 
‘ensemble’ or Deleuze an ‘assemblage’ of interactive processes” (as quoted in McFarlane, 
2011a: 211).  
Picking up, thus, on the mixing of heterogeneous ontologies, I have attempted to use 
insights from political economy and other conceptual frameworks to better explain certain 
processes, which could not be rigorously investigated due to logistical challenges. As 
McFarlane (2011c: 11) states, cities as assemblages are historically patterned through such 
forces as “legacies of colonialism and political economic investment and disinvestment, the 
exploitative work of the state in relations with predatory capital seeking land, or the work 
of imperial institutions like the World Bank or the IMF.” Acknowledging the verity of this 
statement, for the purposes of this thesis where processes in urban governance, political 
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patronage, and multilateral aid agreements, for example, play important if not paramount 
roles in the phenomenon under investigation, I relied on concepts from various conceptual 
perspectives to explain processes without engaging in the rigorous empirical investigation 
that assemblage methodology demands. This “black boxing” of certain processes demands 
a measure of ontological promiscuity, but the point here is not to pit modes of 
understanding and interpreting reality against one another, but to explore important 
phenomena as much as possible within whatever confines and limitations that are present. 
Assemblage thinking displays an openness towards accommodating the multi-scalar and 
slippery notions of urban processes and may thus contribute to alternative intellectual, 
representational, and political formulations to address the contemporary urban impasse. Its 
inherently political character makes it a viable platform to contribute to on going debates in 
the field of critical urban studies with a focus on identifying inequalities and injustices 
along a trajectory to produce a more democratic, just, and sustainable city. Towards this 
end I employ assemblage thinking not in an effort to displace political economy but to 
marshal a set of descriptive, analytical, methodological, and ontological orientations to 
formulate alternative understandings and solutions and thus add to insights already 
generated by traditional critical urban studies. The idea is not to proliferate existing 
distinctions between the micro and the macro, particular sites and wider contexts, and 
structure and agency, but to collapse these distinctions as much as logistically possible and 
empirically demonstrate how associations across time and space combine to form emergent 
relations that enable and constrain action, and to use this understanding as a basis for 
political thought and action (McFarlane, 2011c; Latour, 2005; Law, 2004). 
2.2.3 Assemblage urbanism 
Assemblage theory brings a set of descriptive, analytical, methodological, and ontological 
orientations that can contribute to furthering the goals of critical urban studies and engage 
with political economy in formulating novel intellectual, representational, and political 
responses to the contemporary urban impasse. Assemblage theory is increasingly used in 
the social sciences as a relational framework to refer to a broad array of issues including; 
processes of gathering, holding together, dispersion, and reassembling; evolving and 
emergent social dynamics; and distributed agency through social and material elements. 
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There is no one dogmatic conception of assemblage thinking and it is employed in various 
ways in critical urban theory. First, assemblage thinking is used as a descriptive lens of how 
things are assembled and transformed (Farías and Bender, 2009; McFarlane, 2008b; 
Swyngedouw, 2006; 2004; Gandy, 2005;). Thick empirical description may discover 
unexpected novelties in urban processes and in this way identify new possibilities for more 
just formations, rather than relying on assumptions of structurally causal relationships. 
Thus, for McFarlane (2011c) fine-grained description of the historical processes that lead to 
inequality and the potential for these processes to be otherwise may also contribute to ideas 
for how inequality may be contested and altered. In the context of slum research in 
Mumbai, fine-grained empirical description has the potential to expand our knowledge into 
the ground-level reality of slum dwellers that very often seems to take a back seat to the 
overarching processes that are thought to cause the ground-level reality. Recently, calls to 
this affect have come from various researchers studying women’s lived experience in slums 
(Sen, 2006; 2007; Saigal, 2008), water infrastructure (Zerah, 2008), and toilet blocks in 
slums (McFarlane, 2008) for example. The same can be said for a number of issues that this 
thesis contributes to including: the experience of Mumbai’s slum dwellers in terms of 
housing policy (O’Hare et al.1998; Patel et al. 2003; Mukhija, 2001; 2003), community 
organization (Bhide, 2009; Khandare, 2008), and vote bank politics (Benjamin, 2008; 
Edelman and Mitra, 2007).  
Second, assemblage thinking is used as an idea or analytic of relations between objects that 
make up our world. This conception can decentre the city as an object (Farías, 2009) and 
place emphasis instead on the interaction of multiple consistencies and flows such as 
between social groupings and technical networks for example (Graham and Marvin, 2001). 
In this thesis the notion of “slum” is decentred and deconstructed into the identification of 
functional component parts and their interactions. Assemblage here, thus goes beyond 
investigation into one component of a slum (for example: gangs (Weinstein, 2008), NGOs 
(Ramanath, 2005, Desai and Preston, 2000), infrastructure (Zérah, 2008)) to understand 
how various components may come to affect one another.  
 Third, assemblage thinking is employed as a methodological orientation to objects as a 
way of thinking through the social, political, and economic processes involved in 
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composition with a focus on “practice, materiality and emergence” (McFarlane, 2011b, see 
also 2011a). Finally, the ontological assumptions employed by assemblage thinking 
reconfigure traditional assumptions about space and society.  
The city can no longer be understood as a spatially delimited region as it was by Marxist 
approaches, which treat space as discretely bounded regional entities divided into local, 
regional, national, and global categories (Smith, 2003a). As Massey (2005) argues, such 
interpretations of space have traditionally had difficulty in accounting for the significance 
of space by understanding it in terms of closures and partitions. Instead, I follow several 
contemporary theorists (e.g. Smith, 2003b; Amin and Thrift, 2002; Sassen, 2000) in 
understanding the city as an open system composed of movements and flows of matter and 
energy through interconnected networks. However, these networks are not conceived as 
being two-dimensional and stagnant, but rather as rhizomatic inter-weavings in topological 
space. The term rhizomatic stems from its biological referent, a rhizome, as a type of 
rootstalk from which roots and shoots issue forth from nodes. Deleuze and Guattari’s use of 
the term describes a non-hierarchical system with multiple inputs and outputs derived from 
a plethora of ambiguous connections that defy representations of linear causality. 
Rhizomatic systems may be contrasted with arboreal systems that rely on dualist categories 
and binary choices. A rhizome has no point of origin, but is always in medias res, and 
issues forth nomadically like a body of water that exploits fissures or gaps to spread out and 
occupy available space.  
The notion of topological space is derived from mathematical models that facilitate 
definitions of connectedness, convergence, and continuity. Michel Serres, in conversation 
with Bruno Latour (1995: 60) gives an explanation of what topological space could be: 
If you take a handkerchief and spread it out in order to iron it, you can see in it certain fixed distances 
and proximities. If you sketch a circle in one area, you can mark out nearby points and measure far-off 
distances. Then take the same handkerchief and crumple it by putting it in your pocket. The two distant 
points are now suddenly close, even superimposed. If, further, you tear it in certain places, two points 
that were close can become very distant. This science of nearness and rifts is called topology, while the 
science of stable and well-defined distances is called metrical geometry. 
To investigate extensive topological space requires understanding the emergence and 
evolution of territories from the ground level perspective of practices that engage in spatial 
formation, rather than solely from macro-level spatial mechanics (Amin, 2007). This is a 
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relational approach to space that emphasizes the agency of local spatial practices (Massey, 
2005).  
The city thus regarded is an open and non-linear system that is subject to the circulation of 
movements along a spectrum of local to global connections like economic flows, cultural 
influences, communications and transportation networks, the flux of humans, animals and 
plant life, and populated by virtual political spheres in the form of international 
organizations (Amin, 2007)5. As such, processes and tendencies associated with 
globalization circulate through many of the city’s networks, shaping space, policy, 
demographics, economic circuits, and social practices. These multiple flows push and pull 
the city from states of equilibrium to states far from equilibrium, and back again. This 
movement is characteristic of non-linear systems, “in which there are strong mutual 
interactions (or feedback) between components” (Delanda, 1997: 14). The set of practices 
that analyse non-linear systems, whether non-organic, organic, or social, are known 
variously as complexity theory, and it is complexity theory on which Deleuze based his 
theory of assemblage starting with Repetition and Difference in 1968.  
In terms of ontological assumptions about society, traditional understandings posits a 
separation or irreconcilable difference between humans and other components making up 
our extensive reality. However, I follow the call of Deleuze and Guattari, and others such as 
Latour (2005), Law (2004), Delanda (2002), and Haraway (1991a) to challenge this notion 
that the social is the exclusive domain of humans. Instead, this thesis understands the social 
as a set of associations that connects humans, natural actors and forces, objects, and 
expressive elements in their construction of space and society. For example, our use of 
tools is a defining feature of the human species and as such cannot be considered as 
separate from the social (Latour, 1993; Deleuze, 1988). Humans and their tools are not only 
situated in, but affect and are affected by the natural environment, which includes natural 
forces and animals, (Margulis, 1988) in a “symbiosphere” (Amin and Thrift, 2002 [2009]: 
78). Finally, expressive elements like discourse, knowledge, legislation and institutions 
play an ordering and generative role in human societies by constraining and enabling 
                                                
5 I follow Bonata and Protevi, 2004; Allen, 1997; and Delanda, 1997 in understanding the city as a non-linear 
system.  
 50 
relations of power (Foucault, 1979, 1978). As such, the city must be understood as 
composed of heterogeneous sociomaterials that are interconnected in an open and 
integrated system. Understanding the city as a sociomaterial system that is open to global 
and other flows of material and energy has the potential to better represent contemporary 
urban processes and can thus contribute to critical urban debates about thinking and acting 
in political ways towards more just and sustainable cities.  
2.3 Deleuzoguattarian ontology 
The ontology of Deleuze and Guattari is process-oriented and, in conjunction with the 
overall aim of their philosophical project, is directed towards individuation; that is, 
understanding entities as singular individuals (Deleuze, 1993; 1956). Deleuze approaches 
the problematic of individuation differently from systems of universal knowledge (e.g. 
Aristotle’s essences) where individuals are not knowable as such, but become intelligible 
only through a set of abstract common predicates. Representational thought similarly 
apprehends the individual through a series of rational classifications moving from the most 
general categorizations to the more specific. The problem with these systems of universal 
knowledge and representation is that beings are reduced to concepts – that which is 
intelligible through rational categorization – while the individual, as such, remains 
unintelligible (Deleuze, 1968).  
To properly apprehend an individuated entity Deleuze reverses the traditional metaphysical 
relationship between identity and difference where difference is a product of identity. In 
actuality, no two things are ever truly the same and thus identity is an effect of difference. 
As Deleuze (1956, 32) says:  
If philosophy has a positive and direct relation to things, it is only insofar as philosophy claims to 
grasp the thing itself, according to what it is, in its difference from everything it is not, in other words, 
in its internal difference. 
However, in establishing difference as a generative concept, Deleuze’s ontology must avoid 
locating that which precedes individuation as another form of identity, or the classical 
understanding of difference, which is itself based on identity.  
To account for the generation of individuals without recourse to identity Deleuze posits a 
tripartite ontological system consisting of the virtual, the intensive, and the actual. As such, 
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individuated or stabilized entities/systems in the actual realm stem from a multiplicity of 
immanent potentialities in the virtual realm, which are individuated through intensive 
processes. Being, thus understood, maintains univocity (i.e. that the virtual, intensive, and 
actual are all real), and is not only productive of reality, but creative in the sense that the 
actual is novel: the individuated result of a unique set of conditions. The following sections 
examine the tripartite ontology.  
2.3.1 The Virtual 
The virtual is a realm of pure potentialities and thus a real, but not extensive, multiplicity of 
differences. In a sense, it works as a mechanism to allow Deleuze to claim that difference 
precedes identity. The virtual does not stem from computer-generated “virtual reality,” but 
from Proust’s conception of constancy in the present and the past: that which is "real 
without being actual, ideal without being abstract" (Proust as quoted in Deleuze, 1968: 
28). In terms of its application to social systems, the virtual may be thought of as the near 
infinite potentiality given within a concrete system.  
The virtual realm is a multiplicity. That is, it is composed of a number of dimensions, but is 
not subject to an extrinsic ordering dimension (Delanda, 2002). Thus, ordering is an 
emergent property of the dynamical system, rather than being something imposed from 
outside. Multiplicities function in a non-metric space that is immanent to physical space by 
defining spontaneous tendencies for intensive processes to generate organization, which 
result in physical space. Importantly, this means that virtual multiplicities are independent 
of the processes that order metric space. For example, Delanda (2002) describes two 
different thermodynamic processes, which lead to a crystalline shape in salt and the 
spherical shape of a soap bubble. Despite the processes being different, what they share in 
common is a movement towards energy minimalization: and it is at this level of abstraction 
that the virtual realm operates. While this level of reality may be apprehended in a 
laboratory or through mathematical modelling, in a social setting the complexity of the 
system overwhelms any current investigative mechanism (Delanda, 2006).  
Therefore, although we cannot formally investigate the virtual realm because of the 
inherent complexity of a social system, it can be apprehended in social terms as local 
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tendencies that create spaces of potentiality, and in this way influence the behaviour of a 
system (Srnicek, 2007). As such, social, political, economic, and other contexts must be 
taken into account when analysing how Ganesh Murthy emerged as a functional system to 
focus the behaviour of the urban milieu. These contextual factors are vast, and include 
elements such as the influx of migrants, availability of land, materials, jobs, policy 
frameworks, and other social, economic and political processes as well. The point is to 
identify tendencies in the system that allow not for infinite possibility but for more 
narrowly defined probability.  
2.3.2 The Intensive 
The intensive realm takes its cue from virtual probabilities by translating from the virtual to 
the actual, but it is also always determined by extensive reality. The individuation of 
entities is accomplished through intensive morphogenetic processes that generate 
convergences and divergences in the system. That is, a system, such as Ganesh Murthy, 
both acquires detail through the congealing of component parts, and moves in one direction 
rather than another through discontinuous transitions as it unfolds in time (Delanda, 2002).  
Intensive processes may be generative and produce consistencies through repetitive 
processes that are motivated by desire in the presence of attractors. These consistencies are 
“networks of bodies that preserve the heterogeneity of the members even while enabling 
systematic emergent behaviour” (Bonata and Protevi, 2004: 15). An attractor must be 
thought of along two lines. First, an attractor exists in the virtual realm (where it is 
technically called a singularity) as a potential; such as the potential for land, the potential 
for a home, the potential for water. In the intensive realm, an attractor, as it gains 
consistency through repeated acts motivated by the presence of the singularity, may be 
thought of as an emergent pattern of behaviour. Examples of consistencies in the social 
register include non-formalized aggregates like gangs, bands, and movements. The first 
settlers of Ganesh Murthy are considered to have formed a consistency brought about by 
the intensive processes of moving to the settlement in conjunction with constructing shelter. 
Consistencies do not impose order on socio-materials, rather they are self-ordering and may 
thus generate novel situations and structures. Intensive processes are identified as linked 
rates of change between processes. For example, the rate of immigrants coming to the 
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nascent settlement is linked to the production of land, which is linked to the production of 
hutments. The rate of change in the population may also be linked to the procuring of 
services, which may be linked to other intensive processes. 
As consistency emerges, or as Deleuze (1994: 190) phrases it, during the “condensation of 
singularities,” the system concurrently experiences discontinuous transitions from one 
increasingly stable state to another. At critical thresholds the system changes in kind – a 
becoming (Bonata and Protevi, 2004: 15) – and through this process individuation emerges. 
However, the intensive state is far from equilibrium, with various forces pushing and 
pulling elements of the system towards different sets of attractors. As such, it is extremely 
sensitive to its environment and a slight change can send the system off in another, 
unexpected direction, which is called a bifurcation or line of flight. Following a line of 
flight, new lines of ordering usually re-configures consistencies. However, an absolute line 
of flight can also occur, such as a complete demolition of the settlement, which would send 
the multiplicity back to the virtual realm of potentials, and thus the creation of a whole new 
set of attractors and bifurcations (Bonata and Protevi, 2004). 
2.3.3 The Actual 
The actual is the realm of reality that has reached some state of equilibrium, and thus has 
extensive properties in metric space. It follows from processes of individuation through the 
realms of the virtual and singularity-attractors, and the intensive realm of consistencies and 
bifurcations. It is also the realm of stabilized identities that act in the intensive realm and 
shape potentials in the virtual realm. Deleuze and Guattari (1980) refer to the actual as the 
“system of the strata.” 
Strata are dominating systems where one body is put to work by another in a fixed 
hierarchy. Thus, strata include individual humans, land, and hutments, where components 
are organized in a hierarchical system. Strata also refer to more explicitly political systems 
of power and desire, such as hierarchical systems for delivering infrastructural services in a 
slum. The implication is that a certain order has been instilled into the component parts of 
the object – the roof of the hutment supported by the walls, or the pumps supplying water 
to the pipes of the water network. Although strata are considered to be at equilibrium, it is 
important to note that an individual or social system is always subject to change given that 
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they never exist in isolation, but are always connected and open to other actors, networks, 
and other attractors. Stabilized strata are tangible manifestations of the self-organization 
inherent in the slum assemblage as it functions to establish equilibrium between various 
forces. Keeping this in mind, it is important to stress the historical becoming of various 
strata from consistencies, and the unfolding of alliances and divisions as sociospatial 
structures are made to cohere. The following section specifies how this may function by 
examining various facets of the concept of assemblage.  
2.4 Assemblage 
2.4.1 Politics 
An assemblage refers to a constellation of heterogeneous parts and their reciprocal relations 
that are gathered into a functioning system. The strata of individuals, hutments, and 
infrastructures, nascent social consistencies, and intensive processes, all constitute 
components of the slum assemblage. Relations between components are called relations of 
exteriority (Delanda, 2009) and this denotes a degree of autonomy between components 
due to their inherent properties, which allows them to be theoretically plugged into and out 
of various assemblages. However, components are also defined by their potential 
capacities, which are only realized in association with other components. Various 
components enable or constrain the potential capacity of those they are associated with. It is 
these relations of exteriority that allow for emergent relations to form, which “enables 
focused systematic behaviour through constraining the action of component parts” (Bonata 
and Protevi, 2004; 32). An assemblage may thus be thought of as a type of machine 
composed of heterogeneous materials that engage in processes of assembly.  
The creation and dissolution of relations between components is an inherently political 
process, as it pertains to the enabling and constraining of action. Analyzing an assemblage 
as a political body proceeds along two axes (Bonata and Protevi, 2004). The first is an 
ethical axis whereby the assemblage is either life affirming, or life destroying. The second 
axis is structural with strata occupying one pole and consistencies occupying the other. 
Bonata and Protevi (2004) point out that it is important not to identify the structural 
ordering of an assemblage with an a priori moral judgment. Stratification is “beneficial in 
many regards” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1980: 40), and consistencies are not necessarily 
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ethically praiseworthy. Stratification is necessary if only to provide some stability from 
which new emergent forms of creativity can arise. Ultimately, these judgments must be 
made empirically.  
2.4.2 The State apparatus and the nomadic war machine 
The slum assemblage operates outside the State apparatus initially in terms of permissions, 
plans, and rights. The State operates through functions of interiority, as “sovereignty only 
reigns over what it is capable of interiorizing, of locally appropriating" (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 445). The essential function of the State is thus to capture or appropriate 
that which is outside it. "The State, in effect, is inseparable from a process of capture of all 
kinds of flows; of populations, commodities or commerce, money or capital" (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 479). To effect capture the State overcodes elements outside it, and 
stratifies or segments these elements to better control them.  
Existing outside the State is the nomadic war machine. Deleuze and Guattari's notion of 
nomadism derives from cross-cultural references to nomadic peoples from 
multidisciplinary perspectives such as mythology, anthropology, literature, and history of 
sciences. The term refers to that which is unfixed, ambulatory, peripatetic, wandering and 
in a relatively constant state of motion. Nomadism may also be associated with that which 
is Other (Bogue, 2010). Nomads have an affinity with the line of flight, which manifests in 
the collapse of segmentation and the flourishing of creativity, because "it is along lines of 
technological flight that they invent new weapons to oppose those of the state" (Patton, 
1984: 66). Nomadism is thus associated with the war-machine, a term which generally 
denotes that which is outside the State, or Other to it. "In every respect, the war-machine is 
of another species, another nature, another origin than the State apparatus" (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1987: 436). Through creative lines of flight the nomadic war machine wages 
violence against the State to maintain an existence outside of it. The State itself, also 
articulates a structural violence against nomadism through juridical, regulatory, capture, 
and penal institutions. Deleuze and Guattari, through the writings of Carl von Clausewitz, 
assert that absolute war as a pure idea is without a political dimension, intending only the 
destruction of the enemy. As such it is outside of the State, which seeks to capture and 
interiorize it. Rather than following strict taxonomic definitions of nomadism, however, 
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Deleuze and Guattari utilize the term along with “State apparatus” to articulate contrasting 
tendencies and practices of mobility and stasis that manifest in different forms and which 
have different inherent logics.  
The terms nomadism and State apparatus are real tendencies, but only manifest in mixtures. 
Nomadic relationships with the State involve "complex relations of dependence, resistance, 
and accommodation with contiguous states" (Bogue, 2010: 174).  Nomadic society may not 
be organized around hierarchical class distinctions, although the centralization of power in 
a nomadic society increases in proportion to their interactions with the State. Inversely, 
State societies that interact with nomadic tribes are found to exhibit nomadic tendencies 
and trajectories. As Bogue (2010: 175) says, “the peripatetic populations that roam state 
societies and escape their regulation are functional components of those societies, not 
extrinsic exceptions to their control."  
Foremost of nomadic traits is its relationship to space due to its ambulatory existence. 
However, beyond mere motion, which is shared by migrants and itinerants, what is 
paramount is the relationship to the space being occupied, which is focused on the journey 
across space itself, rather than the destination. Nomadic space is deterritorialized, not 
because nomads do not have a territory (which they do), but because they distribute being 
across an open and indefinite space. The model for this notion of nomadic space is derived 
from pastoral nomads whose flocks occupy a territory to the extent of their capacity as they 
fluidly spread out over terrain, rather than occupying a territory that is limited by discreet 
borders. The relationship to space is open-ended without enclosures, fluidly composed of 
movement and rest. This is smooth space, as opposed to State-associated striated space 
which is measured, oriented, and divided, and has paths from one enclosure to another. 
Smooth space is rhizomatic: directionless but characterized by a multiplicity of local 
directions. "Striated space closes a surface, divides it up at determinate intervals, 
establishes breaks, whereas a smooth space involves distribution across a surface, by 
frequency or along paths (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 600). Nomads have an active 
relationship to smooth space, not only inhabiting it, but creating it through the war 
machine: "The nomad makes the desert no less than he [sic] is made by it" and the war-
machine is "the constitutive element of smooth space, of the occupation of such a space, 
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displacement on it and the corresponding composition of groups of men [sic]: this is its 
sole, true positive objective (i.e. nomos). To increase the dessert..." (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1987: 473 and 519).  
Historically, the State apparatus in Mumbai addressed nomadic slum assemblages along 
absolute lines of flight toward eradication. However, in the early 1970s, the State adopted 
measures meant to reterritorialize slums: to overcode their existing identities outside of the 
State and stabilize order through processes of stratification. These measures included 
codifying certain slums as “notified” and operationalizing limited rights of existence. Later, 
measures were created to provide formal infrastructure to slums, and later still policies were 
adopted to redevelop slums into formally managed and constructed communities. While the 
State apparatus plays a large role in attempts to order the nomadic slum assemblage, it is 
important to note that other components of the slum may engage in ordering processes. In 
order to elaborate, consolidate, and concretize ideas of ordering, the following sections will 
describe the roles component parts of an assemblage may play, as well as elaborating on the 
idea of territorialization and coding.  
2.4.3 Content and expression 
The variable roles a component part may play in an assemblage range between the poles of 
content and expression, which refer to degrees of materiality. Taking the slum assemblage 
as an example, content would refer to the geographical location of the slum, natural 
resources like the sea or the mangrove forest, elements of the built environment like 
hutments and infrastructure, and the human bodies that inhabit the space. Expressive roles 
encompass written and spoken communication like a notice posted advising of an 
impending demolition, or the way someone from Uttar Pradesh speaks Hindi. However, 
expressive roles go beyond linguistic signs to include expressions communicated by bodily 
actions, the manner in which something is uttered, and modes of behaviour. Examples of 
these might be the mocking of or cheering for a politician, or certain regional 
gesticulations.  
The roles a component play are variable and may be material and/or expressive depending 
on what capacities of the component are being exercised. For example, a water network 
functioning in a slum not only supplies water, a material role, but acts expressively, 
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communicating the identity of the politician that funded the network for example, and the 
power of the local administrator who operates the network. It is important to note that 
expressive roles not only carry meaning, but act in an assemblage as well, thus putting them 
on an ontological par with material roles.  
2.4.4 Territorialization and deterritorialization  
Material roles of component parts may engage in processes that territorialize or 
deterritorialize, and this dimension is considered the “driving mechanism within 
assemblages” (Legg, 2009: 238). These concepts respectively refer to processes that 
increase or decrease the material identity, stability, and homogeneity of a system. Thus, 
territorialization and deterritorialization may apply to consistencies, assemblages, and 
strata. Any one of these that is recognized as having a discreet identity, must have some 
degree of territorialization. Further, lines of ordering and striated space are related to 
territorialization, while lines of flight and smooth space are associated with 
deterritorialization.  
As Delanda (2006) suggests, territorialization has literal and metaphorical dimensions. 
Territorialization must be literally understood as the creation or sharpening of spatial 
boundaries of actual territories. The creation of national, state, or municipal borders is an 
example of literal territorialization, while the dissolution or smudging of borders 
deterritorializes identity. Territorialization may also refer to non-spatial processes that 
increase the internal homogeneity of an assemblage. Sorting and segregation processes 
territorialize by respectively classifying individuals and creating group identities or 
memberships, and increasing ethnic or racial homogeneity. As Delanda (2006: 13) 
demonstrates, communication devices, such as the postal service, mobile phones, or the 
internet play a deterritorializing role by blurring the boundaries of regional space by 
negating the need for co-presence. However, it must also be noted that these same devices 
may territorialize a network space, stabilizing relations across interpersonal networks.  
2.4.5 Coding and decoding 
Whereas territorialization and deterritorialization are operationalized by the material roles 
of component parts, coding and decoding pertain to the expressive dimension of 
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components and similarly stabilize or destabilize a system. Coding and decoding are 
realized through two special expressive media, genes and language, however, only the latter 
is germane to this thesis. Further, the thesis will draw mainly upon written communication 
because the materiality of the expression facilitates analysis. Coding is encountered often in 
processes of stabilization and destabilization of various systems operating in the settlement. 
First, the settlement itself is coded and overcoded in various instances by governmental 
agencies in attempts to reterritorialize the assemblage as part of State apparatus. Second, 
various consistencies within the settlement also become codified in law to facilitate certain 
pragmatic functions, such as infrastructure provision. Consistencies and strata in the 
settlement may attempt to overcode competing operational strata to deterritorialize these 
systems and reterritorialize them under their own identity.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Analysing Ganesh Murthy Nagar as a slum assemblage requires an understanding of the 
city as an open non-linear system, where movements and flows of energy and material 
contribute to the virtual potentialities from which the settlement becomes individuated and 
actualized through intensive processes. Rural to urban migration, acknowledgment of cities 
as economic drivers, and uneven economic distribution are all examples of well-researched 
macro-level flows that continue to effect the development of slums. However, this thesis, in 
adopting an assemblage approach, seeks to understand how and why particular sets of 
sociomaterial actors emerge and combine to produce inequitable and unjust sociospatial 
relations and further, how these relations may be reconfigured. This requires not only an 
investigation of macro-level flows and structures, but also ground-level empirical and 
ethnographic analysis of the micro movements and flows of desire and power that translate 
and actualize macro-level forces in the settlement. The next chapter details the 























Based on an empirical case study, this thesis aims to understand how inequalities and 
injustice emerge and continue to evolve in Ganesh Murthy Nagar by examining the 
emergence, organization, and socio-spatial morphology of the settlement. The objectives of 
the investigative portion of the thesis are threefold: to identify the functional components of 
the settlement-assemblage and trace their emergence and evolution in time; to map the 
constitutive associations inherent in the ordering of these components in and beyond the 
settlement; and to determine the component’s constraining and enabling effects on other 
components in the assemblage. These three investigative objectives contribute to the 
politically oriented analytical objective of the thesis, which is to understand how unjust and 
inequitable relations in the settlement emerged and evolved through autonomous and semi-
autonomous processes, and how these relations may be reordered. As such, the methods for 
collecting data must address three domains in which relevant data exists: there is an 
historical domain through which the settlement and its functional components emerged and 
evolved; an ethnographic and micro political domain in which local relations of power 
unfold; and a macro political and developmental perspective with connections to forces 
originating outside the settlement. The methods described in this chapter are thus chosen to 
collect data from these three domains and to triangulate information to establish its 
veracity. 
Before elaborating upon the specific methodologies employed in the investigation, a 
justification for the choice of study site is put forward along with a description of its 
location (3.2). This is followed by a discussion of methodological particularities germane to 
the conceptual framework adopted by the thesis (3.3), which feeds into the duration of the 
field research and the identification of a key informant (3.4), The remained of the chapter 
examines specific methodologies employed to prove the accuracy of the hypothesis, namely 
that Ganesh Murthy is a slum of hope where self-organization yielded basic necessities and 
produced life-affirming relationships between residents (3.5). The methodologies include: 
archival research (3.5.1), a socioeconomic survey (3.5.2), semi-structured interviews 
(3.5.3), informal conversational interviews (3.5.4), mapping techniques (3.5.5) participant 
observation (3.5.6), and a discussion on triangulation of methods (3.5.7). Following the 
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elaboration of each methodology, which includes its sample design and questions pursued, 
is an assessment of ethical considerations and a discussion of the importance of recognizing 
my positionality in the field (3.6). The chapter concludes with a brief examination of the 
inherent pitfalls of relying on a translator while doing cross-cultural research and 
mechanisms adopted to mitigate against these difficulties (3.7). 
3.2 Criteria and location of study site. 
Ganesh Murthy Nagar was chosen as the field site for this research for three main reasons. 
Its population of roughly 11,000 people is amenable to be studied by one individual. By 
contrast, many larger slums in the city, like Dharavi with 1.5 million people, pose logistical 
difficulties for study. Secondly, the settlement is roughly 40 years old, which allows for the 
possibility of interviewing original settlers of the community to establish oral histories and 
the tracing of substantial historical trajectories. Finally, because of the age of the 
settlement, its relative stability due in part to its location on state land6, and the continuing 
growth of the settlement, the historical evolution of the settlement is apparent in the built 
environment, giving access to fundamental emergent processes such as land reclamation, 
incremental building techniques, and infrastructure development. 
Ganesh Murthy Nagar is located according to several spatial overlays. It is politically 
situated at Civic Survey Number 658 of municipal Ward ‘A’ of Mumbai (Figure 3.1). 
Historically, it is situated in Block VI of the Back Bay Reclamation Scheme (Figure 3.2). 
Geographically, it is located at the south western tip of Mumbai’s peninsula and is 
surrounded by a military base known as Navy Nagar to the South, and a proposed helipad, a 
luxury condominium construction site, a Brihanmumbai Electrical Supply and 
Transportation company (BEST) bus station, and two other squatter settlements to the 
North. To the East of the settlement lies a road named Prakesh Pethe Marg, while a marsh 
bordering the Arabian Sea lies to the settlement’s West (Figure 3.3). The roughly 5.4 
hectares of land on which the settlement lies, is owned by the state government (TARU-
WEDC, 2006), and is colloquially divided into four sections, Parts I, II, III, and III 
Backside.  
                                                
6 Historically and presently slums located on state land are more apt to be protected from demolition as 
compared to slums located on land owned by the municipal or national governments. This is further explained 
in Chapter V. 
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Figure 3.1 Map of Mumbai showing wards and position of Ganesh Murthy Nagar 
Source: Google Maps and author 
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Figure 3.2 1967 Development Plan  
Source: Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation 
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Figure 3.3 Map of Ganesh Murthy and surrounding area 
Source: Google Maps and author 
3.3 Methodological considerations 
Analysing the settlement as an assemblage posits the existence of functional components 
that constrain and enable other components from which the settlement and social and 
material organization emerges. As demonstrated in Chapter II, these components may be 
understood as networks of actors that perform associations. Yet, tracing these networks and 
their associations with other networks may pose difficulties. Some networks are stratified 
systems that are relatively easy to identify, but investigating the associations between 
constituent actors may be difficult due to a process of punctualization, where actors and the 
performance of their associations become hidden from view. Other networks of the 
assemblage may be mere consistencies, and thus less territorialized, less apparent, and less 
readily identifiable. Still other networks may once have existed but have subsequently 
become subsumed in other networks or have followed an absolute line of flight, and thus 
once again difficult to identify and investigate.  
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To aid in the identification and investigation of various component parts throughout the 
settlement’s historical trajectory I draw upon methodologies developed by practitioners of 
actor network theory (ANT). Actor network theory evolved from science studies and 
follows a material-semiotic method, making its methodological application germane to this 
study. According to Bruno Latour (2005, 31-34), one of the founders of ANT, various 
functional systems may leave traces of their existence and Latour lists four such traces. 
Networks, whether in the form of strata or consistencies, or those no longer having a form, 
may have spokespersons that speak on behalf of the group. This may be the ‘recruiting 
officer,’ but it may also simply be a talkative person. The spokesperson may define the 
present grouping and describe its past and present form, as well as its potential trajectories 
into the future. Second, for every network there are, at least in theory, anti-networks, where 
the boundaries of one network are defined in relation to others that negate the possibility of 
the first system’s co-existence. This leads to a third trace that refers to the forming and 
stabilization of definitional boundaries. The network’s spokespeople are actively engaged 
in continuing to define the group, whether through invoking anti-systems, law, tradition, or 
other means. Finally, academics, researchers, journalists and other people who nominally 
stand outside the network record traces of network formation and their developing 
characteristics, which may in itself, contribute to the existence of the network. 
Following the identification of networks and aiding in their investigation is Latour’s (2005, 
12) maxim “to follow the actors themselves.” This phrase has both structural and 
interpretive meanings. Actors are connected in the network through their associations and 
following the actor implies that one actor will lead to another. It is imperative to follow the 
chain of actors to create an accurate representation of the network: “just follow the trails 
myopically,” muses Latour (2005, 176). The interpretive meaning of “following the actor” 
refers to allowing the actor to define their reality without, as much as possible, 
superimposing meaning onto their worldview (Latour, 2005, 23). Actors may be fully 
aware of their performance in the network, and the functioning of the system as a whole. 
Further, they have their own ideas of what constitutes the system’s network, or anti-
network. This is essential information. As Latour (2005, 32) says, “actors are always 
engaged in the business of mapping the ‘social context’ in which they are placed, thus 
offering the analyst a full-blooded theory of what sort of sociology they should be treated 
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with.” This realization implies that it is methodologically important to keep preconceived 
hypotheses and categorizations flexible, and ultimately changeable, to reflect the various 
realities encountered in the field. The actor must be permitted to interpret reality for 
themselves rather than having it dictated.  
Finally, investigating the historical emergence of networks and their patterns of 
development demands a broad range of methodological tools. Not only does the network 
need to be analyzed historically but this needs to be done in reference to other local systems 
and relevant contextual factors. This requires to the greatest extent possible a broad 
historical knowledge and especially a focused understanding of the history of the 
immediate region.  
3.4 Duration of study and key informant 
Fieldwork for this thesis was carried out in two parts. Commencing in February 2008 I 
spent three months in Mumbai choosing a suitable field site for the study, collecting initial 
data, and forming a hypothesis to guide the study. After having visited many slums in 
Mumbai throughout February I identified Ganesh Murthy Nagar as a potential site and 
began building relationships there. After an initial and brief foray into the settlement to 
explore the nature of the built environment I returned to the site the following day and 
engaged several people in conversation, before befriending a twenty-something male who 
agreed to guide me through the settlement. As I was leaving Ganesh Murthy, I was stopped 
by another young man who had witnessed my conversations and warned me that my guide 
was a petty criminal and not to be trusted. At the time, I could only start to imagine the 
complexity of networked connections that had brought this young man to speak out against 
my guide, but this charismatic youth who spoke fluent English somehow reassured me that 
he could better introduce me to the settlement with fewer strings attached. Recalling 
Latour’s maxim, I made the decision to follow the actor and agreed to the youth’s overture 
to meet the next day and like that, a two-year working relationship with my key informant 
commenced. During the remaining two months of this first stage of fieldwork I built other 
relationships with residents of the settlement, and through one of these relationships 
acquired a map of the settlement, which I later learned had been produced by a developer 
intent on redeveloping the site. This was a key asset in the investigation around which the 
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socioeconomic survey and mapping exercises were planned. During this phase of research I 
also collected archival data consisting mainly of newspaper articles of slums in Mumbai in 
general and of Ganesh Murthy in particular to better understand the context in which slums 
operated in the city.  
The relationships I had built during the first phase of research contributed greatly to the 
success of collecting local data during the second phase, which took place between 
September 2009 and February 2010. I had maintained contact with my key informant 
throughout my absence in Mumbai and upon my return he was prepared to help me conduct 
the socioeconomic survey, participate in various mapping exercises, and establish more 
relationships towards observation and interview techniques as described in the following 
section. 
3.5 Methodology 
My research draws upon a combination of methods to both triangulate, and therefore 
crosscheck findings (Bryman, 2008), and to generate a holistic account of the situated and 
multi-dimensional nature of the settlement assemblage and networked components under 
study (Bassett and Zuéli, 2003; Zimmerer and Bassett, 2003). The methods I employ are 
archival analysis, socioeconomic survey techniques, semi-structured interviews, open-
ended interviews, participant observation, and mapping techniques.  
3.5.1 Archival analysis 
3.5.1.1 Definition 
Archival analysis is a form of observation where the researcher examines documents or 
archives of a society. The information can take many forms such as broad and shallow 
information in the case of lists, or richly detailed and profound information in the form of 
diaries or novels. Archival research can present a window onto an historically distant 
reality, and is thus a valuable method for historiographicaly-oriented studies. Further, 
archival analysis can reveal information that people would prefer not to talk about. 
3.5.1.2 Sampling design and lines of investigation 
Archival research was carried out in both the first and second phases of the study. During 
the first phase of the study I combed through forty years of Mumbai newspaper articles at a 
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clipping service in Colaba, near Ganesh Murthy, and at the Times of India to identify 
articles that had been written about slums in the city. The search broadly focused on 
functional aspects of slums and their connections with actors outside the settlement such as 
mafia organizations, politicians, and municipal employees. I also collected all articles that 
pertained to land development and local slums in Ward A. These searches yielded 
important information about issues, politicians and slumlords associated with Ganesh 
Murthy Nagar, which helped focus later ethnographic research. Newspaper articles also 
provided information pertaining to the Back Bay Reclamation Scheme (BBRS), an 
important land development project, and the local developmental context surrounding 
Ganesh Murthy Nagar. Information on these topics led to additional archival research 
conducted during phase II of the research project at Mumbai University, the Chhatrapati 
Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya (formerly known as the Prince of Wales Museum of 
Western India), the Maharashtra State Archives located at Elphinstone College, the Asiatic 
Society of Mumbai, and a non governmental organization (NGO) called Partners for Urban 
Knowledge, Action and Resources (PUKAR). A file documenting a pertinent court case 
pertaining to the BBRS was provided by a former Municipal Councillor in Ward A. 
During the second phase of research, after having identified significant components of the 
assemblage to investigate further, archival analysis was conducted in the Ward A municipal 
offices at the Water Department, and at the Slum Rehabilitation Authority located in 
Bandra. The Water Department archives provided valuable, although incomplete, insight 
into the processes of procuring water for the settlement, as well as important historical 
documentation about Ganesh Murthy’s formation. The Water Department archive is 
organized according to specific Community Based Organizations (CBO) operating in 
slums, so particular information about each water network operating in the settlement was 
available. The Water Department also holds records of each network’s water usage, which 
is theoretically counted four times a year. The Slum Rehabilitation Authority provided 
access to two of three files created to document the potential redevelopment of Ganesh 
Murthy, as submitted by particular private developers. A third file, which had been 
submitted to the authority, was not located. Fortunately, the developer associated with the 
file in question (Plymouth Constructions Pvt. Ltd.), was able to supply a large file 
documenting their efforts to redevelop the site. 
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Information about the development of toilet blocks at Ganesh Murthy Nagar was acquired 
through archival research at the Society for the Preservation of Area Resource Centres 
(SPARC) and at several municipal offices. The latter also provided historical Development 
Plans for the city including maps. Additional maps were acquired at the Town and Country 
Planning Division of the Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority 
(MMRDA). Historical information concerning the settlement in the 1970s was acquired at 
the Collector’s office (the department charged with managing state lands) in Ward A. 
Information related to social and demographic census data was acquired at the Tata 
Institute of Social Sciences. The Urban Development Department, in their offices at 
Mantrale, provided documentation of specific changes to the Development Plan relevant to 
Ganesh Murthy Nagar. The Metropolitan Rail Transportation Project (MRTP), located in 
Bandra, provided archival material related to plans to build a railcar shed where the 
settlement sits. Finally, a file documenting recent activities pertaining to the development 
of luxury condominiums and the BEST bus station located adjacent to the settlement were 
obtained from an NGO called Ghar Bacha Ghar Banao Andolan.  
3.5.2 Socio-economic survey 
3.5.2.1 Definitions7 
Survey research entails collecting data from multiple cases synchronically to produce a 
collection of quantifiable data with several variables that can be examined to detect patterns 
between them. Data may be collected either through structured interviews, which involve 
an interviewer asking interviewees the same questions in the same order aided by an 
interview schedule, or through self completion questionnaires. The sample, or segment of 
the population to be investigated, may be selected randomly (a probability sample) or not 
(a non-probability sample). A randomly chosen sample has a better chance of being 
representative of the entire population because each segment of the population has a chance 
to be chosen. A representative sample may thus be considered a microcosm of the 
population, notwithstanding the possibilities of sampling bias (a distortion in representation 
when segments of the population stand little, if no chance of being selected for inclusion in 
                                                
7 The following definitions are derived from Bryman, 2008. 
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the sample) and sampling error (errors deriving from a difference in the sample and the 
population).  
3.5.2.2 Sampling design 
Surveys were conducted throughout the entire territory of Ganesh Murthy Nagar. 
Probability samples were generated entailing the random selection of one household 
followed by an interval of a discrete number of households (Bryman, 2008). Every tenth 
household was interviewed, thus creating a 10% sample of the population of households. 
3.5.1.3 Questions 
The survey was composed of a small set of visual observations and a set twenty open-ended 
and closed-ended questions. Open-ended questions facilitated quick responses and open-
ended questions allowed for answers that more exactly represent the opinion of the 
interviewee (David and Sutton, 2004). The aim of the survey was fourfold. The primary 
goal of the survey was to identify networks that contribute to important components of the 
settlement assemblage. Questions pertaining to difficulties experienced in and by the 
settlement’s community provided one line of inquiry, while questions pertaining to group 
participation and communal activity provided another. The former questions revealed that 
the two major concerns of the population centred on water distribution (with 57 percent of 
respondents identifying it as the most serious problem) and toilet facilities (with 31 percent 
of the population identifying it as the most serious problem). The third highest concern the 
population shared, with 25 percent of the population, revolved around problems related to 
social friction involving fear, violence, and lack of unity and trust. These areas of concern 
informed the identification of water, toilets, and muscle gangs as important components of 
the settlement, which were subsequently followed up upon by other data collecting methods 
as described below. Questions pertaining to group participation and communal activity 
revealed the existence of many groups existing in the settlement and contributed to the 
second goal of the study, which was to identify possible interviewees with connections to 
relevant functional components in the settlement. All respondents were asked to agree to a 
follow-up interview. The third goal of the survey was to sketch the broad lines of the 
settlement’s socio-economic composition and identify variables that may contribute to 
network associations. The survey’s questions were thus designed to identify the broad 
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social and economic living conditions of the inhabitants including regional origins, former 
places of residence, familial relations in the settlement, and employment information. The 
final goal of the survey was to create a broad profile of the settlement’s built environment. 
With a map of the settlement on hand I noted the state of the hutment wherein the 
respondent lived (whether pucca, semi-pucca, or kutcha)8 and I noted the number of stories 
for every hutment in the settlement. I also noted the presence or absence of electrical meters 
to measure the distribution of informal electricity (which was less than 1 percent of 
hutments). The socioeconomic survey questionnaire is appended as Appendix A.  
3.5.3 Semi-structured interviews 
3.5.3.1 Definition 
The interview is intended to acquire information that is not easily observed, such as 
people’s understandings, beliefs, feelings, perceptions, and experiences about the reality 
they inhabit described in their own words (Valentine, 2005; Kitchin and Tate, 2000). Thus, 
it provides a highly suitable complimentary mode of acquiring information alongside 
observational techniques. Further, interviews may yield rich and multi-layered contextual 
information through face-to-face contact (Valentine, 2005; Burgess, 1984). Finally, 
interviews allow for in-depth examination of a wide-range of subjects that ultimately 
facilitates the explanation and examination of complex realities as understood by the 
interviewee (Bryman, 2008; Silverman, 1993). 
A semi-structured interview has more flexibility than a structured interview, and less 
flexibility than an informal conversational interview. That is, the interviewer is aided by an 
interview guide outlining the questions to be asked, but may ask the questions in whatever 
order seems best at the time, and may also add questions based on the interviewee’s 
responses (Bryman, 2008; Kitchin and Tate, 2000). Further, a semi-structured interview 
provides leeway to the interviewee to respond (Bryman, 2008). In general, however, 
questions are asked with the same wording from one interview to another. Thus, the 
strength of the semi-structured interview is that it allows for the particularities inherent in 
                                                
8 Pucca (from Hindi meaning sophisticated, good quality) refers to more permanent housing, utilizing cement 
and brick and mortar construction. Kutcha (from Hindi meaning crude, imperfect) refers to more temporary 
housing consisting of a mosaic of materials including wood, plastic and metal objects. Semi-pucca refers to 
housing consisting of a mix of pucca and kutcha elements.  
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individual responses, but because the questions are more or less the same, it allows for 
comparability across interviews (Patton, 2000). 
3.5.3.2 Sampling design 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with residents of Ganesh Murthy Nagar initially 
through purposive sampling. Purposive sampling differs from random modes of sampling, 
which strive to be representative of an entire population, and convenience sampling, which 
is a sample that is simply available by chance (Bryman, 2008).  Purposive sampling 
endeavours to sample strategic choices so that answers will be relevant to the research. 
Strategic samples were suggested by the socioeconomic survey, which identified 
respondent membership in a variety of local networks. Initially, relevant networks included 
those that were stratified, for example, any CBO, or groups defined by political party 
affiliations or religious denominations. However, this category of “relevant” networks was 
expanded to include other groupings like muscle gangs. As such, I employed theoretical 
sampling. Theoretical sampling is:  
Data gathering driven by concepts derived from the evolving theory and based on the concept of 
‘making comparisons’, whose purpose is to go to places, people, or events that will maximize 
opportunities to discover variations among concepts and to densify categories in terms of their 
properties and dimensions (Strauss and Corbin, 1998, 201; as quoted in Bryman, 2008, 415). 
Thus, theoretical sampling allows for increasing sample populations based on evolving 
theoretical considerations.  
In following Latour’s maxim to follow the network myopically, early purposive and 
theoretical samples led to snowball sampling. Snowball sampling proceeds from the 
responses of initial interviewees that identify other relevant interviewees (Bryman, 2008). 
This kind of snowball logic was very important in the identification of relevant actors in 
tracing specific networks. Additionally, snowball sampling aided in identifying actors 
belonging to anti-networks and multi-network memberships as well. 
3.5.3.3 Questions 
The goal of the semi-structured interviews was to both identify social consistencies and 
strata that contribute to the functioning and organization of Ganesh Murthy, and to 
elaborate upon these components of the assemblage as well. Because of the range of 
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networks under investigation and the importance of snowball sampling, the interview sheet 
represented more of a toolbox, from which I utilized certain lines of inquiry, rather than a 
list of questions that were posed to every respondent. The interview sheet was divided into 
nine sections including: questions comparing Ganesh Murthy Nagar to neighbouring 
settlements and communities, questions concerning relevant threats to the settlement, 
questions related to the local power geometry, security questions relating to Navy Nagar 
and the terrorist attacks of 2008, questions related to the settlement’s proximity to the sea 
and legislation regulating the development of coastal areas, questions about the potential 
redevelopment of Ganesh Murthy Nagar, social questions pertaining to relationships with 
other residents and the State apparatus, questions about personal associations to groups, and 
finally, questions about groups themselves. The interview sheet with the specific questions 
is appended as Appendix B. 
3.5.4 Informal conversational interviews 
3.5.4.1 Definition 
Informal conversational interviews (or unstructured interviews) are interviews without an 
explicit structure guiding the questions. The interview may be understood as a purposeful 
conversation (Eyles, 1988), and thus may be guided by an aide-mémoire or some mental 
checklist. Generally, the questions are developed in-situ during the course of the interview, 
and the interviewee is encouraged to discuss issues they feel are pertinent to the general 
research being performed. Thus, the unstructured interview may be a source of important 
information that the researcher has not thought to ask, and importantly, it is delivered in 
ways that reflect the interviewee’s own “frame of reference” (Kitchin and Tate, 215).  
3.5.4.2 Sampling design 
Informal conversational interviews were carried out with two broad categories of people: 
residents and non-residents of Ganesh Murthy. Unstructured interviews with residents 
proceeded through convenience samples during chance meetings. Most of these chance 
meetings occurred after I had been informed of a specific person of interest to the 
investigation, and happened upon them during my workday in the settlement. Alternatively, 
there were cases where a connection was formed between a resident and myself where I felt 
there was potential to uncover information relevant to the organization of the settlement. 
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The majority of informal conversational interviews were performed with the second 
category of people in the sample: non-residents of the settlement. This category consisted 
of purposive and snowball samples. After having identified important components of the 
settlement assemblage from the survey and semi-structured interviews I pursued the trail of 
actors in the network outside the settlement. Informal conversational interviews were 
conducted with five broad categories of people. I interviewed three politicians that had 
direct connections to the settlement including the two current local Municipal Councillors, 
and a former Municipal Councillor. Additionally, telephone and email interviews were 
conducted with former Municipal Councillor Shri Kisan Mehta to glean historical 
information about the BBRS. Interviews were conducted with municipal employees who 
had had direct and ongoing associations with the settlement in the capacity of providing 
essential services. Thus, interviews were conducted with employees at the Water 
Department in the Ward A offices, and municipal employees in several offices that were 
associated with furnishing the toilet blocks at the settlement. In following the investigative 
line of enquiry concerning the status of the land at Ganesh Murthy, I interviewed 
employees at the local Collector’s office, the Director and other employees of the Town 
and Country Planning Division at the MMRDA, the Director and other employees of the 
Metropolitan Rail Transportation Project, municipal employees at the Harbour Department, 
and the former Vice President of the Maharashtra and Housing and Area Development 
Authority. To pursue the line of inquiry based upon the settlement’s potential 
redevelopment, I interviewed employees at the Slum Rehabilitation Authority, a real estate 
developer that had submitted a scheme to redevelop a slum adjacent to Ganesh Murthy 
Nagar, a developer contemporaneously collecting signatures in Ganesh Murthy Nagar to 
submit a scheme for its redevelopment, and the three developers that had already submitted 
schemes to the SRA for the redevelopment of Ganesh Murthy Nagar. Interviews were also 
conducted with local academics studying slums in Mumbai, a lawyer specializing in coastal 
legislation, journalists reporting on issues pertaining to slums, urban planners working for 
the municipality and the MMRDA, members of three NGOs concerned with issues directly 
related to the settlement, and residents of Colaba, including residents from all fourteen 
slums located in the borough, residents of Cuffe Parade, and residents of Navy Nagar.  
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3.5.4.3 Questions 
The informal interviews ranged widely in subject matter, depending on the expertise and 
experiences of the interviewee. In interviews with residents the conversations revolved 
around covert forms of organization, including but not limited to the presence and functions 
of slumlords, muscle groups, and illegal activities. Interviews with non-residents 
commenced with questions pertaining to the their general knowledge of Ganesh Murthy, 
and were followed by more penetrating questions about the network or lines of inquiry 
relevant to their employment. To prepare for informal conversational interviews, I drafted 
thematic lines of inquiry and specific questions, which I committed to memory or for which 
I created aide-mémoires. Most conversational interviews were recorded in my field 
notebook during the process and those that were not were immediately recorded there after 
the interview had terminated.  
3.5.5 Mapping techniques 
3.5.5.1 Definition 
Mapping techniques are a valuable way to explore the spatial dimension of reality, and 
refer to the creational or methodological aspect of representing the world (Sanderson, 
2007). Mapping may reduce the complexity of the phenomena being represented, but may 
also orchestrate important elements to best convey certain messages. A typology of maps 
includes: social maps (habitation patterns), resource maps (natural resources), mobility 
maps (mobility patterns), services and opportunities maps (services and opportunities in the 
locality), and transect maps (a cross section of an area) (Mikkelsen, 2005). 
3.5.5.2 Sampling design and results 
Mapping techniques were used to record and convey information about the built 
environment and to spatially represent important components of the settlement assemblage. 
A map of the settlement was obtained during phase one of the research (as described above) 
and this map was later scanned into a computer and reprinted in a smaller format allowing 
for portability (Figure 3.4). The map was essential in recording the hutments that 
participated in the socioeconomic survey (Figure 3.5). The original map was created in 
1999 by the first real estate developer that had been interested in redeveloping the site, and 
while conducting the survey I updated the map everyday to achieve a more accurate 
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representation of the settlement. In this way a map emerged to show new construction, 
additions, and subtractions that had taken place in the last decade (Figure 3.6). While 
performing the survey I concurrently noted the number of stories of each hutments, thus 
producing a topographic representation of the built environment (Figure 5.6). Additionally 
while conducting the survey, I noted the usage of each building, dividing each structure into 
residential, business, infrastructural asset, and religious categories and noting the specific 
use of each of the latter four categories (Figure 5.16). I also sketched two transect maps of 
the settlement, walking and recording along the north-south axis (Figure 3.7) and the east-
west axis (Figure 3.8). Finally, a map was produced to represent visible water distribution 
infrastructure by following the pipes on the ground and noting the location of standpipes 
(most pipes in Parts I and II have largely been buried) (Figure 3.9).  
The maps were important tools that often played a key role while conducting the research. 
Immediately, it would not have been possible to navigate the labyrinthine settlement 
without a map. Correspondingly, the map greatly facilitated conducting the survey by 
permitting me to record those hutments that had been interviewed, and later facilitated the 
follow up semi-structured interviews by recording the location of the relevant hutments. I 
always carried a map of the settlement with me, not only for the purposes of navigation, but 
also as a tool to be used when conducting interviews to delimit certain spatial or location-
based data. The map also had an unforeseen character, which conferred upon me an 
element of power as few people had seen a map of the settlement before. Thus, I found that 
it lent a certain legitimacy to my persona while conducting the survey and interviews, and 
was also a useful tool that I occasionally employed to trigger or advance directed 
conversational interviews. Due to this power invested in the map I kept it hidden for the 
most part and used it sparingly.  
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Figure 3.4 Developers map of Ganesh Murthy Ambedkar Nagar and Rajak Nagar  
Source: Plymouth Construction PVT. LTD.  
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3.5.6 Observation and participant observation 
3.5.6.1 Definition 
Observation is a research method entailing “the systematic noting and recording of events, 
behaviours, and artefacts in a social setting” (Marshall and Rossman, 1995: 79). It is a 
direct interpretation of events by the researcher based on the actions of individuals. It is 
thus differentiated from interview techniques by recording what people do, rather than what 
they say they do (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). Observation may be overt or covert. With overt 
observation, the purpose of the researcher is made clear to subjects from the beginning. 
Covert observation entails the hiding of the researchers’ role. This latter strategy may 
facilitate access and reduces the reactivity of subjects towards the researcher (Bryman, 
2008).  
Researchers may be more or less active in their observation techniques. Gold (1958, cited 
in Bryman, 2008) identifies a continuum with complete participation, entailing covert 
immersion in a society, on one end of the spectrum, and complete observer, entailing no 
interaction with the participants, on the other end of the spectrum. In the middle of the 
continuum there are the positions of participant-as-observer, similar to complete 
participation but with the researcher occupying an overt identity, and observer-as-
participant, with the researcher acting mainly as an interviewer. With straight observation 
the researcher diachronically records events and behaviours in a holistic fashion and often 
with the help of detailed checklists (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). Participant observation 
usually takes the form of an unstructured narrative together with in-situ interpretation and 
analysis (Kitchin and Tate, 2000). 
3.5.6.2 Observation in practice 
Of the combined nine months spent in Mumbai during phases one and two of my field 
research, I spent roughly 90 percent of my time in Ganesh Murthy Nagar. At the field site I 
pursued an overt strategy of observation-as-participant by identifying myself as a 
researcher. I not only performed the survey, mapping techniques, and conducted interviews, 
but took part in various activities such as participating in religious festivals, family events, 
and spent time simply sitting around and chatting with residents about subjects not directly 
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related to the thesis. During these times my persona was malleable. I presented different 
dimensions of my research to specific audiences in order to display empathy and a non-
threatening positionality, with the goal of gaining as much openness and trust from the 
residents as possible. 
Through my key informant I had befriended a group of twenty year old males that were part 
of a powerful muscle gang in the settlement, and I spent a lot of time with them and their 
families: eating meals, watching Bollywood movies and item numbers9, and chatting. My 
participation in daily routines and special celebrations provided opportunities to observe 
and understand communal life in the settlement. Further, participation solidified my 
relationships with people and thereby gave me access to events and places that I would not 
have had as a mere observing researcher. One evening, for example, I was invited to 
accompany the major actors in a muscle gang to Ambedkar Nagar, where another gang 
showed their respect by offering us a resplendent meal during the celebration of a local 
deity. Observation-as participant yielded general information about the social dynamics in 
the settlement, and was particularly useful in the investigation of the various muscle gangs 
operating there. I recorded my observations during the day as much as possible, and 
assiduously transcribed my thoughts and experiences in a field notebook every evening.  
3.5.7 Triangulation 
Triangulating these various methods compounds their relative strengths while minimizing 
their respective weaknesses. For instance, the survey generated a lot of data, which conveys 
a global perspective of the settlement. However, the relatively surface-level data recorded 
by the survey is balanced by the semi-structured and open-ended conversational interviews, 
which together produce richly detailed, multi-layered, and contextual information. 
Specifically, open-ended conversations elicited information that could not be easily 
observed, such as people’s perceptions, experiences, feelings, beliefs, and the meanings 
they attribute to their physical and social environments, in their own words. In turn, the 
semi-structured interviews allowed me to make direct comparisons between interviews on 
the same subject. Where respondents were unwilling or uncomfortable talking about certain 
subjects, such as muscle gangs and challenging water distribution patterns for example, 
                                                
9 An “item number” refers to musical sequences in Bollywood films where the characters dance.  
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participant observation produced parallel information about what people did and thus acted 
as a tool for verification. Finally, archival analysis provided a perspective on past events 
that was either novel information or used to verify information collected through other 
methods. 
3.6 Ethical considerations and positioning myself in the field 
Permission to carry out fieldwork in Mumbai was given by the principal of the Sir J.J. 
School of Architecture in Mumbai, Sri Rajiv Mishra, who acted as my local supervisor. A 
letter of permission was drawn up, which I carried at all times during the collection of data. 
I also obtained the permission of the local Municipal Councillor to collect data in the 
settlement. Finally, a statement explaining the nature of my research and my identity was 
recited to all interviewees before conducting each questionnaire.  
I have avoided using the names of people interviewed except where their comments can not 
be construed to undermine their character or position. For the most part, names have been 
withheld and instead I merely refer to their position or function. In two cases I have 
changed actual names to pseudonyms to facilitate understanding of the ongoing narrative. 
The changing of identities is intended to protect people and groups against reprisals for 
having given sensitive information concerning illegal activities, and against any reprisals 
that may arise from competing social consistencies and strata. Finally, where information is 
anecdotal, unsubstantiated by hard fact, or triangulated by various methods, the text 
indicates that events are only alleged to have taken place.  
The production of knowledge, as socially constructed, situated, and laden with value (Law, 
2004; England, 1994; Haraway, 1991), demands the recognition that power relations are 
inherent to the research process. My interactions with and understandings of local people 
and their reality were shaped by my personal knowledge, situated perceptions, and 
prejudices. Similarly, locals’ perceptions of me were shaped by my perceived identity. My 
relative positionality in the field, as an educated, white, Canadian-European with enough 
money to pursue research for several months, compared with many residents of Ganesh 
Murthy living in substandard housing, may have engendered certain asymmetrical power 
relations. The need to address these power relations, especially when doing research in the 
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Global South or with vulnerable groups, is clear (Smythe and Murray, 2000; Rose, 1997; 
Schulz et al., 1997). Therefore, I attempted to redress potentially asymmetrical power 
relationships and fostered relationships that approached equality as much as possible during 
my research. I learned basic Hindi, which along with Marathi, are the main languages 
spoken in the settlement, and I used my knowledge of Hindi whenever possible. I attempted 
to quickly learn the local customs and assimilated them into my habits. Essentially, I 
worked to not only integrate myself into the culture as much as possible, but also embraced 
the position of “researcher as supplicant” (England, 1994: 82; Smith, 1988). That is, I 
impressed upon residents the fact that their situated knowledge was valuable and that I was 
fortunate to learn from it.  
Other positions that I inadvertently came to occupy posed more of an overt difficulty for 
data collection. Specifically, despite maintaining a malleable persona (as described above), 
it became apparent to the leader of one of the muscle gangs that I was pursing information 
about his network. The leader thereafter attempted to discredit me by suggesting to others 
that I may be an agent of terrorism like David Headley, an American who was associated 
with the 2008 terrorist attacks, and who was believed to have collected information about 
local slums to help the terrorists. In response to a few inquiries stemming from this, I was 
able to produce my letter of permission from the Sir J.J. School of Architecture, and I 
subsequently minimized my investigation of the muscle gang. The muscle gangs in Ganesh 
Murthy are important components of the settlement, and despite negative feelings I had 
about pursuing this line of inquiry, I had made a commitment to following the actor, which 
I realized as far as possible without placing myself in danger. Nonetheless, some 
information about these gangs is incomplete, and this represents a limitation in the research.  
Further, in terms of my inadvertent positionality, as I had created associations with 
members of a particular gang that were displayed in public celebrations in the settlement, 
my identity became somewhat tied to the gang. To a certain extent this worked against 
creating associations with members of other gangs to understand their perspective of 
settlement relations. I thus had to work to dispel notions that I was not an objective 
observer, and while I was able to mostly overcome this identity, in some cases actors 
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simply refused to talk to me. I relay these pitfalls of inadvertent positionality as a warning 
to researchers occupying malleable personas in the field.   
3.7 Language and translation issues 
There are challenges inherent in relying on translators in cross-cultural research. As 
language contributes to meaning-construction (Derrida, 1991), the reliance on translation is 
certain to affect understanding. The central issue revolves around translating a concept in 
one language to another for which there is no equivalent concept (Frenk, 1995). This is 
applicable for every outsider who tries to understand another culture, whether it is the 
researcher, or someone reading the report. Understanding thus requires an intellectual 
construction of mapping concepts onto Western categories of understanding (Tambiah, 
1993), where there is sure to be inaccuracy.  
As such, I attempted to limit the inaccuracies inherent in translation as much as possible by, 
as a first step, recognizing the limitations. I was reflexive in understanding the contextual 
complexities around identity and the positionality surrounding power in relationships. I 
employed translators that were as proficient as possible in both languages, and impressed 
upon them the importance of accurately translating word for word the interlocutors’ 
responses. Further, I was fortunate to find a translator who shared an intellectual and social 
interest in the work I was pursuing. This facilitated explanations of the research to the 
translator, which was intended to engender a sense of the work’s social significance and so 
that the translator could pick up on especially significant pieces of information. Finally, I 
discussed important interviews immediately afterwards with the translator to verify the 
meanings and interpretations encountered. Through these mechanisms I attempted to 
mitigate as much as possible the distorting effects of translation and capture the nuanced 
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“In the end, we’ll get the land.”  
Director, Metropolitan Rail Transportation Project, December 18, 2009 
4.1 Introduction 
The current and following chapters provide historical and contextual information about the 
political planning of the Back Bay, where Ganesh Murthy is located, and the more ground-
level sociospatial formation of Ganesh Murthy itself, respectively. As such, the two 
chapters exhibit a general investigative dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up 
processes, which may be interpreted as having occurred in parallel but separately. This is 
not the case. Rather, the synthetic division of these two subjects functions heuristically on 
two levels. First, the chapters are structured according to Deleuzoguattarian ontological 
moments, with the current chapter considering virtual attractors in the city system, and the 
following chapter investigating intensive morphogenic processes inherent to the settlement. 
Second, the division of chapters allows for a more thorough investigation and clearer 
description of a large quantity of information. That being said, the evolution of Ganesh 
Murthy Nagar and other slum settlements in the area played a smaller role in the State’s 
development of the Back Bay as compared to the very large impact planning decisions had 
on the evolution of the settlement, and this dynamic is clearly reflected in the text.  
In this chapter the Back Bay reclamation is used as an entry point to further investigate the 
contested processes of planning in the city. Urban planning is treated as an assemblage 
focusing on historical processes that contributed to the assembling of land, efforts to make 
sociomaterials cohere along this trajectory, and various manifestations of their dissolution 
and reassembly. In this way the chapter provides important contextual information about 
virtual singularities that historically orient urban planning in Mumbai, thus contributing to 
better understanding the emergence of Ganesh Murthy and its potential for the future.  
The historical desire for land in Mumbai created associations between politicians, real 
estate developers, and state bureaucracies, which informed the intensive processes from 
which the city, in terms of its form and to an extent its politics, emerged. Historical 
accounts reveal that land reclamation tends to be justified in terms of the public good, but 
in fact is covertly oriented towards desire for capital accumulation. Coterminous with the 
historical reclamation of the Back Bay are alternative trajectories established by competing 
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actors such as civil society organizations arguing for more environmental solutions, 
alternative branches of government seeking to control the land, and immigrant workers 
seeking to territorialize land for themselves and their families. These trajectories intersect 
in manifest ways to reterritorialize land, or its potential, and the alignment of specific actors 
conspired to send competing trajectories along absolute lines of flight. No one actor 
completely dominated the movement of the city-system towards its current physical form 
and it was only from the complex interweaving of a multitude of sociomaterials that 
Ganesh Murthy could have emerged.  
The chapter follows the chronological trajectory of governmental desires to unleash the 
potential of land and commences with the historical context of Mumbai’s territorialization 
in the colonial period of the 16th century (4.2). The main phases of the Back Bay 
Reclamation, which is of paramount importance to the emergence of land at Ganesh 
Murthy, follows with the early history of the Back Bay Reclamation Company (4.3), its 
iteration in modern times (4.4), the development freeze of 1978 (4.5), continued efforts at 
reclamation post 1978 (4.6), and the effects on development there from the enactment of 
the Coastal Regulation Zone (4.7). The following section examines recent developments in 
the Back Bay (4.8), and a substantial conclusion attempts to distil developmental 
trajectories based on the history of the Back Bay Reclamation (4.9).  
4.2 Heptanesia, Bom Bahia, and Bombay: fusing seven islands 
The land where Ganesh Murthy Nagar now sits was, until the 20th century, buried under 
water just off a group of seven islands in the Arabian Sea that Ptolemy referred to as 
Heptanesia in 150 CE (David, 1973). These islands, known in the 16th century as Mahim, 
Parel, Worli, Mazagaon, Mumbadevi (or Bombay Island), Old Woman’s Island (or Little 
Colaba) and Colaba, were some of the larger islands forming a fecund archipelago that was 
able to support human life from an early stage (Figure 4.1). Pleistocene sediments found in 
the northern archipelago demonstrate that the islands had been inhabited since the Stone 
Age (Ghosh, 1990). The land, together with the marine ecosystem, would have supported 
several settlements of kolis, or fishermen, at the beginning of the Common Era or earlier 
(Greater Bombay District Gazetteer, 1960). On these lands the kolis stayed for millennia as 
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waves of indigenous and foreign dynasties washed over the islands leaving traces of their 
civilization on its shores.  
 
Figure 4.1 Showing original islands in 1670 and outline of present-day Mumbai  




The arrival of colonial powers in the 16th century heralded a new era of governance and 
territorialisation in the region. In December 1535 the Gujarate Sultanate, which then ruled 
the islands, was forced to sign away possession in the Treaty of Bassein to the Portuguese 
who were interested in the deep natural harbour for commercial shipping purposes. In 1661 
the Portuguese transferred possession of the islands to the British as part of Catherine of 
Braganza’s dowry to Charles II. The crown thereafter gave control of the islands to the 
British East India Company in 1668, thus establishing governance of the territory to 
business interests that worked to reclaim land in the interest of commerce and trading. At 
first, transportation routes between the islands were created to facilitate the movement of 
goods being funnelled out of the Deccan Plateau to the centres of colonial empires via the 
port of Bom Bahia, as Mumbai was then called (Sinclair and D’Souza, 1991). The 
causeway built between Mahim and Sion in 1708, is an example of such transportation-
oriented land reclamation. Soon, however, motivation to reclaim land from the sea included 
the desire to produce new territory for development and secure previously reclaimed land. 
In 1782 William Hornby, British Governor of Bombay, initiated a causeway over low lying 
lands between Worli and Mahalaxmi, known as the “Great Breach,” to keep out the high 
tide from land to the east that had already been reclaimed. The “Hornby Vellard,” (the area 
called “Breach Candy” today) was completed in 1784 and provided 400 acres of land for 
new development. Thus, from early on commercial interests motivated by capital 
accumulation governed the physical development of Mumbai.  
Over time, the remainder of the original seven islands were fused and new territory created 
with the same logic. In the north, Sion was connected to Salsette in 1803, and in the south, 
Colaba was connected to Bombay Island by a causeway built via Old Woman’s Island in 
1838. In 1845 Mahim and Bandra were connected by causeway (TIFR, 1995). The land 
from which Ganesh Murthy Nagar eventually gained a foothold was created in 1905 as part 
of a 90,000 square yard reclamation on the west side of Colaba. The City Improvement 
Trust had initiated the work, which gave way to a seaside promenade created in 1906, 
known as Cuffe Parade, named after T.W. Cuffe – one of the members of the Trust (TIFR, 
1995). However, it is unlikely that anything would have been built on the seaward side of 
the promenade if it were not for the Back Bay Reclamation Scheme.  
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4.3 Back Bay Reclamation Company 
The most important government-led reclamation scheme, in its overall impact on the built 
environment of South Mumbai, is the Back Bay Reclamation Scheme (BBRS) (Das, 1996). 
Feeling increased pressure from the commercial sector, in particular businesses involved in 
cotton production and shipping, the government decided in 1853 to reclaim 607 hectares of 
land from the sea (Patel, 1975). The project was given further force by the onset of the 
American Civil war in 1861, which halted cotton exports there and greatly increased the 
UK’s demand for Indian cotton. Together with the opening of the Suez Canal in 1969, 
which created new shipping routes, Mumbai felt the crush for new land during the cotton-
led economic boom years of the 1860s.  
During this time the Bombay Reclamation Company (BRC) was created, which initiated a 
long-enduring alliance between the government and private developers to create wealth out 
of reclamation in the Back Bay. The BRC was formed by Premchand Roychand, the 
wealthiest of all indigenous cotton traders (Tripathi, 2004), and owned partly by the 
government after Sir Bartle Frere, then Governor of Bombay Presidency, purchased 400 
shares in the company (Upadhyay, 2010). Due to their associations with the government, 
the BRC was awarded the franchise to reclaim 607 hectares from the Back Bay on the west 
side of Mumbai from Malabar Hill to the tip of Colaba. However, shortly after having 
started the reclamation work, the end of the American Civil War was announced in India on 
May 1, 1865, which triggered a depression and a subsequent plunge in land prices. The 
BRC was forced to liquidate and went bankrupt. The reclamation project however, was 
merely scuttled for the time being and would be reconstituted later in time. The narrow strip 
of land that had been reclaimed was taken over by the government, which gave the land to 
the Bombay Baroda and Central India railways for the construction of a railway from 
Churchgate to Colaba (TIFR, 1995). 
In time, four more proposals to reclaim land in the Back Bay had been put forward before 
Governor George Lloyd initiated a new phase of the BBRS in 1917 with a syndicate of 
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prominent citizens and “a private company”10 (TIFR, 1995; The Daily, 1984). The initial 
plan was to reclaim the original 607 hectares for development, but this was reduced to 463 
hectares in 1920 when the BBRS was taken over by the Development Directorate, a branch 
of the Bombay Government’s Development Department, led by Sir George Buchanan; a 
civil engineer from England who had previous experience with similar projects (The Daily, 
1984). The scheme was finally taken up in 1922 and called for the construction of a four-
mile long sea wall along the foreshore from Chowpatty Beach to Colaba Point, which was 
accomplished except for a gap of 597 meters in the middle. The plan called for the division 
of land into eight blocks (Banerjee-Guha, 1996). Blocks I and II stretched from Chowpatty 
to Sachivalaya – (the current Mantralaya11). Block III runs to the end of Nariman Point, 
while blocks IV and VI are the undeveloped areas to the north and south (respectively) of 
New Cuffe Parade, which is built in block V. Blocks VII and VIII comprise the current 
defence area known as Navy Nagar, and Ganesh Murthy would emerge later in Block VI 
(Figure 4.2).  
 
                                                
10 The “private company” seems to have been either a composition of leading industrial conglomerates in 
Mumbai led by the Tata family, or a company solely owned by the Tata’s themselves (The Daily, 1984). 
Anecdotal evidence collected during an interview suggests the latter scenario (Cooper, 2010).  
11 Mantralaya is the name of the administrative headquarters of the State of Maharashtra. 
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Figure 4.2 Blocks developed as part of various phases of the Back Bay Reclamation Scheme 
Source: Google Maps and author  
This iteration of the reclamation project encountered friction almost immediately with the 
unforeseen necessity of uprooting the railway terminus at Colaba and transferring it to 
Mumbai Central, where it is currently located. Problems mounted with the depression of 
the 1920s, which deflated real estate prices. This, together with delays and cost overruns, 
sparked a reassessment of the project. The Back Bay Enquiry Committee, spearheaded by 
K.F. Nariman and Manu Subedar, found many irregularities in the project including: 
financial mismanagement and corruption by the officers of the Development Directorate, 
the siphoning off of money to British interests, an inefficient dredging craft that was 
purchased before the project was even sanctioned, and the improper construction of the sea 
wall that had lost 900,000 cubic yards of mud (TIFR, 1995). These management errors and 
their exposition by the enquiry effectively shut down the BBRS in 1929, which thereafter 
became known as “Lloyd’s Folly.” By this time the sea wall was in place (including a large 
gap) and four blocks of the project had been reclaimed, comprising 177 hectares of land. 
Blocks I and II became Marine Drive and the area to the east, while Blocks VII and VIII, 
comprising 94 hectares, were sold to the military for INR 2.06 crore (TIFR, 1995; Sinclair 
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and D’Souza, 1991).12 The sea wall, together with a large gap, allowed the tidal motions of 
the sea to deposit silt by the shore, which eventually became a mangrove forest, and later 
Ganesh Murthy Nagar. 
4.4 Growing population and reclamation in modern times 
In the 1950s the population of Mumbai increased by 50 percent giving rise to new calls for 
reclamation in the Back Bay. In the decades following India’s independence in 1947 the 
central government sponsored the growth of industrial development. As a result, Mumbai 
acted as a virtual singularity attracting rural populations with the potential for jobs and 
better livelihoods at the city’s burgeoning textile mills and other industries, the majority of 
which were located substantially north of present-day Ganesh Murthy Nagar. Many of the 
migrant workers were housed in pre-independence chawls, which are four or less storied 
structures that are divided into a number of small basic residential units. However, no new 
units were being built to accommodate the migrating workers by the private and public 
sectors, and in fact limiting the amount of residential units was a tactic adopted by urban 
planers to limit the city’s size (Weinstein, 2008; D’Monte, 2002; Sharma, 2000). These 
factors led to a dramatic rise in the number of squatter settlements in the 1950s (Bhide, 
2009).  
To investigate possibilities for addressing the escalating population in the 1950s the 
government appointed a one-man committee in 1958 chaired by Shri S.G. Barve, I.C.C. 
Secretary of the Public Works Department. One of the five panels of the study group 
formed by the Barve committee, the “Land and Open Spaces and Other Community 
Requirements” panel, recommended reclamation as a possible solution to the increasing 
population density of Mumbai. The panel identified at least nine areas where this could take 
place and went to great length to explore these various possibilities. It only briefly 
mentioned the Back Bay in the final sentence of the report, writing; “similarly, it would be 
possible to reclaim about 575 acres in the Backbay Reclamation area and about 129 acres 
west of the Hornby Vellard near the race course” (Land and Open Spaces and Other 
Community Requirements panel of Barve Committee, as quoted in Economic and Political 
                                                
12 1 Indian rupee (INR) equals 0.0136891 pounds (GBP). 1 crore is equal to 10,000,000 so INR 1 crore equals 
136,890 GBP.  
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Weekly, 1976: 1101). Despite the panel’s lack of enthusiasm for reclaiming the Back Bay, 
the final report of the Barve Committee recommended reclamation there along with 2,135 
acres at Mahim-Dharavi and 2,365 acres between Wadala and Chembur, for “community 
requirements” including “public housing” and “relocation sites” for “slum clearance.” 
(Barve Committee as quoted in Economic and Political Weekly, 1976: 1102). However, the 
committee qualified their recommendation by placing priority on developing Bandra-Kurla 
to the north so as not to fuel the congestion problems already in existence in South 
Mumbai. To this end the committee also suggested shifting all central and state government 
offices to the suburbs (Patel, 1995).  
Of all the many recommendations put forward by the Barve committee only two were taken 
up: the construction of a bridge across Thana Creek, and the reclamation of the Back Bay 
(Economic and Political Weekly, 1976). Rather than adhering to the more persuasive 
arguments of the panel to reclaim land elsewhere, and following the committee’s 
recommendations to avoid fuelling congestion problems in South Mumbai, reclamation of 
the Back Bay made financial sense. South Mumbai, which is home to the central business 
district and the location of the state and municipal headquarters, has higher real estate 
values than the rest of the city and thus there is more potential to accumulate capital 
through real estate development there. The government created and then used the Barve 
Committee report to re-initiate reclamation work in the Back Bay. Further, the state 
government would thereafter misleadingly refer to the Barve Committee report as proof of 
the necessity of reclaiming land in the Back Bay (Economic and Political Weekly, 1976). 
Work was taken up swiftly within one year after the report was submitted in 1959, which 
attracted labourers to the area. In the absence of inexpensive formal housing in the area, 
labourers squatted parts of the coastline adding to established fishing communities, nascent 
squatter camps already there, and initiating new squatter settlements as well, as was the 
case with Ganesh Murthy Nagar (Cooper, 2009). 
The new reclamations went against the norms of local self-governance with the state 
government bypassing the Bombay Municipal Corporation, which was the legal planning 
authority for Mumbai as per the Bombay Town Planning Act (BTP Act), 1954. Further, the 
reclamation work contravened the BTP Act, which necessitated the production of 
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development plans preceding the commencement of all projects (Mehta, 2010). The 
reclamation was immediately and almost universally criticized on the grounds that 
establishing more commercial space would drive up the number of commuters to an 
intolerable level (Economic and Political Weekly, 1976).  
Despite the criticism and questionable legality of the project the government proceeded 
with the reclamation. The force with which the state pursued the reclamation attracted the 
municipal government, which in 1964 the produced a draft Development Plan (DP) that 
allied itself with the desires of the state government, and was approved in 1967. The DP 
included a written report about the Back Bay and the intention to reclaim 223 hectares of 
land of which 107 hectares would be developed with a 60:40 residential to commercial 
ratio, with the remainder of land pegged for open spaces, roads, a substation, other smaller 
uses, and on Block VI (where Ganesh Murthy is now located) a large railway car shed for a 
planned underground railway (Figures 4.3.1 and 4.3.2) (Economic and Political Weekly, 
1976). Although legally obliged to produce a map in order to obtain the approval of the 
state government under the BTP Act, the DP showed no land use indicators, and no roads 
or other public utilities. There was a note, however, attached to the DP mentioning that 
detailed plans for the BBRS were being prepared by the state government as per the BTP 
Act, which, as Banerjee-Guha (1996) points out, had in any case been repealed by the 
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act in 1966.  
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Figure 4.3.1 1967 Development Plan  
Source: Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation 
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Figure 4.3.2 1981 Development Plan showing railcar shed in Block VI in pink at lower left 
Source Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation 
The Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, which is currently in force, establishes 
a hierarchical planning structure consisting of nested regional development authorities 
responsible for producing development plans for their region according to the Development 
Control Regulations (DCR) set out in the same Act. In effect, it shifts power over urban 
planning from the municipal authorities to the state government in two ways. It directs the 
local planning authority through the establishment of broad planning and development 
areas of transportation, infrastructure, and housing, and establishes the state government as 
the ultimate arbiter of the local DP. Despite these new powers the state government 
obscured the plans for the Back Bay by failing to produce a detailed map, which negated 
the public’s right to consult and comment upon it (Banerjee-Guha, 1996).  
Meanwhile, public criticism of the reclamation had not withered and the state government 
responded by establishing the Gadgil Committee to report on development in the Bombay-
Pune region in 1965. The committee recommended abandoning any further reclamation in 
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the Back Bay because of the dire effects development would have on the island city and the 
lives of its inhabitants.  
The decision to spend very large amounts on reclamation of land in this area also appears to be 
unfortunate. The prices at which reclaimed land is sold may seemingly make the venture profitable. It 
is highly doubtful whether this would be so if the total social costs, recurring and non-recurring, of the 
burden imposed by the additional activity and population on the reclaimed area in terms of expenditure 
on roads, services, and amenities and travel to work, etc, are taken into account. (Para 5.2 - Gadgil 
Committee, as quoted in Economic and Political Weekly, 1976: 1102).  
The Gadgil Committee clearly argues against further reclamation as a burden on society for 
it’s effects of increasing population density, and activities necessary to manage it, including 
increased transportation and other infrastructural service costs and longer and less 
comfortable commuting to work. With the publishing of the sanctioned DP in 1967, more 
parties embraced the Gadgil Committee’s perspective and called for the abandonment of 
the BBRS. Such groups include: the Metropolitan Transportation Team of the Planning 
Commission, Government of India in 1967; the Metropolitan Regional Planning Board 
under L.G. Rajwade in 1970; the Committee on Backbay Reclamation appointed by the 
Maharashtra government; the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 
which studied the BBRS; the City and Industrial Development Corporation (CIDCO) – a 
branch of the state government – and other organizations such as the Save Bombay 
Committee and the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee (Banerjee-Guha, 1996; Patel, 
1975). The World Bank Mission, visiting Mumbai in 1970 also condemned the plan, saying 
that the only party to benefit from the BBRS was the Government of Maharashtra in its 
ability to generate revenue from the sales of plots (World Bank, as quoted in Economic and 
Political Weekly, 1976). No mention is made of several nascent squatter settlements taking 
root along the coastline.  
Against these countervailing forces the state government slightly modified its plan for the 
BBRS. The 1970-1990 regional plan for Mumbai, which was sanctioned in 1973, embraced 
the widely held desire to constrain development along the north-south axis of the city. The 
plan limited the commercial area of the Back Bay Reclamation Area (BBRA) to 20 percent 
of the total and gave priority to the Bandra-Kurla reclamation to give immediate relief for 
the demands of commercial development. It is important to note, however, that 
corresponding to those actors intent on developing the Back Bay, and in contravention of 
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the stated objective to not perpetuate development along the north-south axis, the regional 
authority only purported to limit, and not stop, commercial and residential development of 
the Back Bay. 
The immediate response to the 1970-1990 regional plan was condemnation from the public 
and the municipal government. The mayor of Mumbai, Sudhir Joshi, along with Municipal 
Councillors requested the Chief Minister of Maharashtra to disallow further development of 
the BBRA fearing for the strain on municipal services and traffic congestion. The state 
government met the request with a new argument for reclamation by stating that land was 
needed for the provision of housing for low and middle income groups, and especially 
government employees. To further enrol municipal authorities the state government argued 
that the sale of land would financially benefit the municipality (Patel, 1975). 
Notwithstanding continued public pressure, the state continued the allotment of plots in the 
BBRA until 1974, at which time the last allotment of 11 commercial plots in Blocks III and 
V was committed in April to eight builders and three banks for prices ranging from INR. 
3,000 to INR 5,400 per square metre (High Court Bombay, 1992).  In the same year the 
municipal corporation stepped up its fight against the development of the Back Bay by 
passing a resolution declaring the BBRA as a no development zone except for public 
service-oriented buildings. The resolution also designates the BBRS as a burden on society 
by warning of increased strain on the population, water resources, traffic, electricity, other 
services, and points to an inability to properly respond in the event of a fire due to the 
height of the proposed skyscrapers and their density (High Court Bombay, 1992). A year 
later, in 1975 the state conducted the first slum census to enumerate the number of slums in 
the city and the amount of hutments. The census counted four slums in the Back Bay, 
including “Ganesh Moorthy,” but there is no evidence to suggest that slums or slum 
dwellers played any role in the development of the Back Bay up to this point (State of 
Maharashtra, 1976). At this time State policy towards slums was in flux between 
demolition and eviction to forms of toleration.  
While the actions of the municipal corporation did not deter the state government from 
further reclamation, the resolution may have spurred the state government to increase its 
consolidation of power over development activities in the city. In 1974 the Bombay 
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Metropolitan Regional Development Act was enacted, which created the Bombay 
Metropolitan Regional Development Authority (BMRDA) in 1975 as an apex body for 
planning and coordination of development activities in the region. The BMRDA is guided 
by the “Authority” of the BMRDA, a council consisting of 17 members, of which only four 
are representatives of the local populace: the mayor and three Municipal Councillors. The 
other 14 members hold important state government offices, and the chair of the council is 
held by the Minister for Urban Development; a position traditionally held by the Chief 
Minister of the State of Maharashtra, who traditionally also holds the office of the Minister 
of Housing, and chair of the Slum Rehabilitation Authority. Below the “Authority” in the 
BMRDA hierarchy is the Executive Committee comprised of six members of the 
Government of Maharashtra and three professional urban planners. Heading the MMRDA 
administrative office (consisting of 300 employees) is the Municipal Commissioner who is 
appointed by the Chief Minister. The BMRDA, then, is mainly composed of non-elected 
officials, who are not accountable to the electorate, including the administrative head of the 
agency, the Municipal Commissioner. There are only four representatives of the local 
government on this agency, which has come to define all major developments in the city. 
Finally, the BMRDA would become an effective tool through which the Chief Minister 
could exercise increasing control over the profitable business of real estate development in 
the city.  
Desperate now to maintain some control over the development of Mumbai and disrupt the 
BBRS, three petitions were filed in the High Court of Bombay by Mr. Madhu Limaye, 
Member of Parliament, Mr. Shri Sudhir Joshi, Mayor of Mumbai, and a group of citizens. 
The petitions called for a pause in the allotment of land to be developed, and for a stay in 
any future development of the BBRA (High Court Bombay, 1992), which momentarily 
halted all development. In response to the petitions the builders that had been granted 
allotments claimed they should be allowed to continue building and agreed to demolish the 
buildings at their own cost if the court ruled against them. The BMC granted the builders 
permission to resume their construction on these terms pending the court’s verdict on the 
three petitions. After a lengthy legal battle, including a Supreme Court ruling, the matter 
was finally settled at the Division Bench on April 26, 1979, which was in keeping with the 
initial ruling made in 1975 by Mr Justice Gandhi of the Bombay High Court.  
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In the course of the court case it emerged that only five builders had been awarded the last 
of the 11 plots, with each taking several plots under different names. Out of 60 builders that 
had applied for plots, only these few were chosen after discussions took place at the 
ministerial level (Economic and Political Weekly, 1976). These builders’ names continue to 
adorn some of the most expensive buildings in the world. Justice Gandhi ruled that the 
State had acted in a surreptitious manner in granting the lots to the builders, and that it had 
grossly undervalued the cost of the lease. The judge found that ultimately the government 
had acted in the interest of the builders, and not in the best interest of the State, and thus the 
transactions were held to be mala fide in law. However, in applying the equitable principles 
that the courts of Chancery in England would have applied, the justice ruled that the 
builders could keep their allotments if they agreed to pay 33.5 percent more for their leases 
(High Court Bombay, 1992: 4). 
In a related, but separate dispute over a BBRS allotment involving the Free Press Journal 
Estate, the Minister for Housing reversed a planning authority decision and increased the 
floor space index (FSI) granted to the Free Press to 3.5 in 1978.13 The Minister noted that 
although his ruling would defeat the main purpose of legislation to avoid increasing traffic 
congestion and additional burden on civic amenities, it was necessary in the name of 
“justice.” Commenting on this decision in 1981, Justice Suresh of the Bombay High Court 
felt it was obvious that “the government was willing to accommodate private companies 
who could satisfy the whims and fancies of individual officers of the government” (High 
Court Bombay, 1992: 9).  
Thus, with the ruling of the High Court of Bombay it becomes apparent that an assembly of 
powerful politicians and private developers ordered the development of the Back Bay from 
1950 to the 1970s. Developers were attracted by the potential to make money from the 
development of land in the most expensive and important region of the city, and they paid 
politicians to align their desires with their own, leading to the flouting of laws directing 
urban planning and development, and skirting norms of local governance. To facilitate the 
development of the Back Bay, politicians worked to assemble a chimera of objective 
                                                
13 Floor space index refers to the ratio between the total floor area of a building in relation to the size of land 
on which the building sits. An FSI of 3.5 thus allows 3.5 times the size of the land to be built into the floor 
area of the entire building.   
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necessity through the one man Barve Committee and argued for reclamation with a logic 
necessitating increased land for “community requirements” like social housing and slum 
relocation sites. Further, state politicians assembled power over urban planning through the 
Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act and the BMRDA. This had the effect of 
limiting the power of the municipal government in the city assemblage, which necessitated 
their use of the courts to intervene in the development of the city for which they had been 
elected to represent citizens. The trajectory of development adopted by state politicians and 
private developers contradicts the interests of the city as a whole, as argued by national, 
state, municipal, and multilateral organizations. Clearly, for state politicians the logic of 
capital accumulation trumped logics of good governance and sustainable urban planning.  
4.5 The freeze of 1978 
In the years following the allotments awarded in 1974, pressure to develop the Back Bay 
did not wane. In 1974 celebrated architect Charles Correa drew up a plan to apply the 
modern urban planning concepts of aesthetics and functionalism to the Back Bay in what he 
marketed as, “an event for the city […] unprecedented in the contemporary Indian urban 
scene” (Correa, as quoted in the Economic and Political Weekly, 1976: 1104). Correa’s 
design intended to fill the developmental gaps to the north of New Cuffe Parade with a 
promenade, dam, artificial lake, and low-rise public-oriented architecture. The state 
government did not waste the opportunity to camouflage further reclamation as a cultural 
“happening” and in October of the same year Chief Minister V.P. Naik agreed to the Correa 
plan in principle (Patel, 1975). The development of the BBRS was now not only necessary 
for “community requirements” including public housing for relocated squatters, state 
employees, and low and middle income groups, but also as a chance to modernize the city 
through functional planning design.  
However, a series of Supreme Court injunctions protecting the rights of indigenous fisher 
colonies in the area placed a legal hurdle in the path of further reclamation. These rulings, 
together with growing public dissent through citizen action groups such as the Save 
Bombay Committee, motivated the government of Maharashtra in 1975 to appoint another 
committee, chaired by M.D. Kale, the Secretary of Public Works, to re-examine the BBRS 
for the third time. The Kale Committee forwarded their report to the government on August 
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9, 1975 and the report was shortly thereafter circulated to the public. Unsurprisingly, the 
report advanced by the state’s committee advocated the reclamation of 52 hectares more 
than the 128 hectares already allotted. The additional area would provide 41 hectares of 
public amenities, 6 hectares of housing, and 5 hectares of commercial space. The public’s 
reaction to the plan was mixed, showing appreciation for the public spaces but 
condemnation of the commercial development, which would increase traffic congestion 
(MMRDA, 1990).  
With reclamation in the Back Bay still on hold due to the Supreme Court injunctions, the 
Save Bombay Committee (SBC) organized a seminar at K.C. College in 1978 to discuss 
issues of reclamation. The SBC was registered as a society and public trust in 1973, and 
was composed of several influential public figures such as Mayor Joshi, the city’s sheriff, 
journalist Rusi Karanjia, and Municipal Councillor Kisan Mehta. Mr Rajni Patel, the newly 
appointed Regional Congress Committee President, agreed to attend the seminar and urged 
Chief Minister V.P. Naik, to participate as well. It was during the seminar that Patel asked 
Naik why the government was continuing to reclaim land in the Back Bay. The Chief 
Minister at first replied about the necessity of relocating the state government offices there, 
but under pressure asserted that the government would immediately quit their efforts. As 
Kisan Mehta (Email correspondence, 2010) explains it, this news spread rapidly across the 
country, and even though the Chief Minister recanted the statement several days later, Patel 
took him to task on his public statement. Concurrently, the High Court proceedings against 
BBRS participants were being heard, which “added to the public disgust to reclamation. 
The government was embarrassed” (Mehta, 2010). The surprising result, communicated on 
December 9, 1978, was that the government took the policy decision to stop all further 
reclamation: only two small areas to be used by fishermen were permitted to be developed 
thereafter. In retrospect, it is an amazing concurrence of events, the High Court Hearings 
and the public slip-up by the Chief Minister at the SBC seminar, that managed to stop the 
reclamation, where criticism from the World Bank, Government of India, State of 
Maharashtra agencies, and the BMC could not.  
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4.6 Post 1978 
Nevertheless, despite the official development freeze illegal reclamation work continued in 
the Back Bay. A letter to the editor of The Daily, written by the President of the Colaba 
Cuffe Parade Citizens Group, points to land being reclaimed in the southeast corner of 
Block IV of the BBRA. The letter states that small-scale reclamation, which had started in 
Cuffe Parade in 1985, had turned into “massive dumping operations being carried out day 
and night on a war footing” by 1988. Further, Kumar explained that he had tried to get 
information from the Bombay Collector (a branch of the state government in charge of state 
lands) and from the municipal office, to no avail (Kumar, The Daily, 1988). Together with 
oral histories recorded from residents of Cuffe Parade (Cooper, 2010) Kumar’s letter points 
to land being reclaimed and breakwaters established north of Cuffe Parade. There is no 
evidence to prove the state government continued its efforts of reclamation despite publicly 
agreeing to freeze development, but a current map of the Back Bay (Figure 4.4) bears 
uncanny resemblance to an unpublished plan by the state government to reclaim land north 
of Cuffe Parade (Figure 4.5). Eventually the land referred to by Kumar was reterritorialized 
by the Cuffe Parade Resident’s Association as a semi-private park. The breakwaters were 
probably created to reclaim additional land, however, the work was arrested leaving the 
breakwaters to sit in place and contribute to the slow reclamation of land by the natural 




Figure 4.4 Map of Cuffe Parade (Block V of BBRA) and surrounding area. Red indicates park and blue 
indicates breakwaters 
Source: Google Maps and Author 
Following the impetus derived from the Correa plan, the government reframed the BBRS in 
terms of aesthetics. In August 1981 a small document entitled, Back Bay Beautification 
Scheme, made its way from the Executive Committee of the BMRDA to the Urban 
Development Department (UDD) of the state government (BMRDA, 1981) (Figure 4.5). In 
this first iteration of the Beautification Scheme the Executive Committee argues that the 
abrupt development freeze initiated in December 1978 had undesirable results for the area 
such as: the formation of awkward pockets of un-reclaimed areas susceptible to siltation by 
natural processes, an aesthetically displeasing truncated profile of the shore line, and 
unauthorized dumping leading to “unconsciously reclaiming some land” (MMRDA, 1981: 
3). The Beautification Scheme had incorporated some of the details of the Correa plan such 
as a large promenade encircling an artificial body of water. It called for the reclamation of 
17.26 hectares for “public and semi-public purposes” to address the stated concerns 
(BMRDA, 1981: 4). 
Concurrently, the BMC moved to reterritorialize the potential land through a draft 
Development Plan submitted on May 26, 1983. The municipal DP called for the 
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reclamation of 45.16 hectares in the BBRA. However, several weeks later on June 15 the 
government of Maharashtra issued a notification stating that the BMRDA would take over 
from the BMC as the legal planning authority for the entirety of the BBRA, which was 
designated as a Special Planning Area (SPA). This move effectively cut the BMC out of the 
planning assemblage for the Back Bay and signalled that development work would 
continue as before under the state government.  
Figure 4.5 Cover of Back Bay Beautification Scheme  
Source: MMRDA (1981) 
The MMRDA declared its intention to create a new Development Plan in 1985 and two 
years later its plan for the Back Bay, a reworked “Back Bay Beautification Scheme,” was 
made public. The new plan acknowledged that public pressure had caused the government 
to freeze development of the BBRA and that all un-allotted plots should be used only for 
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public purposes. The plan went on to document the problems caused by the December 1, 
1978 notification (as described earlier) and billed the plan as a compromise between the 
Kale Committee plan and the development freeze. The published MMRDA plan calls for 
the reclamation of 17.27 hectares for public and private purposes, including retail outlets 
and a sea wall that would prevent further unauthorized reclamation. The report appropriates 
and reverses the logic used by the BMC in the 1970s by citing traffic and parking 
challenges of the area, and the paucity of electrical infrastructure, as necessitating more 
reclamation. The report stipulates that a minimum of 14.88 hectares reclaimed from the sea 
is necessary for: a sea wall, promenade, road, Indira Gandhi Memorial, garden, parking, 
transit camp, the Tata Electric Company, and land for smoothing the reclamation boundary 
(Bombay High Court, 1992).  
Despite the plan’s appeal to aesthetic considerations and community requirements the 
media’s reaction to the 1987 Beautification Scheme was merciless in its condemnation of 
the project. Several papers reported that the MMRDA committee meeting had been called 
on the same day as a large BMC function, which was interpreted as an effort to exclude 
possibly dissenting voices of the Shiv Sena political party committee members likely to 
vote against the plan. The press reported that politicians were served Champaign in their 
limousines on the way to the meeting and enjoyed a sumptuous feast there, all calculated to 
win votes at the voters’ expense. More substantive fears were raised regarding the vagaries 
of the plan, which could give way to imaginative interpretations of land use designation. 
Other fears surrounded the usurpation of public lands into private spaces for the wealthy, 
such as a proposal to build a gymkhana (sports centre) for government officers in the place 
of an open area. The construction of a helipad to transport VIPs and politicians was 
questioned: “How many people would be able to use this and how much of a nuisance it 
will be for anyone to see” (Bist and Shankar, 1987: 9). Underlying all these criticisms were 
the ever-present over-crowding and already over-burdened infrastructure. One newspaper 
suggests that the makers of the scheme perceived the potential hurdles in accepting and 
implementing the plan and therefore provided housing in the plan to municipal councillors, 
MLAs and judges, in a bid to buy “peace and quietude” (Onlooker, 1987: 27). Ultimately, 
the Beautification Scheme, which had been so elaborately designed and strategically carried 
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out, failed to be passed on August 20th 1987, as two councillors and an MLA demanded 
more time to study it. 
This hurdle, of course, did not stop the drive to reclaim more land. After things had settled 
down, in 1989 the state government once again announced their intention of reclaiming 15 
hectares in the Back Bay. In their defence of this scheme this time, Municipal 
Commissioner Mr. S.S. Tinaikar, and the MMRDA Commissioner Mr. S.R. Kakodkar 
(both appointed by the Chief Minister), changed tact from the need for aesthetic 
improvements to the growing threat of slum dwellers, which had otherwise been excluded 
in considering plans for the area. They suggested that the largest part of the new land to be 
reclaimed was to be used for a sea wall, which would finally put an end to all further 
reclamation and the proliferation of squatter settlements. Kakodkar says: 
From 60-65 huts in the Fisherman’s Colony in 1979, there are more than 1000 huts today. Are they all 
occupied by fishermen? [...] It is to stop this and provide a firm boundary that proposals made three years 
ago […] were pushed at last week’s meeting. (as quoted in the Times of India, October 1, 1989).  
 
This is the first direct reference to slums and slum dwellers in the literature reviewed about 
the development of the Back Bay. Similarly, in documentation about slum dwellers in 
particular (in State archives or media archives) there is no mention of any form of 
resistance or acquiescence to the development of the Back Bay. This is curious as the 
development of the Back Bay would have massive implications for slum dwellers living 
there, and the development of slums along the coast would affect the redevelopment of the 
Back Bay; especially as state policies became reoriented towards toleration and acceptance. 
As demonstrated in later chapters, despite efforts to limit the growth of slums, State 
policies actually facilitated their growth, by providing forms of tenure security and services. 
Meanwhile, during periods when reclamation was deemed illegal (and going forward as the 
next section explains) slums along the coast of the Back Bay continued to reclaim land, 
which could ostensibly be reterritorialized by the State. The suggestion here, made without 
any form of conclusive evidence, is that slum dwellers’ land reclamation efforts were and 
are tolerated up to a certain point because this trajectory is aligned with that of the State.  
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4.7 Coastal Regulation Zone 
Before the state government could implement its plan to further reclaim the Back Bay, 
national legislation issued by the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) arrested 
further reclamation of the Back Bay. On February 20, 1991 the MoEF published the 
Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) as part of The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, for 
“protecting and improving the quality of the coastal environment and preventing, abating 
and controlling environmental pollution” (Government of India, 2002). The CRZ 
legislation limits certain activities along the coast and other bodies of water affected by 
tidal movements up to 500 meters from the high tide line, and totally prohibits land 
reclamation. There are four zones identified under the legislation: CRZ I exists between the 
low and high tide lines where no development is permitted; CRZ II includes urban areas 
that have been developed up to the shore line and consists of several building restrictions 
including the limiting of FSI to 1.3; CRZ III relates to relatively undisturbed areas up to the 
shore line, and within 200 meters of the high tide line; CRZ IV relates to islands. In 
conjunction with this legislation the State of Maharashtra introduced its own legislation on 
the same day by amending the Development Control Regulations to include Regulation 59, 
which states that except for underground toilets and greening without construction, no 
construction can take place on coastal land up to 200 meters from the high tide line. As a 
result of these legislative enactments legal reclamation in the Back Bay was suspended and 
development efforts have been severely constrained by the limited FSI, which has protected 
squatter settlements along the coast from being developed: at least until recently. In 
September 2010, the FSI on CRZ II land was increased to a minimum of 2.5 and may be 
extended to 4 in some cases, and this change will certainly alter the trajectory of many 
squatter settlements that have emerged along Mumbai’s shoreline.  
4.8 Recent developments in the Back Bay 
Until recently, there has been little official development carried out in the Back Bay, 
although the present DP, which was prepared in 2000, still projects 11 hectares of 
reclamation. On Block VI of the BBRS, the DP map indicates that the sea runs right up to 
the bus depot, where in fact Ganesh Murthy is located. As a general policy, slums are not 
indicated on DPs, but the fact that the land is not even acknowledged as land is curious: 
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especially as the map does not concur with the high tide line, which is also indicated on the 
map (Figure 4.6). In the past year the BMC’s Harbour Department has consolidated the 
shoreline to the north of Cuffe Parade by placing very large boulders in a wide swath along 
the shoreline. The Harbour Department, which is a branch of the BMC, has jurisdiction 
over the space between the low and high tides – between the sea and where the MMRDA’s 
jurisdiction starts. The Harbour Department is also in charge of maintaining the sea wall, 
which collapsed in front of Ganesh Murthy and was repaired in 1996 (Sequeria, 1996).  
Figure 4.6 Development Plan as of 2010  
Source: MMRDA (2010) 
Additional construction in the Back Bay is being pursued through the Slum Rehabilitation 
Authority with the redevelopment of Mahatma Phule Nagar by Ace Links Developers in 
the northeast corner. Documentation from the SRA reveals that the developers have applied 
for several changes to the original scheme they had submitted, and with the change in FSI 
in CRZ, more changes are likely as well. Concurrently, residents of the Mahatma Phule 
Nagar have complained of being shut out of the development, of not being informed of the 
rehabilitation plan, of being asked to relocate to Mankurd (much further to the north), of 
physical threats, and blackmail (Suryawanshi, 2010).  
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Another spurious development in the Back Bay is located between Ganesh Murthy and the 
BEST bus depot along Prakash Pethe Marg. For several years a 31-story building has been 
constructed ostensibly for the purposes of housing retired military commanders and 
important politicians by the Adarsh society. In 2009 I was privy to documents assembled 
by Ghar Bachao Ghar Banao Andolan, an NGO concerned with defending the rights of 
squatter residents and civic justice in general, which proved that widespread corruption 
existed in the construction of the building. In early 2010 the NGO made the documents 
public and a year later a wide swath of Mumbai’s political elite are reeling from their 
involvement. While the specifics of the case are beyond the purview of this chapter, they 
reveal that the developer enrolled high-level government employees to illegally issue 
permits and false Non Objection Clauses, amend Development Plans, and transfer 
development rights. Those implicated include employees of the MMRDA, which issued all 
clearances, employees of BEST for transferring the development rights of the Bus Depot to 
the developer, and many others including IAS officers and, unsurprisingly, the Chief 
Minister of Maharashtra who was forced to resign because of his involvement. The 
Municipal Corporation used the scandal as leverage to regain lost power over urban 
development in the city by trying to abolish the MMRDA as SPA for the Back Bay. The 
Mayor said: “Incidents like Adarsh can be contained only if there is one agency to decide 
about development and planning. The powers should be vested with BMC” (As reported in 
Sharma, 2011).  
Finally, in terms of official development in the Back Bay, plans are quietly being drawn to 
house a metro car shed in Block VI of the BBRA (where Ganesh Murthy is located) for a 
new subway line being devised by the Metropolitan Rail Transportation Project (MRTP), 
which is a branch of the MMRDA. Several plans are being formulated depending on the 
latitude given by the MoEF for adhering to CRZ norms. The most extensive plan would 
require the reclamation of the entirety of Block VI to include a large maintenance facility. 
Alternatively, a smaller shed could be built and the maintenance facility could be moved to 
the northern end of the line by extending the track by eight kilometres, although this would 
involve another portion of CRZ land. In both cases the shed could either be placed above or 
below ground, but considering the helipad, bus depot, and seaside location, the MRTP 
would prefer to reclaim the land with debris being mined from a current metro line, build 
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below ground, and develop commercial and real estate properties on top of it. In July 2008, 
the MoEF in New Delhi denied the MRTP the right to build anything in Block VI of the 
BBRA, but the MRTP resubmitted the plan in the spring of 2009 arguing they had no other 
options. The Director of the MRTP was confident they would get the permission to build: 
“In the end, we’ll get the land” (Interview, Director MRTP, 12/18/09). 
4.9 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes to several aims of the thesis by providing contextual information 
into the macro-level concerns of contested urban planning processes in Mumbai and into 
the more micro-level concerns related to the Back Bay, where Ganesh Murthy is located. 
This contextual information is useful in the construction of a holistic approach to the 
emergence of Ganesh Murthy and to understand its potential future, which continues to be 
negotiated alongside an understanding of land (or its potential) as a virtual attractor 
motivating many developmental decisions. The development of Mumbai from the 16th 
century onwards is coincident with a desire for land for commercial purposes and the 
production of new land to meet these desires. The original seven islands were joined to 
create transportation routes to facilitate merchants who shipped goods out of the Deccan 
plateau through the port at Bom Bahia. Additional land was desired and produced to create 
space for industry and to provide worker housing for those industries and the peripheral 
jobs they helped create. Later, land was reclaimed for speculative real estate projects such 
as financial and service sector businesses and high-end residential buildings. Throughout, 
an attraction to the potential of land fussed the original seven islands and progressively 
expanded the physical boundaries of the city. 
To create this land from its mere potential various actors formed associations and worked 
together. Foremost in this theatre of reclamation are politicians and developers, whose close 
associations stem from as early as the 16th century, and continue today. Over time certain 
patterns of behaviour resulting from these associations become apparent, and as several 
historians of Mumbai’s urban development argue, city planning in the city has consistently 
reflected the needs and desires of its developers in serving to facilitate capital accumulation 
(Verma, 1981, 21; Dossal, 1991, as reported in Times of India, August 5, 1991). 
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The ostensible logic behind such urban development changes with the times. In the case of 
reclamation in the Back Bay the government first argued in the 1950s that land was needed 
for “community requirements” including “public housing,” and “relocation sites” for slum 
clearance programs. In the early 1970s more land was needed to create housing for “low 
and middle-income” groups. This need changed in 1974 to address modernist ideals of 
functionalism. In 1987 the need to reclaim more land in the Back Bay was to address issues 
of aesthetics and “beautification.” Two years later the justification for further reclamation 
was laid on the impending threat posed by squatters. While all of these reasons make some 
appeal to community needs, the tangible result of these appeals in the Back Bay is mainly 
manifested in luxury condominiums and high-rent office spaces. Clearly, for the 
government charged with administering the land, the potential profits offered by developers 
outweighed the social costs of further development. The World Bank was wrong when it 
said that only the government of Maharashtra benefits from further development of the 
BBRA (World Bank, as quoted in Economic and Political Weekly, 1976). As Ashoak 
Upadhyay (2010), referring to attempts to develop the Back Bay, put it, “land reclamation 
became a password to prosperity.”  
Reclamation in the Back Bay was also a password for corruption and the assembling of 
power over urban development. Corruption was apparent in the 1920s as the Back Bay 
Enquiry Committee found financial mismanagement and graft by the officers of the 
Development Directorate, while others were found to be siphoning off money to British 
interests. In the 1950s the BBRS was illegally reinitiated without a development plan as 
necessitated by the BTP Act, which prevented the public from assessing and commenting 
on the project. In the 1970s the government allotted 11 plots in the Back Bay to five 
builders out of 60 that applied. To conceal the obvious favouritism, let alone any changing 
of money that may have taken place, the builders used different names to conceal their 
associations with politicians. Another link between a politician and developer is the 
granting of extra FSI to Free Press House, despite official policies discouraging such types 
of developments. As Justice Suresh of the Bombay High Court said of the matter “the 
government was willing to accommodate private companies who could satisfy the whims 
and fancies of individual officers of the government” (High Court Bombay, 1992: 9). This 
“politician-builder nexus,” as it is referred to in the Indian press, is well documented (c.f. 
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Weinstein, 2008; Mahadevia, 2005; Thakkar, 1996). An article written in 2005 by 
Chandrashekhar Prabhu when he held, amongst other titles, the presidency of the 
Maharashtra Housing and Area development Authority (MHADA), details aspects of this 
relationship from an insider’s perspective. He states that the reterritorialization of land 
mainly through land reclamation along the coast or along rivers “is a major source of 
income for politicians” (Prabhu, 2005: no pagination).  
The money involved in land development in Mumbai has twisted the political order such 
that local self-governance and democratic ideals have been quashed by the consolidation of 
power in the state government and in the position of the Chief Minister in particular. As a 
sign of things to come, in the 1950s the state government reinitiated the BBRS without 
input from municipal government, which was the legal planning authority of Mumbai. In 
the 1960s the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act greatly shifted power from the 
municipality to the state by creating a hierarchy favourable to the state and establishing the 
state government as the ultimate arbiter of the local DP. In fact, while the city continues to 
be the legal planning authority in theory, the Development Plan it creates is verified by the 
UDD (state agency) and then actually created by the state’s Town Planning Department. In 
the 1970s the creation of the BMRDA (later changed to MMRDA) as an apex authority was 
a masterstroke for the state’s consolidation of power. Besides being the Special Planning 
Authority (SPA) for the BBRA, the MMRDA is also SPA for the largest developments in 
the city including: the Bandra-Kurla complex, the Oshiwara District Centre, and the 
International Finance and Business Centre, amongst others. Additionally, the MMRDA 
controls all transportation and major infrastructure projects in the city such as the Mumbai 
Metro Rail Project, the Mumbai Monorail Project, the MUTP, MUIP and a host of other 
projects. The problem is not that there is an apex body directing development, but that this 
body has assembled a tremendous amount of power to create and implement projects in the 
city, and is unaccountable to the local population. Of the 17 member Authority directing the 
agency, only four are elected municipal representatives. Many of the other elected 
member’s constituencies are located outside of the city, which greatly limits their sense of 
responsibility to the local population. As an urban planner at the MMRDA says, “the 
MMRDA can do what they want, and they do do what they want” (Interview, 12/23/09).  
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The MMRDA itself is a tool of the Chief Minister of Maharshtra, who chairs the highest 
authoritative council, and appoints the MMRDA Commissioner. Indeed, the Chief Minister 
has assembled a tremendous amount of power over land development in the city. The Chief 
Minister appoints the Commissioner of the BMC, occupies the chair of the UDD and SRA, 
and is the Housing Minister. The Chief Minister’s office is also implicated by Prabhu 
(2005), who lists the de-reservation of land plots by a succession of Chief Ministers for 
profit by opening them up to private development. The last Chief Minister was forced to 
resign over a land development deal implicating a wide set of government agencies.  
The potential to personally profit from reclaiming and developing the Back Bay led to 
spurious associations between politicians and developers and contributed to the state’s 
consolidation of power. However, the state’s trajectory of reclamation in the Back Bay was 
consistently attacked by other actors that sought to establish competing trajectories. The 
municipal government long tried to maintain control over the area and produced plans to 
establish its own trajectory of reclamation perhaps in part to align the city with the desires 
of state officials. A plethora of organizations including state bodies, the central 
government, the municipal government, multilateral organizations and local NGOs 
condemned the state’s reclamation efforts in the Back Bay. When the tactics of the 
municipal government and the various public admonitions had no effect in arresting the 
state’s reclamation efforts the municipal government and other political actors took the 
state to court, which went to the Supreme Court of India. It took the force of two confluent 
trajectories to finally disrupt the state’s reclamation in the 1970s: the publicity of juridical 
proceedings proving the criminality of government officials together with the public 
statement of the Chief Minister to withdraw from further reclamation. Even so, the state 
continued to push for reclamation, only to be temporarily arrested by the CRZ in the 1990s.  
The state government has not forsaken its golden goose as, quietly, the MRTP is trying to 
reterritorialize Block VI for a rail shed and being open to forms of development on top of 
the infrastructure. Meanwhile, slowly but surely the Back Bay is being reclaimed in other 
ways not directly linked to the government but certainly reliant on them to some degree. 
Squatter settlements that emerged on the shores of the Back Bay in the mid 1960s have 
expanded to include tens of thousands of people occupying many new hectares of land 
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along the shore. There are now roughly ten squatter settlements in the Back Bay, and they 
and their residents are formidable engines of reclamation. 
The squatter settlements could never have gained a foothold in the Back Bay if it were not 
for the dynamic and contested system of local reclamation that has spanned close to 200 
years. If the government had been successful in its efforts, there would never have been a 
Ganesh Murthy Nagar or other settlements similar to it. But if the government had not been 
at least partially successful, again, Ganesh Murthy would not exist. As these settlements eat 
into mangrove forests, beloved by environmentalists and owners of wealthy condominiums 
in the area, it is not clear how or if the government is working to arrest their development. 
Indeed, the government has provided water, electricity, and other components that have 
facilitated the growth of these illegal and unwanted settlements. The following chapters 
therefore explore the emergence and development of Ganesh Murthy to uncover the various 
productive associations within the settlement and between these networks and politicians, 












Population, Land, Hutments: Intensive Processes and an Overview of the 
Nomadic Assemblage 
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 5.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of Ganesh Murthy’s population and built environment 
by charting its origins in the early 1970s and its expansion over nearly forty years. The 
incipient settlement, originally a marshy mangrove forest, was territorialized through three 
interlinked intensive processes from which emerged its built environment and a community 
of people with far-ranging internal and external associations. Various components of the 
settlement were assembled through self-organizing forces without an external authority. 
However, the reciprocal relations between components, which enable and constrain action, 
have resulted in social hierarchies and fragmentation in the community. Elements of the 
State apparatus are identified as important components in the development of the 
settlement, which is understood as nomadic for its persistent existence outside the State 
despite the latter’s attempts at capture and containment.  
The chapter commences with an overview (5.2) of the settlement in terms of its population 
(5.2.1) and built environment (5.2.2). The following section charts the development of 
Ganesh Murthy (5.3) from its origins in the early 1970s (5.3.1) through the 1980s (5.3.2), 
the 1990s (5.3.3), and into the new millennium (5.3.4). The next section makes the case for 
understanding Ganesh Murthy as an assemblage (5.4) by briefly reiterating the role of land 
as a virtual attractor (5.4.1), and outlining the movement of Mumbai’s housing sector far 
from equilibrium (5.4.2), before explaining the dynamic between the three intensive 
processes of movement to the settlement, hutment construction, and land reclamation 
(5.4.3). The final section (5.5) argues that Ganesh Murthy occupies smooth space outside 
the striated space of the State, and details the nature between the nomadic settlement 
assemblage and the State apparatus.  
5.2 Overview of Ganesh Murthy 
5.2.1 Social strata 
The population of Ganesh Murthy Nagar currently stands at approximately 11,000 people 
and is mainly composed of migrants that came to Mumbai in search of work and their 
families. To a large extent, migrants were drawn to the settlement’s basin of attraction in 
 123 
the late 1970s and afterwards by employment opportunities in the vicinity of the settlement 
and through village and familial associations: roughly 50 percent of the population have 
relatives living in the settlement. With a population composed mainly of migrants, the 
settlement exhibits a high degree of regional origin variation (Figure 5.1). Residents hail 
from three countries, India, Bengal, and Nepal and from 18 states within India. Despite the 
high proportion of people from Uttar Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Bihar, there is no pervasive 
regional identity in the settlement. Unlike the Dharavi14 districts of Kamaraj Nagar, where 
most people come from Tamil Nadu, or Indira Kureishi Nagar with its high concentration 
of people from Uttar Pradesh (Sharma, 2000), at Ganesh Murthy regional culture does not 
contribute to a common settlement identity. If anything, the vast regional diversity may 
exasperate pervasive feelings of social fragmentation in the settlement.  
 
Figure 5.1 Demonstrates regional origins of residents of Ganesh Murthy 
                                                
14 Dharavi is one of the largest slums in Mumbai with a population exceeding 1 million people. 
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Employment in Ganesh Murthy is similarly diverse but dominated by low paying jobs in 
the service, transportation, and commercial sectors, which each employ a quarter of the 
settlement’s residents (Figure 5.2). Most resident’s work places are located nearby the 
settlement. 16 percent of the population is employed as domestic labourers at the nearby 
wealthy condominiums of Cuffe Parade in the form of cooks, cleaners, chauffeurs, or 
nannies. 12 percent of residents are employed at Navy Nagar in various roles, and nine 
percent work in the settlement itself. An additional 48 percent of residents are employed in 
Colaba, Fort, and Nariman Point, while only seven percent work north of Fort (Figure 5.3). 
Thus, it is clear that proximity of the settlement to employment is an important livelihood 
condition.  
 




Figure 5.3 Demonstrates resident’s location of work place  
 
Ascertained through interviews with residents, average salaries in the service, 
transportation, commercial, and domestic help sectors are roughly INR 700015 per month. 
With an average of 1.5 workers per hutment, the average monthly income per hutment is 
INR 10,500. Average figures, however, obscure the widely divergent economic realities 
that exist in the settlement. Residents may earn enough income for comfortable lifestyles 
through well-paid jobs as business owners, bank workers, and through other means. For 
example, one family living in the settlement collects rent from two commercial properties 
near Fort and a new condominium located in North Mumbai. Wealthy residents often have 
larger hutments than the norm, which may be serviced by domestic labour, and 
accessorized with showers, refrigerators, air conditioners, satellite antennas, and wide 
                                                
15 The value of Indian Rupees (INR) to British Pounds (GBP) is calculated with the exchange rate of 1 INR to 
0.0137796 GBP. The average monthly salary is thus 96.49 GBP. 
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screen televisions. At the other end of the spectrum many more families live in rudimentary 
shanties covered by blue tarpaulin roofs. These families were observed to suffer multiple 
health-related issues and are not able to afford basic amenities such as potable water and 
medical care. Thus, against a prevailing notion that only the poor reside in squatter 
settlements this study suggests diverse planes of existence in the economic strata.  
In terms of community participation, 61 percent of the population reported being active in 
the settlement’s community in some way but only 28 percent identified themselves as 
belonging to a formal community group. Of these 28 percent a quarter of respondents were 
members of organized religious communities, however, many more residents belong to 
small informal religious consistencies that organize annual celebrations of particular 
deities. Interviews with religious leaders in this primarily Dalit settlement revealed that 
there is a clear separation between religion and local administration of the settlement, with 
religious bodies playing little if any role in the supply of goods or services. 16 percent of 
those involved with formal community groups report participating in the settlement’s 
administrative processes and 11 percent report involvement with a local CBO. 12 percent 
reported being involved in political activities associated with party politics.  
Anecdotal information gleaned from interviews together with observation suggests that the 
adult population of the settlement is largely uneducated and those employed spend the 
majority of their time at work. This, coupled with labour intensive domestic responsibilities 
(due to limited services) and observed propensity to drink alcohol, has led to a general 
neglect of children, who spend much of their time roaming the settlement. One social 
worker living and working in the settlement (Interview, 11/12/09) says that this neglect is 
one of the greatest challenges currently facing the settlement. In the vacuum created by 
parental disregard, gangs have come to fill the void. “Now there is a more gang-like 
atmosphere. Kids are taken by gangs against their will to do things. There are no good role 
models.”   
Demographic information reveals that the social strata of Ganesh Murthy Nagar is 
inhabited by a diverse meshwork of informal consistencies based mainly on familial 
connections and some form of community participation, but also on regional, employment, 
caste, and other affiliations. Running throughout this web are more formal networks forged 
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by religious, administrative, and political associations. Based upon interviews with 
residents and through observation, broad connections between residents are apparent in 
their detailed knowledge of each other’s identity and activities. Yet concurrently, the 
survey, interviews, and observation reveal that these connections are weak and tentative. 
Even though half the population have relatives in the settlement, only 18 percent of these 
rely on these networks in times of need. Further, only five and four percent of the 
population rely on friends and neighbours, respectively, in times of difficulty. 65 percent 
report not having anyone at all to turn to. Additionally, nearly a quarter of survey 
respondents identified forms of social friction as problematic for the settlement and 
examples of such were readily apparent during the course of my research. Not only were 
disagreements and fights prevalent, but during interviews many respondents displayed fear 
that their neighbours would overhear what they had to say. Respondents would choose not 
to answer certain questions, others would only have the conversation inside their hutments, 
and some would only agree to talk at a location outside the settlement. Thus, the broad 
distribution of social ties in the settlement is tempered by weak links and discontinuities in 
the form of distrust, social friction, and the inability to rely on social networks in times of 
need. 
5.2.2 Built environment  
Ganesh Murthy Nagar is one of fourteen squatter settlements located in the affluent 
borough of Colaba, located at the southern tip of the Mumbai peninsula. The wealthy 
residential enclave of Cuffe Parade is half a kilometre north of the settlement. The financial 
and business districts of Fort and Nariman point are located three kilometres north. The 
terminals of the two north-south railroad lines in Mumbai are also located approximately 
three kilometres north of the settlement. Relative to the city as a whole, there are many 
large open green spaces in Colaba and there is considerable access to the Arabian Sea on 
the east and west sides of the peninsula. For these and other reasons, Colaba and the 
surrounding area is a highly desirable residential and commercial area, a fact reflected by 
Nariman point having had the most expensive real estate values in the world in 1996 
(Nijman, 2000).  
 128 
Ganesh Murthy Nagar is located in the Back Bay on state-owned land, where it occupies 
roughly 5.4 hectares of land. A road named Prakash Pethe Marg marks the eastern 
periphery of the settlement and this road extends down to Navy Nagar, which occupies the 
entire southern tip of the peninsula, and forms the southern boundary of the settlement 
(Figure 5.4). To the west of the settlement, a fence marks the beginning of a mangrove 
forest, which idles by the Arabian Sea. The fence was erected by MMRDA, the planning 
authority for the Back Bay, and is guarded day and night by men occupying several 
surveillance platforms. To the north of the settlement there are three built elements: at the 
western extremity of the northern border there is Ambedkar Nagar, another squatter 
settlement, followed by the Bombay Electrical Supply and Transport Company (BEST) bus 
station in the middle, and a construction site where luxury condominiums are being 
constructed at the eastern extremity. In proximity to the settlement are four other notable 
features. A dhobi ghat, or slum-like textile-washing place, called Rajak Nagar, exists near 
the corner of Prakesh Pethe Marg and Sadhu Vaswani Road. Rajak Nagar is the oldest slum 
in the area, having registered the Colaba Rajak Consumers Co-operative Society in 1951 
(Bombay High Court PIL Writ Petition No 45, 2007).  
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Figure 5.4 Map of Ganesh Murthy and surrounding area  
Source: Google Maps and author 
 
Another squatter settlement called Geeta Nagar is located to the west of Ganesh Murthy 
along a road bordering the northern periphery of Navy Nagar. There is also a vacant lot 
adjacent to the settlement, which was formerly part of Ambedkar Nagar. It was cleared of 
hutments in 1997, to make way for a state-initiated helipad. Finally, Ambedkar Nagar 
surrounds a Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) transit 
camp, where those displaced by government projects have been given housing 
accommodations. An aerial view of Ganesh Murthy Nagar and its surrounding area reveals 
two very different textures of built environments (Figure 5.5). Slums areas are densely 
occupied by hutments spreading out to their limits, while military, commercial and formal 
residential spaces are neatly laid out with roads connecting buildings and open areas.  
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Figure 5.5 Demonstrates differences in the fabric of the built environment 
Source: Google Maps 
Ganesh Murthy is home to some 2100 hutments, which are mainly composed of one or two 
floors, but three story hutments also exist (Figure 5.6). The residential housing stock in the 
settlement is varied, with no two hutments being the same, but 81 percent of the total 
housing stock is dominated by brick and mortar pucca hutments. Five percent of hutments 
are kutcha structures, a mosaic of non-permanent materials such as driftwood, plastic bags, 
and metal plaques. 14 percent of hutments are semi-pucca, which are comprised of at least 
one permanent component, such as a cement slab floor, or brick walls together with non-
permanent materials (Figure 5.7). Most hutments occupy a small footprint (roughly ten feet 
by 15 feet) and are organized and managed to maximize efficiency. With interior dividing 
walls a rarity, the same space must be used for all domestic practices. Domestic spaces 
accommodate various activities by employing creative tools, such as tables mounted on 
walls by hinges that fold down, multi-use furniture (a bed may double as a table and a 
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couch), or washing places for culinary equipment and clothes sculpted from concrete that 
double as door steps. 
 
Figure 5.6 Map indicating levels of hutments in the settlement 




Figure 5.7 Various hutments at Ganesh Murthy Nagar 
Source: Author 
Hutments are connected to one another via long, narrow alleys (Figure 5.8) and where 
alleys are home to multiple storied hutments, they are dark: additional floors jut out over 
the alley to maximize domestic living space (Figure 5.9). The composition of alleys is, like 
most elements in the settlement, varied; with some alleys paved by concrete blocks, some 
with dirt and diverse materials, while incipient alleys may still be home to stumps from the 
mangrove forest (Figure 5.10). The alleys themselves may contribute to the social 
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fragmentation witnessed in the settlement. The dark alleys do not provide a potential setting 
conducive to social interaction, let alone social gathering. Further, long alleys with few 
interconnections negate against social relations forming as a result of spatial proximity. 
These observations are supported by a lack of evidence demonstrating the existence of 
social consistencies based on the proximity of two successive alleys.  
 









Figure 5.10 New alley in the settlement 
Credit: Author 
Ganesh Murthy Nagar is colloquially divided into four parts, prosaically named Part I, Part 
II, Part III, and Part III Backside, and is accessed from three main locations (Figure 5.11). 
The primary access point is located on Prakesh Pethe Marg where a pathway from the road 
to the settlement is flanked on either side by motorcycle parking and an open area often 
occupied by kids playing (Figure 5.12). For a fee paid to the local administrator of Part I, 
the whole front area can be cleared to accommodate weddings and other communal 
gatherings. Additionally, there is an access point at the southwest corner of the settlement, 
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via a road that leads to Geeta Nagar. This entrance provides vehicular access to supply 
many of the businesses located along the settlement’s southern commercial road (Figure 
5.13). The settlement may also be accessed along a commercial alley adjacent to the bus 
station through Ambedkar Nagar, and through several small alleys spanning the two 
settlements (Figure 5.14). Ambedkar Nagar, in turn, has many access points along Sadhu 
Vaswani Road to its north, which also hosts a large police station and an informal food 
market in the evenings. Finally a wide alley between Rakesh Nagar and the helipad 
provides additional access into the heart of Ambedkar Nagar. 
 
Figure 5.11 Demonstrating divisions in the settlement and three main access points 
Credit: Author  
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Figure 5.12 Primary access point to Ganesh Murthy Nagar along Prakesh Pethe Marg 
Credit: Author  
 
Figure 5.13 South side commercial street 
Credit: Author  
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Figure 5.14 Commercial alley joining Ganesh Murthy Nagar and Ambedkar Nagar 
Credit: Author  
Commercial enterprises line Ambedkar Nagar and Rajak Nagar along Prakesh Pethe Marg 
from Rajak Nagar to the corner of Sadhu Vaswani Road, and westwards along the limit of 
Ambedkar Nagar. There are 106 stores and business lining the two settlements. In Ganesh 
Murthy there are two major commercial arteries; which have a combined total of 73 
businesses (Figure 5.15). Additionally 58 smaller commercial enterprises are distributed 
throughout the settlement (Figure 5.16). These are composed mainly of essential food 
items, but also tailors and other services including three medical clinics. Thus, in terms of 
commercial accessibility, the settlement is largely self-sustaining on a day-to-day basis. 
Further, the redundant distribution of commercial retailers provides a degree of security and 
consistent supply of goods.  
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Figure 5.15 Transportation and commercial corridors in Ganesh Murthy and surrounding area 
Source: Author 
The settlement contains two mosques, one small chapel, and many Hindu devotionals 
peppered liberally on walls, hanging from plants, and detected via jasmine-infused air 
particles. The largest building in the settlement is owned by an inclusive Hindu 
organization, called Satsang, which has many devout followers in the settlement. The 
building was built five years ago, and the ability to assemble the land from various 








There are four toilet blocks located in Ganesh Murthy. The two blocks in Parts I and II 
were built by MHADA and are older, very basic, and operate without running water. The 
two newer (c. 2003) toilet blocks at the western and northern peripheries of the settlement 
are more elaborate, with tiled floors and walls, and serviced by running water. The 
combined total of toilet seats in the settlement is 79, thus the ratio of toilet seats to people is 
1:133. This ratio is almost three times the 1:50 ratio advocated by the BMC for squatter 
settlements. This deficiency is reflected in the survey with 31 percent of people reporting 
difficulties related to toilets. Other municipal infrastructural assets in the settlement are 
clustered in Part II, and include a water pumping station for Geeta Nagar, and several 
electrical meter substations in various states of decay and disrepair. There are also five 
municipal water schemes operating in the settlement, which have various pumping houses 
and storage tanks around the settlement. The presence of these water distribution networks 
is distributed throughout the settlement via pipes that snake above ground through 85 
percent of the settlement. 
Parts I and II of the settlement feature a sewer system that transports waste to a treatment 
facility. There are generally no toilets, urinals, or sinks in the hutments located in Parts I 
and II, but holes in alleys collect rainwater and other waste liquids (from washing and 
cooking) and connect to the sewer system. In Part III and Part III Backside sewer systems 
eject waste to a natural drainage plain at the western periphery of the settlement abutting 
the mangrove forest. This is also the settlement’s main solid waste dumping ground (Figure 
5.17). Much of the sewer system in Part III and Part III Backside was formally constructed, 
but a sizable portion of the system continues to be informally fashioned as hutments are 
improved upon and connected to the system, and as new hutments emerge at the fringes of 
the settlement. Maintenance of sewers is theoretically the responsibility of the city, but 
residents perform daily maintenance nonetheless. 13 percent of residents complained about 
drainage systems, the failure of which is particularly acute during the monsoon, which 
leads to flooding.  
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Figure 5.17 Drainage basin and dumping grounds preceding the mangrove forest 
Credit: Author 
In addition to the open area at the entrance to the settlement along Prakesh Pethe Marg, 
there are two open spaces that are located in Part II. Both spaces are near municipal assets; 
the pumping station and meter houses in one case, and the toilet blocks in the other case. 
Both spaces accommodate a covered stage, and based on the development of the settlement, 
are likely to have been constructed at roughly the same time as municipal interventions. 
The open areas are used by the settlement’s youth to gather and play sports and games. 
Resident group meetings, while by no means pervasive, have been known to take place 
around the stages as well. Young children (predominantly boys) also make use of the open 
helipad lot to play cricket and other sports, and wider alleys provide another impromptu 
place to play as well. For adults, there are fewer places to socialize. The market atmosphere 
of the southern commercial street makes for fleeting and tentative social interactions, and 
some alleys that do not completely block out light do provide social settings. Beyond the 
settlement, a restaurant located on the bus station lot, run by a prominent resident of 
Ganesh Murthy, provides a quiet and secluded locale for certain male residents to talk 
 143 
politics and business. Women gather publicly to wash clothes at a natural spring in between 
Ganesh Murthy and Geeta Nagar, and during the daily distribution of water in the alleys.  
In sum, the built environment of Ganesh Murthy Nagar may be defined by a diversity 
exhibited throughout a variety of components like individual hutments, alleys, commercial 
enterprises, open spaces, sewer systems, toilet blocks, water distribution systems, and 
others, which together operationalize the settlement as a residential enclave. However, this 
static representation fails to communicate the everyday fluidity of the built environment. 
Individual desires and abilities to improve spatial assets translates into an ever-evolving 
built environment, and because regulatory enforcement is lacking in the settlement, 
interventions can be made swiftly without engaging with planning and regulatory processes 
and authorities. The settlement is in constant transformation, with renovations occurring in 
hutments, floors being added, alleys receiving new water pipes, paving stones, or sewer 
lines and extensions, and businesses springing up or shutting down. The assembling and 
reassembling of all these various elements and the functional roles they play in the 
settlement is effected by chains of actors inside and outside the settlement without an 
ultimate authority governing the built environment. There are thus opportunities to effect 
change, but also various constraints and forces that obstruct or dissolve potentials. The 
following section thus introduces some of the actors and forces inherent in the constant 
reordering of the settlement’s built environment together with the social strata by narrating 
the unfolding of the settlement’s development since its origin in the early 1970s.  
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5.3 Charting the growth of the settlement 
5.3.1 1960-1980 
 
Figure 5.18 Projected built environment of settlement until 1980 
Credit: Author 
 
In the late 1960s, when construction crews started building the first luxury condominiums 
in Cuffe Parade, the land at Ganesh Murthy Nagar did not exist. In its place was a marsh 
populated by mangrove forests whose growth had been triggered by the 1920s iteration of 
the Back Bay Reclamation Scheme consisting of the reclamation of land at Navy Nagar and 
the construction of the sea wall (with a small opening) extending from the military 
compound to Marine Drive. Navy Nagar, the sea wall, and the sea’s tidal movements 
contributed to a process of siltation, which after 40 years had deposited enough silt in the 
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southeast corner of the Back Bay to facilitate the growth of the mangrove forest. No longer 
water but not quite land, the marshy forest’s potential as a territory for shelter attracted the 
attention of a handful of construction workers. Without affordable accommodation near 
their work in Cuffe Parade, they came to live in the marsh under saris suspended from 
sticks. They reclaimed small portions of land in the marsh to facilitate their living 
conditions and were joined by another group in search of land in 1974 (Interview, Resident 
of Ganesh Murthy, 10/03/09). Mr Murthy, representing 100 of his associates from the 
Garrison Engineers Service (GES) at Navy Nagar, had lost housing on the military base and 
petitioned the local Collector in charge of state lands for permission to squat the marsh. 
Allegedly, the Collector gave his permission for an undeclared sum of money, and the 
settlement called Ganesh Murthy Nagar gained consistency. One of the earliest settlers to 
arrive after Mr. Murthy and the GES personnel described the community very positively, 
saying: “People felt a sense of togetherness and unity. There were no problems amongst us 
at that time” (Interview, Resident of Ganesh Murthy, 13/03/09).  
In 1976 a slum census was carried out in Mumbai by the state government to enumerate the 
number of slums and their hutments and to segregate slums into official and unofficial 
classes. The census found 2.8 million slum dwellers living in 1,680 settlements (Panwalker, 
1996). “Ganesh Moorthy” was coded as an official slum and defined by the 110 hutments 
occupying the site. Other local slums in the area also gained “official” status. Rajak Nagar 
was defined with 24 hutments, and “Fisherman’s Colony”, to the north, is defined with 34 
hutments. The largest settlement coded at the time was Geeta Nagar with 985 settlements 
(State of Maharashtra, 1976). 
“Official” slums located on state land are segmented from other slums that are located on 
municipal or national government land, and from those slums that had resulted from illegal 
subdivision on privately-owned land. The coding of Ganesh Murthy as an official slum 
reterritorialized the incipient community by increasing its material identity and stability 
under state legislation. At this critical threshold the settlement changed in kind towards a 
becoming with greater potential for links with the State. The inclusion of Ganesh Murthy as 
an official slum created a perceived sense of tenure security and gave impetus to the 
improvement of shelters. Official slum status also created the potential to obtain basic 
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municipal amenities and this triggered the emergence of social consistencies oriented 
towards realizing these services. The establishment of the Sri Ganesh Murthy Hutment 
Dwellers’ Welfare Association, sometime between 1976 and 1980, is an example of such a 
consistency. The legislation creating official slums and the enumeration of hutments would 
also come to striate the settlement, creating a fault line between the official Ganesh Murthy, 
currently known as Part I, and the unofficial settlement following a line of flight away from 
Part I towards the west into the mangrove forests. Although the settlement had been 
captured to an extent by the State, inefficiencies in surveillance, regulation, and 
enforcement, together with the forceful flow of new migrants into the city prevented the 
State from maintaining the identity of the settlement as defined by 110 hutments. Migrant 
settlers, motivated by the potential of land and shelter at Ganesh Murthy, and the social 
consistencies that resulted thereof, generated a form of persistent disequilibrium16 in the 
settlement, facilitating an emergent pattern of development and organization. Lastly, while 
legislation removed the threat of demolition without relocation and thus added to a sense of 
tenure security, it denied real tenure security to residents, which would have stabilized the 
relationship between residents and the settlement, to the land. Instead, the settlement would 
remain unfixed and set adrift from forms of stability resulting from tenure security.   
                                                
16 “Persistent disequilibrium” denotes a state in between constancy and relentless change (see Kevin Kelly’s 
See Out of Control, 1995). In the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari, it is a state in between stratification 




Figure 5.19 Projected built environment of settlement until 1990 
Credit: Author 
The housing shortfall in Mumbai, resulting from migration flows to the city from the 1970s 
to the mid 1980s and the failure of formal housing supply mechanisms (Bhide, 2009) did 
not immediately impact the population and development of Ganesh Murthy. By the end of 
the 1970s there were roughly 500 people living in the settlement. However, in the decade of 
the 1980s the settlement’s area expanded threefold to accommodate some 400 hutments 
housing a population of 1,600 people. The need for increased essential services compelled 
the congealing of consistencies in the social register, which produced key socio-technical 
components of the settlement assemblage. 
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In 1981 the Maharashtra government amended the cut-off date for inclusion in the official 
slum register from 1976 to 1980. A slum census carried out in 1983 counted 1,930 
settlements in the city occupied by an estimated 4.3 million people living in 924,572 
hutments (Panwalker, 1996). The legislation and census enumeration at Ganesh Murthy 
triggered the organization of the Seva Sangh, a community based organization (CBO) 
created to procure municipal water services, in 1982. As with the 1976 efforts to 
reterritorialize slums, the legislation and census in the 1980s further striated the settlement, 
segregating the newly formed Part II community from Part I and the continually expanding 
settlement.  
During the decade of the 1980s the settlement moved westwards into the mangrove forest, 
constrained to the south by Navy Nagar, and to the north by the BEST bus station, which 
was established in 1976. As the settlement spread out, two main transportation corridors 
emerged to feed the influx of migrants building new hutments over marshy land. These are 
located along the borders between the settlement and its two aforementioned neighbours. 
The bus station, which went through several renovations and additions, made a vital 
contribution to the development of the settlement as a source of materials for construction 
and sand to reclaim land from the marsh. Residents recall that children were sent to the bus 
station to collect sand in buckets, as the security guards were more tolerant of children that 
trespassed the land than they were of adults. Demonstrating the importance of material 
inputs form the bus station, one resident asserts that the expansion of Ganesh Murthy 
“would not have been possible” without them (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 
10/18/09). The bus station provided materials to the settlement several times during periods 
of renovation and construction, and efforts to increase security there are documented by the 
multi-layered fence surrounding it. The fence features a base of stone that supports a newer 
cement wall with a newer metal fence on top of it, and is topped finally by barbed wire. 
Residents also used Navy Nagar as a dumping ground for garbage until a fence was erected 




Figure 5.20 Projected built environment of settlement until 2000  
Credit: Author 
 
On February 20, 1991 two important pieces of legislation were passed that fuelled the 
potential for growth at Ganesh Murthy. The Ministry of Environment and Forests of the 
central government created the Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) as part of the Environment 
(Protection) Act, 1986, to protect the quality of India’s coast from pollution and 
development. The CRZ legislation limits certain activities along the coast and other bodies 
of water affected by tidal movements up to 500 meters from the high tide line, and prohibits 
land reclamation. In addition, the Government of Maharashtra amended the Development 
Control Regulations, which regulates construction activities, to include Regulation 59. This 
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states that except for underground toilets and greening without construction, no 
construction can take place on coastal land up to 200 meters from the high tide line. This 
legislation my have triggered increased migration to the settlement by negating the 
possibility of further land reclamation and development by the State apparatus, thus 
creating a relatively safe location for migrants to informally settle. The Director of the 
Metropolitan Rail Transportation Project suggests that slum dwellers are aware of 
legislation that limit the development of land and act upon this information to find safe 
havens for their hutments (Interview, 11/18/09). The demographic data of migrants moving 
to Ganesh Murthy, as gleaned from the survey, supports this hypothesis. While the decade 
of the 1980s witnessed the population in the settlement increase by 1,100 people, the 
decade of the 1990s saw 5,900 more people in the settlement, propelling the population to 
7,000 people that occupied some 1,400 hutments.  
Bold newcomers to the settlement captured land by driving stakes into the ground and 
building horizontal platforms of wood suspended several feet above the marsh to live on. 
Makeshift walls and a plastic roof would quickly follow. Established residents of the 
settlement also captured land through the same processes with the intent of renting their 
second and third hutments to newcomers. Some of these established residents made a 
business out of providing rental housing, with one resident alleged to have had over one 
hundred units in their portfolio (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 11/15/09). Large-
scale reclamation of land and hutment development also occurred with the help of actors 
outside the settlement. In 1999, for example, the Indian Express newspaper reported that 70 
truckloads of debris were dumped into the mangrove forests at Ganesh Murthy, creating an 
acre of developable land. A local Municipal Councillor at the time said: “The slumlords in 
the area usually connive with politicians to grab the sea coast this way and then sell the 
reclaimed land at a premium... taking into account the high real estate prices in Colaba-
Cuffe Parade, there is big money involved here” (Singh, 1999a).  
The reclamation and territorialisation of land, which was ironically spurred by laws 
intended to achieve the opposite, was quickly reterritorialized by the State. Legislation was 
passed that again amended the cut-off date for inclusion in the official register of slums to 
1995 where it currently stands. As before these laws divided the settlement further to create 
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Part III and Part III Backside, and triggered the organization of more social consistencies to 
procure municipal services.  
The territorialisation of land from the mangroves and the development of hutments 
continued to follow a line of flight westward and concurrently to the north. To a large 
extent the topography of the land influenced the developmental trajectory of the settlement, 
which followed the high ground occupied by Navy Nagar and the bus station. The two 
main transportation corridors continued alongside these axes, which fed emerging alleys 
directed downwards into the marsh. A map representing the height of hutments in the 
settlement supports this conclusion (Figure 5.6). As slum hutments are generally built 
incrementally, over time and when owners have assembled the funds and materials to invest 
in their hutments, it is likely that the height of hutments is generally related to their age17. 
As such, the map shows that older elevated buildings are located in the southeast portion of 
the settlement and along the transportation corridors, while one-storied hutments are 
clustered towards the northwest of the settlement indicating it was developed later. The 
map also points to the expansion of the settlement along its vertical axis. Over time and 
with more residents incorporated into perceived tenure security, concrete slabs and brick 
and mortar walls replaced the original wooden platforms, makeshift walls, and tarpaulin 
roofs. The newer pucca hutments may support second floors and thus allow for rental 
incomes to be derived from the extra space or the accommodation of expanding families. 
Currently, 20 percent of Ganesh Murthy’s residents live in rental housing, where they pay 
anywhere from INR 1000 to 4000 a month.  
The 1990s was the largest decade of growth in Ganesh Murthy, with 45 percent of the 
current population moving, or having been born, there during the decade. However, the 
settlement did not follow a linear trajectory of constant expansion. A fire in 1996 destroyed 
a reported 300 to 400 hutments (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 10/07/09). 
Residents whose hutments were destroyed remained in the settlement and as the fire 
coincided with a large construction project at the bus depot, resulted in a major expansion 
into Part III. The event of the fire demonstrates the resilience of residents in overcoming 
setbacks, and the fluid character of the settlement space, which both expands and contracts.  
                                                
17 For a discussion about informal building practices and incremental building techniques see (Wells, 2001). 
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5.3.4 2000 - 2010 
 
Figure 5.21 Demonstrates built environment of settlement in 2010  
Credit: Author 
The first decade of the new millennium was a period of incremental growth, and 
destruction and contraction in the settlement. During the decade the population grew by 50 
percent, reaching some 11,000 people by 2010. The development of the settlement 
continued the pattern established in previous decades following a trajectory oriented to the 
west and avoiding the low marshy area for as long as possible. The settlement also 
continues its expansion vertically as well, and currently 50 percent of hutments have two 
floors. Four percent of hutments accommodate three floors. These buildings not only 
contravene the 14-foot vertical limit of slum hutments as defined by the Development 
Control Regulations, but may also constitute a threat to national defence as some have a 
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site-line over the military’s fence. Informants intimate with the owners of these hutments 
note that they are wealthy and hold the power of touch, meaning they have connections and 
influence: in this case with certain regulators. These owners allegedly pay employees of the 
Collector and military personnel baksheesh (a bribe) to occupy space in this way.  
Concurrent with the expansion of the settlement are more frequent contractions and 
rearrangements of space and society. Municipal demolitions have become an annual feature 
of the settlement’s existence since 2004 when 60 hutments were demolished as part of a 
municipal-led citywide demolition drive that razed 90,000 homes from December 2004 
until March 2005 (YUVA, 2005). According to the report generated by the Youth for Unity 
and Voluntary Action (2005) municipal demolitions target hutments that have not been 
notified on the official register, but often, official hutments are destroyed as well. The 
military also stages its own demolition of built-up components on Ganesh Murthy’s major 
transportation and commercial corridor abutting Navy Nagar. Retailers along the corridor 
use the military’s concrete perimeter wall to suspend canopies, sales items, and other 
things. The military interpret these activities as a threat to their security and enter Ganesh 
Murthy every three months with a complement of police officers to demolish not only 
anything suspended from the wall, but all tables, stands, and materials along the corridor as 
well.  
Further, in 2003 a large fire engulfed 200 hutments at the western extremity of the 
settlement (Indian Express, 2003). According to several residents the fire was apparently 
ignited before a municipal demolition as a tactic to avoid having to produce an identity card 
demonstrating their inclusion in the official slum register (Interview, resident of Ganesh 
Murthy, 10/07/09)18. Following the fire the MMRDA (as the planning authority for the 
Back Bay) erected a fence along the new border to contain the settlement. As a result, 
residents affected by the fire largely re-established their hutments at the northern periphery 
of Ganesh Murthy, which had not been territorialized due to its low elevation and tendency 
to be flooded during the annual monsoon. Despite the fence, which is guarded, the 
settlement continues to blur the borders of the State apparatus. Bangladeshi immigrants 
                                                
18 This is a known tactic employed by slum dwellers in Mumbai. Without an identity card authorities cannot 
disprove the slum dweller was included in the official register. 
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who say they are from Kolkata to avoid immigration authorities have built a small satellite 
settlement in the mangroves to the west of Ganesh Murthy, underneath the gaze of the 
police chowky.19 The settlement is also a staging point for the dumping of debris into the 
mangrove forest at the end of the guarded fence in neighbouring Ambedkar Nagar. An 
informant reports witnessing nightly deliveries of refuse to Part III by truck where it is 
packaged and sold for INR 50 a bag-load (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 11/12/09). 
Allegedly, Bangladeshi labourers follow a trail through Ganesh Murthy to get to the 
construction site abutting the mangrove forest (Figure 5.22). Ganesh Murthy is the staging 
point because the drop off point is cloistered. Other possible locations along the periphery 
of Ambedkar Nagar are less suitable because they are on a large road and in proximity to 
the Cuffe Parade police station. Finally, in terms of blurring the lines of the settlement, 
people from Ambedkar Nagar whose hutments abut the settlement allegedly switch their 
addresses to Ganesh Murthy to acquire better services.  
 
Figure 5.22 New hutments taking shape on the periphery of Ambedkar Nagar 
Credit: Author 
                                                
19 A police chowky is a small edifice used as a police satellite station.  
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5.4 Understanding Ganesh Murthy Nagar as an assemblage 
5.4.1 Land as a virtual attractor 
The historical narrative related above demonstrates that the development of Ganesh Murthy 
Nagar is integrally tied to the desire for land; a virtual attractor, whose immanent force of 
potentiality has motivated the transformation of Mumbai from seven islands into a 
peninsula over the last 500 years. It was the attraction to land and the potential profits 
associated with it that motivated the government and private interests to reclaim and 
develop the Back Bay from the 1800s onwards as related in the last chapter. Competing 
actors, however, conspired to continually delay and fragment the development of the Back 
Bay, resulting in the siltation of the southeast corner of the bay. Over forty years the 
accumulation of silt created the conditions for a mangrove forest to emerge, which 
beckoned to construction workers at Cuffe Parade looking for land on which to erect their 
makeshift shelters. The potential for shelter offered by land hailed Mr Murthy and his GES 
co-workers that had lost their land and shelter, and the same potential later called to the 
thousands of migrants that came to the city from the rural hinterland. 
5.4.2 Housing in Mumbai: Far from Equilibrium  
From an early date the demand for land and shelter in Mumbai caused an imbalance 
between housing demand and supply in the city. Amita Bhide (2009), a scholar specializing 
in Mumbai’s squatter settlements, places the emergence of modern slums in Mumbai in the 
1930s. During the 1950s, rural to urban migrants, attracted to the city by the potential for 
economic benefits in the burgeoning textile industry, accounted for 50 percent of the city’s 
population increase. In the 1970s, droughts in the Deccan Plateau propelled many more 
migrants to Mumbai. These singularities, and their triggering of flows of people into the 
city contributed to the emergence of slums. The natural reproduction of the urban 
population, together with limited land on the peninsula and a sluggish housing sector, sent 
the housing system far from equilibrium, reaching an annual shortfall of 45,000 residential 
units from 1970 to mid 1980 (Bhide, 2009). From 1991 to 2001 1.12 million migrants from 
outside of Maharashtra came to the city, representing 54.8 percent of the net population 
increase (Government of Maharashtra, 2006). Currently, with more migrants arriving in the 
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city combined with the force of natural reproduction, the flow of the city’s population 
continues to overcome State and market forces producing formal housing. At the time of 
writing the population of Mumbai is estimated at 13,830,000 people (Helders, 2010), and 
some 8,680,000 live in slums (Singh, 2010), representing 62.8 percent of the population. 
The creation of slums, as functional elements in the city system, has emerged to 
accommodate the flow of people and bring a form of equilibrium to the city’s housing 
sector. A number of forces in the city contributed to the emergence of each slum, many of 
which organized themselves without an external source directing that order. These self-
organizing functional structures, in the terminology of Deleuze and Guattari, are 
assemblages, and the following section examines the intensive generative processes that 
translate between virtual desire to the actual realm as manifest in Ganesh Murthy’s social 
and built environments. 
5.4.3 Intensive generative processes 
Intensive morphogenetic processes generate convergences and divergences in a system and 
are identified as linked rates of change between processes. The process of moving to 
Ganesh Murthy Nagar, which was independently repeated thousands of times throughout 
the 40-year existence of the settlement, is tied to the processes of building a shelter and 
reclaiming land. These processes translate the virtual realm of potential for land and shelter 
through the motive force of desire to the actual realm of observable reality: the hutments 
and alleys that comprise the built environment. Moving to Ganesh Murthy, through being 
drawn into its basin of attraction, was historically facilitated via associations with family 
members, friends, and village contacts. Additionally, knowledge of the site and the 
subsequent move there came about through a practice known as roaming, which is a term 
heard frequently in the settlement and denotes purposeful explorative movement. Once 
land, or at least its potential, was identified, the process of building a shelter could 
commence. This process originates in finding, taking, or purchasing the materials to build a 
platform on four poles with a roof, so as to suspend the shelter above the marsh and protect 
it from monsoon rains. Materials for these shelters may also have been provided to new 
migrants that purchased the land from a local landowner or by migrants renting the shelter: 
a practice that still takes place in the settlement today. Access to the hutment was a primary 
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consideration in capturing land or purchasing it, as the developing site was a marshy 
mangrove forest, which impedes movement. For this reason, the shelter was usually built 
right next to its neighbour down an undulating path of refuse and mud, minimizing the 
amount of energy needed to access the hutment. Abutting and attaching the shelter to its 
neighbour also increased the stability and durability of the whole. The success of this 
design led to its repetition, resulting in the linear progression of alleys. Aligning hutments 
both side-to-side and back-to-back, provides the maximum degree of stability and 
durability, minimizes the energy needed to access the shelter, and maximizes the utility of 
limited space, resulting in the predominant form of double hutment clusters in the 
settlement.20 
The process of erecting a shelter is tied to the incremental dumping of debris underneath 
the platform and in front of the hutment. This process of incremental land reclamation 
works to solidify the base of the shelter and mitigates against the threat of water inundation. 
Further, individual efforts of land reclamation in front of hutments elevate the walkway and 
facilitate access to the shelter. In turn, the process of reclaiming land from the marsh 
facilitates access to potential land located further down the linear chain of hutments, and 
thereby facilitates the construction of new shelters by migrants and other actors. As such, 
the rate of change in population, shelter creation, and the reclamation of land are linked. As 
more people arrive more shelters are erected and more land is created, resulting in a circular 
pattern of development, which facilitates the movement of more people to the site.  
Moving to the settlement, establishing a shelter, and reclaiming land are intensive 
morphogenetic processes that produce more than the sum of their parts. For example, 
individual efforts to reclaim land in front of hutments together become transportation 
corridors. Further, these alleys together with hutments and residents combine to form a 
settlement from which social consistencies emerge to acquire water distributions systems, 
toilets, and other built assets. Unlike other slums, which arise through illegal land division, 
there was no one authority that directed the construction and evolution of the settlement.  
                                                
20 i.e. two rows of hutments located back to back. 
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The benefit of an historical and process-oriented approach to understanding the emergence 
of Ganesh Murthy reveals that many heterogeneous components and their reciprocal 
relations feed into the settlement-assemblage. State and private actors desirous of land 
reclamation in the Back Bay and the sea wall that was erected, together with countervailing 
forces such as community organizations (e.g. the Save Bombay Committee) and other 
elements in the State apparatus (e.g. the contemporaneous mayor, Supreme court 
injunctions) as described last chapter, produced precisely the conditions for the siltation of 
the southeast corner and the emergence of a mangrove forest. The emergent marshy forest 
attracted potential residents, desirous of land and shelter, to the site. Other components of 
the assemblage contributed to intensive processes such as the bus depot, which provided 
much needed materials, and elements of the State apparatus, from which essential services 
such as potable water were obtained.  
Understanding and analysing the settlement as an assemblage reveals the distributed agency 
of many actors and thus the distributed responsibility for emergent forms, such as the built 
environment and the social relations inherent to the settlement. The settlement as 
assemblage also considers Ganesh Murthy as an entity in the process of becoming, rather 
than as a resultant formation. This has important consequences for understanding the 
development of power relations in the settlement as a “plurality in transformation” that 
contributes to the on-going evolution of the settlement into the future (McFarlane, 2009: 
562). This perspective is apparent here through the settlement’s current extension into the 
mangrove forest and vertically beyond two floors, both of which point to an evolving local 
power geometry including police, MMRDA-hired guards, employees of the Collector and 
military officials. Finally, understanding Ganesh Murthy as an assemblage, and the analysis 
of the intensive processes from which the settlement emerged, demonstrate the success of 
the basic system as a generative engine, which is based on the distributed nature of the 
individual actors inherent to the system. The growth of Ganesh Murthy, and the ability of 
the settlement to accommodate part of the city’s burgeoning population, is dependent on the 
individual actions of many people and not the more hierarchical directives of a central 
power like a planning department, real estate developer, or financing body. The 
organization of individual actors follows from energy and space efficiencies, and limits 
imposed on actors derived from the built and natural environments. The success of the 
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distributed system derives from simple social and built modules that operate individually 
and have potential for improvement in the form of incremental construction techniques. 
Further, the redundancy of the system mitigates against the failure of certain components in 
the assemblage, such as the destruction of shelters through fire, demolition, or water 
inundation. Where government and market forces fail to produce equilibrium between 
housing demand and supply, the association of component parts in the settlement 
assemblage has generated a residential enclave that is home to some 11,000 people.  
5.5 A nomadic settlement 
The spatial pattern of development at Ganesh Murthy exhibits a fluidity and constancy of 
motion in its creeping and incremental movement over the mangrove forest, and also in the 
way the settlement experiences moments of expansion and contraction. The fluid and 
peripatetic distribution of the settlement over space without the direction of a central 
authority, suggests a nomadic pattern of spatial occupation that is open-ended and 
composed of rest and movement. The settlement occupies what Deleuze and Guattari call 
smooth space, which is rhizomatic and directionless, but characterized by a multiplicity of 
local directions. Smooth space is opposed to State-associated striated space, which is 
measured, oriented, and divided, and has roads from one enclosure to another. "Striated 
space closes a surface, divides it up at determinate intervals, establishes breaks, whereas a 
smooth space involves distribution across a surface, by frequency or along paths (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1987: 600). Figure 5.5 demonstrates that Ganesh Murthy and the other local 
settlements display a felt-like texture of components that are not homogenously oriented 
but instead follow multiple directions, and overlap and press upon one another. These are 
compared to the immediate surroundings composed of military compounds and 
commercially-developed areas, which are distinctively measured, atomized, and 
homogenously oriented in space. Moreover, nomads have an active relationship to smooth 
space not only inhabiting it, but also creating it through the war machine, or technologies 
used to maintain existence outside the State apparatus such as the products of the intensive 
processes described above. "The nomad makes the desert no less than he [sic] is made by 
it" Deleuze and Guattari (1988: 473, 519) write, and the war-machine is "the constitutive 
element of smooth space, of the occupation of such a space, displacement on it and the 
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corresponding composition of groups of men [sic]: this is its sole, true positive objective 
(i.e. nomos). To increase the desert..."  
The settlement, in several ways, remains outside the State apparatus. There continues to be 
no master plan or urban design influencing its development. It does not conform to zoning 
ordinances or follow laws relating to construction. Ganesh Murthy does exhibit elements of 
striated space, such as its division into discrete residential units for example. However, as 
Bogue (2010) points out, Deleuze and Guattari use the terms nomadism and State apparatus 
in opposition to signify real tendencies, but they only ever manifest as mixtures of both. 
This mixture is immediately observable in the alleys of the settlement. The alleys are 
predominantly oriented along north-south and east-west axes and it is clear that they inherit 
this orientation from the borders of the striated spaces of the military compound and bus 
station. The way in which they manifest, however, is anything but measured. Rather, there 
is an ambulatory quality to the paths that defies strict orientation and measurement. Rather, 
alleys have no standard width, but undulate according to the size of hutments, and may 
abruptly jog to the left or right due to the historical conditions of their creation. The same is 
true for the hutments that, while dividing space, do so in an unfixed fashion that defies 
discrete and homogenous metrics.   
The residents of Ganesh Murthy are not nomadic: they are mostly migrant families that 
have come to the city to settle. It is the settlement itself that is nomadic, fluidly and 
constantly distributing being across a deterritorialized and indefinite space. State 
reterritorializations of space exist, such as the striation of the settlement into various 
“Parts.” However, in failing to grant tenure security to residents the State concurrently 
deterritorializes the settlement, decreasing its stability and its material identity in relation to 
its specific geographic location. In fact, the planning authority of the Back Bay, the 
MMRDA, does not even recognize the land on which the settlement sits, as indicated in 
their current Development plan: deterritorialization indeed.  
As this example demonstrates, manifest mixtures between the State and nomadism go 
beyond the formal qualities of the settlement. Nomadic relationships with the State involve 
"complex relations of dependence, resistance, and accommodation with contiguous states" 
(Bogue, 2010; 174). Nomadic society may not be organized around hierarchical class 
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distinctions, although the centralization of power in a nomadic society increases in 
proportion to their interactions with the State. Elements of the State apparatus have helped 
to create social hierarchies in Ganesh Murthy, such as the reterritorialization of certain 
hutments in the official register. These permit official segments of the population a degree 
of security against eviction and demolition of their hutments, where others have no such 
luxury. Identification in the official register also creates the potential for inclusion in any 
redevelopment efforts pertaining to the slum and thus orients opposing political positions 
along this trajectory. Official status also, importantly, permits access to municipal services 
such as water, while others have to pay higher prices and expend more time and energy to 
collect often inferior products (such as non-potable water), which can lead to an array of 
illnesses. Furthest down on this hierarchy are those that are denied state access to services 
and cannot afford to pay market prices. 
Inversely, State societies that interact with nomadic tribes are found to exhibit nomadic 
tendencies and trajectories (Bogue, 2010) and elements of the State apparatus that interact 
with Ganesh Murthy have been found to step outside their juridical and regulatory 
boundaries. The Collector, who allegedly allowed Mr. Murthy and employees of the 
Garrison Engineers Service to occupy the site for a sum of money, clearly operates outside 
the legal norms of the state. Military personnel and agents of the Collector also demonstrate 
nomadic tendencies in permitting the existence of three-storey hutments that endure despite 
contravening the Development Control Regulations and posing a threat to security. Finally, 
police officers and guards employed by the MMRDA to maintain the western periphery of 
the settlement must have nomadic tendencies in allowing Bangladeshi immigrants to cut 
down a mangrove forest in an environmentally sensitive zone to establish a satellite 
settlement beyond the western periphery. The admixture of nomadic and State tendencies is 
only glimpsed at in this chapter aimed at providing an overview of the settlement’s society 
and built environment. In fact, nomadic/State associations are a central tenant of the 
settlement assemblage’s existence and forms a dominant investigative trajectory of the 
thesis. 
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5.6 Conclusion  
This chapter provides an overview and historiography of the built and social strata of 
Ganesh Murthy as an assemblage, where assemblage is marshalled in several ways. 
Ontologically, assemblage theory reveals that slums in Mumbai emerged as self-organizing 
functional systems in reaction to a state far from equilibrium in housing demand and 
supply. In addressing this situation, Mumbai’s administrators and planning authorities 
pursued a logic that sought to control the inflow of population from the hinterland by 
limiting housing supply and the potential for migrants to find homes. However, this 
strategy conflicted with, and was ultimately overwhelmed by, scores of people following a 
logic of desire to pursue improved livelihoods. Migrants were drawn by economic 
opportunities in the city and driven from their homes by ecological calamities. Slums 
emerged as the actualized reality of virtual singularities contributing to the inflow of people 
to the city and their possibilities for acquiring shelter.   
In the case of Ganesh Murthy Nagar virtual singularities and probabilities were translated 
into reality through three intensive morphogenetic processes that are gleaned through 
empirical description, and a methodological focus on practice and materiality. Ganesh 
Murthy Nagar was assembled through three interrelated processes of moving to the 
settlement, reclaiming land from the marsh, and constructing a hutment. The rates of 
change of these processes are tied together such that a circular pattern of development 
occurs enabling more people to move to the settlement, facilitating more land reclamation, 
and more hutment construction. Further, incremental hutment construction feeds into the 
growth of the settlement through the addition of floors to accommodate expanding families 
and providing rental units.  
Intensive morphogenetic processes are the engine of the settlement’s growth, and they have 
produced more than the sum of their parts. These processes together reclaimed some 5.4 
hectares of land from the sea, produced 2,100 hutments, and became home to 11,000 people 
from three countries and 18 states in India. However, Ganesh Murthy Nagar is not merely 
an assemblage of land, hutments, and people. The settlement also includes transportation 
corridors, businesses, toilets blocks, water distribution systems, temples, performance 
stages, electricity lines, and other built assets. Less materially tangible are various 
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communities or social consistencies that inhabit the settlement. These communities interact 
with the built environment in different ways, but the point is that they, along with built 
elements, emerged from the combination of intensive processes along lines of becoming to 
produce novel combinations of sociomaterial networks.  
The chapter thus employs assemblage thinking to reconfigure Ganesh Murthy as a 
monolithic “slum” toward an understanding of component parts whose interrelations enable 
and constrain action. This re-conceptualization of a slum decentres it as an object and 
instead places emphasis on various components and the processes through which they 
interact. As such, flows of migrants and urban planning policies interact with natural 
processes of siltation, facilitated through a unique history of land reclamation in the Back 
Bay, and other components such as fires, monsoon flooding, or construction materials from 
the bus depot and the inability of the State apparatus to safeguard such materials. 
Throughout the process of Ganesh Murthy’s evolution various components of the 
assemblage plug in and plug out to reassemble conditions in the settlement as a plurality in 
transformation. The intensive empirical orientation of processual relationships thus helps to 
avoid reductionist and over generalized conclusions and demonstrates that responsibility for 
the slum’s emergence and evolution goes beyond macro-level flows and policies to include 
historical planning trajectories, natural forces, and personal desires.  
Here, State policies and actors are important components that have worked to both stabilize 
and destabilize the assemblage, which changed the settlement in kind and sent it along a 
different trajectory of development. Ganesh Murthy is characterized as nomadic in terms of 
its spatial occupation of the site and in its existence outside of the State apparatus in terms 
of planning, permissions, and regulatory enforcement. The State, however, has continually 
exercised its essential function to capture that which is outside it by reterritorializing parts 
of the settlement in 1976, 1980, 1985, and 1995. The legislation permitting capture and the 
enumeration of hutments stabilized the slum assemblage by defining it in terms of 
hutments, and segregating it from other nonofficial slums. However, this form of 
reterritorialization never granted residents security of tenure and thus failed to realize the 
potential stability between the settlement, residents, shelter and the land, giving rise to 
injustices in the form of demolitions and exploitation by State officials and other local 
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authorities. Further, this form of reterritorialization created internal divisions within the 
settlement, which destabilizes the identity of the settlement as a whole. Residents in all 
parts of the settlement that built hutments or moved to the settlement after 1995 are not 
entered into the official register and thus there is a division between official and unofficial 
slum dwellers, which gives rise to the pursuit of different trajectories such as the desire to 
pursue or not pursue slum rehabilitation schemes.  
The reterritorialization of Ganesh Murthy by the State apparatus also stabilized the 
settlement by creating opportunities to access municipal services such as water distribution 
and toilets blocks. However, the addition of these components also destabilized the 
settlement assemblage by feeding its capacity to accommodate more residents. Further, the 
incremental nature of this reterritorialization created internal divisions within the settlement 
beyond mere territorial boundaries, such as the emergence of competing social 
consistencies to procure services, and the establishment of social hierarchies around the 
control of services. With the acquisition of State elements, Ganesh Murthy changed in kind 
from a nomadic settlement to some hybrid inhabited by State-facilitated centralization of 
power and social hierarchies. Concurrently, nomadic tendencies displayed by the Collector 
in granting Mr. Murthy and the GES squad informal permission to squat the land, and 
various regulators giving informal permission to maintain three story hutments, would 
migrate to other State officials and politicians through their interaction with the settlement. 
The totality of these associations, hierarchies, and divisions emanating from nomadic-State 
mixtures are at the root of insidious social inequalities and injustices, which move the 
settlement towards a slum of despair. The need to understand precisely how these 
hierarchical networks and divisions emerged and how they might become otherwise is 
apparent. As such, the following chapter empirically investigates the settlement’s key 
components that demonstrate the power to assemble and maintain diverse sociomaterial 
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This chapter investigates the water distribution networks in Ganesh Murthy Nagar. 
Motivated by the desire for water provision and triggered by governmental policies to 
provide these services to squatter settlements, several CBOs gained consistency in the 
settlement to address the continually widening gap between a growing population and 
minimal provision of water. However, the ostensibly participatory-oriented policies of the 
government, by integrating local elements into the provision of water services, created an 
administrative platform that was susceptible to, and resulted in, the capture of these 
services by local actors motivated by profit and power. This platform created a niche for 
CBOs to establish relationships with local politicians and created opportunities for the 
networks to enrol segments of the municipal bureaucracy and other actors who themselves 
display nomadic tendencies beyond the strict legal parameters of the State.  
The emergent socio-space within which four major water provision CBOs operate is 
liminal, existing at once in between and beyond residents of the settlement and the State 
apparatus, where both strata of the settlement are engaged but also isolated. The CBOs that 
function in this space utilize fluid infrastructures that are able to conform to evolving 
patterns of land creation and population growth. Yet, despite the success of these novel 
configurations to adapt to evolving conditions, CBOs demonstrate unjust, disruptive, and 
sometimes violent behaviour in maintaining their oligopoly over water provision and in 
competitions with each other for greater market share. The present chapter thus 
demonstrates how four local CBO networks at Ganesh Murthy emerged and continue to 
contribute to the constitution and ordering of space and society in the settlement.   
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first section examines water supply and 
demand in Mumbai (6.2), with a focus on uneven distribution patterns, and is followed by 
an examination of participatory-oriented water provision schemes to squatter settlements 
adopted by the State (6.2.1). The second section (6.3) charts the historical development of 
the four CBOs that administer municipal water schemes from information derived from the 
Municipal Water Department archives (WDA) and from interviews with residents. The 
CBOs investigated are the Ganesh Murthy Nagar Hutment Dwellers Welfare Association 
 167 
(6.3.1), Seva Sangh (6.3.2), Mahila Pragati Sameti (6.3.3), and Manav Seva Sameti (6.3.4). 
The final section (6.4) provides analysis of the various patterns of development discernable 
from the data including: the assembling and capture of CBOs (6.4.1), the nomadic 
tendencies of State actors (6.4.2) creative infrastructural configurations (6.4.3), the nature 
of liminal space in the nomadic settlement (6.4.4), and barriers to enter this space (6.4.5).  
6.2 Water and Mumbai 
The demand for water in Mumbai has consistently exceeded its supply, resulting in 
historically persistent inequalities in the city. In the mid 19th century the acute 
disequilibrium between water supply and demand motivated the government of Bombay to 
examine alternative sources outside of the traditional wells and stone-stepped bodies of 
water called “tanks” it had been relying on as sources of water. As a result of these efforts 
the Vehar Water Works project, located 18 miles to the north of Bombay on Salsette Island, 
came on line in 1860 to deliver seven million gallons of water per day for the 700,000 
citizens of the city (MEA, 2006). However, as only some households could pay for the 
infrastructure necessary to connect residences to the municipal infrastructure, water was 
distributed mainly to the wealthy (Dossal, 1988). Since then, Mumbai’s State-operated 
municipal water infrastructure has become one of the largest and most complex water 
supply undertakings in the world. It produces 3,500 million litres of water a day from seven 
basins: Vehar, Tulsi, Bhatsa, Powai, Tansa, Vaitrana, and Upper Vaitrana (MEA, 2006). 
However, inequality still marks the distribution of water in the contemporary city (Gandy, 
2008).  
One of the main causes of uneven water distribution is the fact that there is not enough 
water, with supply meeting only 65 percent of domestic demand (BMC, 2000). Natural 
reproduction and immigration to the city, together with increased industrial usage, has 
resulted in greater demand for water. Currently, domestic demand for water in slums is 
valued at 39.85 percent, while non-slum domestic demand is 46.96 percent. Industrial 
demand is valued at just under 8 percent, commercial demand is at 3 percent, and 
institutional demand is 2.3 percent (Rode, 2008). While more sources have been cultivated 
to increase supply, an aging and dilapidated municipal infrastructure, some of which is over 
100 years old, results in supply losses of up to 40 to 60 percent (World Bank, 2001 as 
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referenced in Gandy, 2008). However, along with these demographic, sectoral, and physical 
flows, social reasons also contribute to uneven distribution. For example, private water tank 
suppliers conspire with politicians to delay the construction of infrastructure that would 
connect newer slums to the municipal system, and thus maintain their practical monopoly 
over water supply (Lokhandwala and Namboodiri, 1999a; 1999b; Shrivastava, 1998). 
Reacting to the dearth of water from institutional sources, a number of alternatives have 
emerged to address the disequilibrium in water supply and demand such as bore holes and 
wells, as well as neo-traditional water management techniques such as rain water 
harvesting and water conservation (Gandy, 2008).  
All social and economic classes in the city are affected by these physical, demographic and 
social conditions. For example, some luxury condominiums constructed in the city come 
with all possible amenities, except for municipal water service. Further, upscale 
condominium blocks and hotels that are connected to the municipal network often employ 
illegal booster pumps to draw more water from the system, and additionally may purchase 
private tanker water to meet demand. Socially and economically weaker sectors of society, 
however, experience the disequilibrium in water supply and demand more acutely than 
wealthier sectors, and residents of squatter settlements bear the greatest difficulties. As 
Gandy (2008) argues, the postcolonial Indian state has been captured by the middle class, 
resulting in the historical perpetuation of dualities in urban governance so that the political 
agenda is consistently turned away from universal provision of services. For example, 
water apportioned to individual slum dwellers is 45 litres/day, approximately one third of 
that apportioned to owners of private residences, which receive 135 litres/day per person 
(YUVA, 1999). Due to rapid growth at the northern periphery of the city, in places like 
Thane, Bhayandar, and Mira Road, water access in unofficial squatter settlements is 
particularly acute. However, even residents of official settlements like Ganesh Murthy 
Nagar struggle to procure an adequate supply of water. The lack of water in squatter 
settlements has resulted in political unrest, and when water supply diminishes substantially, 
as it did with the unfavourable monsoons in 2009, the results can be deadly. In 2009, the 
city faced a water shortage of 400 million litres of water a day, resulting in widespread 
reductions and interruptions in service. In Sanjay Nagar slum in Bhopal three residents 
were murdered by other residents of the settlement for taking water from a municipal 
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supply line when water started flowing again after three days of interrupted service 
(Chamerberlain, 2009). In Ganesh Murthy, similar uneven distribution in the supply of 
water is extensively tied to the local distribution of water that is administered by 
participatory CBOs, which is the subject of the next section. 
6.2.1 Water in slums: participatory programmes 
In the 1960s urban centres gained acknowledgment for their contribution to national wealth 
generation, and as a result urban planning came to facilitate development through the 
creation of infrastructural services and the removal of barriers to growth (O’Hare et al., 
1998; Harris, 1990; 1989). Additionally, in the early 1970s the World Bank adopted and 
promoted self-help programmes, an idea that was gleaned from a series of influential papers 
from field studies (Stokes, 1962; Turner, 1963; 1967; Abrams, 1964). The Bombay 
Municipal Corporation (BMC) and the State of Maharashtra responded to these trends by 
reversing their long-held strategy of slum clearance and eradication. The State apparatus, 
acknowledging that slums might provide a solution to the housing crisis in the city, initiated 
policies designed to reterritorialize illegal slums and provide services to those located on 
State and municipal land (Singh and Das, 1995; Burra, 2005).  
The Maharashtra Slum Act (1971) and the Central Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) 
Act (1976) formed the policy framework for the potential delivery of services to notified 
squatter settlements. Concurrent with these efforts was the creation of the Slum 
Improvement Board (SIB) in 1974 to administer the State’s Slum Improvement Programme 
(SIP). These slum improvement mechanisms targeted environmental improvements of 
slums in situ and consisted of development and improvement to piped water provision, 
sewer systems, toilet blocks, pavement, lighting and electricity (Singh and Das, 1995). 
Despite these efforts to implement slum upgrading, however, funds from the Central 
Government’s Basic Amenities Programme were stopped two months after the SIB was 
inaugurated. This left the state government to pay for the implementation of the SIP, which 
resulted in less than hoped for results (Panwalkar, 1996). In the decade from the mid 1970s 
to mid 1980s the establishment of infrastructure was supply-driven and carried out by the 
engineering department of the given municipal agency without consultation or participation 
with communities (Burra, 2005). Under these conditions and provisions, Ganesh Murthy 
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Nagar received its first water stand-post sometime before 1981. Water was fed from Navy 
Nagar to a stand-post that was located adjacent to the military compound on the boundary 
between Part I and Part II. 
At the Nagpur Assembly Session in 1981 the State government announced the 
regularization of squatter settlements built before 1980, an extension from the previous 
1976 cut-off date (as described in Chapter IV), which qualified more slum residents for 
access to municipal services (WDA-HDWA, 09/02/83). In 1983 the state government and 
the BMC launched the World Bank-funded (and largely controlled) Slum Upgradation 
Programme, which addressed the provision of sites and services (O’Hare et al., 1998). 
Importantly, community consent and participation were structured into the process of 
leasing land and arranging for government subsidies and loans for infrastructure provision.  
During this time changes to the Maharashtra Slum Act led to demand-driven and 
participatory municipal policies for water supply provision including their administration 
by “community management systems” (MCGM, 2005). Processes related to these 
community management systems necessitates the involvement of a registered CBO 
consisting of not less than 15 member households to apply for and administer a water 
network on behalf of its members and the use of licensed plumbers to install the 
infrastructure. These measures, which are still in practice today, correspond to Mumbai’s 
contemporary management strategy where the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai 
(MCGM) “play[s] the role of regulator rather than the provider of services” (Government 
of Maharashtra, 2004: 21). This participatory management strategy is more akin to “public-
private community partnerships” rather than “government-citizens co-production” (Allen, 
Forthcoming 2011). The former strategy signals a stronger concern with efficiency rather 
than social equality and accountability, and understands water provision as a commodity 
rather than as a State-guaranteed universal entitlement. The focus on instrumental water 
provision entailing slum dweller “clients” in local administrative positions, rather than as a 
potentially transformative social and political process would ultimately ill-serve the 
residents of Ganesh Murthy.  
The adoption of participatory processes in service provision arrangements is part of a 
widespread neoliberal reform agenda of urban management. Related notions of  “urban 
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governance”, as opposed to city government (La Galès, 2005), is based on the hypothesis 
that market forces can lead to greater cost-efficiency in urban administration (McCourt and 
Minogue, 2001), which entails the decentralization of state power towards multi-
stakeholder agreements that include private sector actors and the participation of civil 
society (Blair, 2000; Batley, 2004). The move to such forms of urban governance that 
include participatory mechanisms was triggered by failures of market-oriented policies in 
the 1980s and 1990s to adequately address service provision, poverty reduction, social 
inclusion, and environmental protection (Mitlin, 2004).  
Those who are optimistic about the long-term benefits of participatory mechanisms 
recognize a necessary shift from top-down urban management to an assemblage of actors 
such as NGOs, CBOs, citizens, State actors and corporate partners, engaging in cooperation 
and negotiation. However, the emergent effects of participatory schemes are dependent not 
only upon the actors engaged directly with negotiations, but also upon their operating 
logics, the context in which they function, and the local context in which schemes are 
realized. There are thus many variables that affect the results of participatory management. 
Under the right circumstances participation suggests ideas of social inclusion (Mitlin, 2004) 
and a “deeper” sense of democracy (Appadurai, 2001) based on greater forms of 
representation (Bacqué et al., 2005). Participatory service provision schemes are expected 
to be more responsive to the needs of communities and may facilitate the development of 
participants’ knowledge through administrative exercises (Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2006; 
Bacqué et al., 2005; Blair, 2000). With the right conditions, participation can reduce costs 
(Oström, 1996), facilitate improved maintenance of infrastructure (Tounée and Van Esch, 
2001) and increase local employment opportunities (Majale, 2008). Further, participatory 
schemes can foster inclusiveness and empowerment (Cornwall, 2002), with the potential to 
reshape local power geometries, reducing patronage and dependence, and potentially 
establishing alternative structures of power over the long term (Zerah, 2009; Fung and 
Wright, 2003). 
Critics of participatory schemes argue that NGOs may be components of neoliberal 
development plans that shift the control of service provision from the public to private 
realm. Here, the idea of civil society is depoliticized from a radical force that challenges the 
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State to a consensual one promoted by donors and developmental agencies (Chandhoke, 
2007 from Zerah, 2009). Further, the counter-discourse produced by such private-public 
partnerships may further undermine more radical critiques of the State (Leal, 2007). The 
role of NGOs acting as intermediaries between the State and citizens (Botton, 2007), is also 
criticized. NGOs may develop their own constituencies (Lake and Newman, 2002) and as a 
result fail to engage with local stakeholders (Benjamin, 2004). Edwards and Hulme (1996) 
demonstrate that NGOs are increasingly dependent on donors, making them less 
accountable to citizens. Further, competition between NGOs can divert attention away from 
local-level interactions (Nainan and Baud, 2009). Finally, participatory schemes can 
perpetuate patronage relationships (Zerah, 2009) and result in local “social bads” (Durlauf, 
1999) leading to hostility, discrimination, segregation, and exclusion (Zerah, 2008; Graham 
and Marvin, 2001).  
Participation in urban governance is thus a contested terrain (Hickey and Mohan, 2005). 
However, as Zerah (2009) argues, the ambivalent outcomes of participatory schemes come 
as a result of its uses, rather than their ambiguous origins. Participatory schemes are subject 
to existent power structures and the capacities of communities (Beaumont and Nicholls, 
2008). Multiple factors need to be included in the consideration of participatory schemes 
including, “the role of the public sphere and politics, the initial endowment of communities, 
the socio-political and cultural context, and the nature of civil society” (Zerah, 2009: 859). 
Thus, an evaluation of the successes and failures of participatory schemes my be aided by 
an assemblage approach, which recognizes that emergent outcomes derive from a 
confluence of various components and their proper operating logics which may constrain 
and enable action. Further, while several studies have examined outcomes of the World 
Bank’s Slum Sanitation Program (McFarlane, 2008a; Sharma and Bhide, 2005) and other 
participatory schemes in Mumbai (Zerah, 2009), there is very little research that focuses on 
the assemblage of local organizational components of participatory water provision services 
in Mumbai. As Emmel and Soussan (2001: 282) point out:  
Further iterative action research is needed which recognizes the dynamics of organizations and their 
abilities and failures. It is these organizations which define the quality of the built environment in low-
income urban communities in developing countries.   
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Addressing this need for research is Nikhil Anand’s work (2011), which makes an 
important contribution to slum dweller water access by examining the politics and 
materiality inherent to slum dwellers’ diverse tactics of gathering water from both inside 
and outside the municipal system. This chapter then, builds on Anand’s research through an 
historically informed study of the four main water distribution networks that have come to 
shape the local power geometry at Ganesh Murthy Nagar.  
6.3 Historical formation of water networks at Ganesh Murthy 
This section investigates the historical evolution of the four municipal water schemes that 
operate in Ganesh Murthy Nagar as of 2010: the Sri Ganesh Murthy Nagar Hutment 
Dwellers Welfare Association, the Seva Sangh, the Mahila Pragati Samiti, and the Seva 
Sameti. The emergence of these networks and their related administrative CBOs are 
illuminated from documentation at the Municipal Water Department Archives (WDA) in 
Colaba, from interviews with residents of the settlement, and form participant observation. 
The data reveal a developmental space where access and control over water is highly 
contested and transpires in a context that includes political and municipal actors.  
6.3.1 Sri Ganesh Murthy Nagar Hutment Dwellers Welfare Association 
The earliest settlers at Ganesh Murthy made do without a local source of water and had to 
carry it home from their places of work in Cuffe Parade and later Navy Nagar. In addition 
to these sources, a fenced-off well located in Navy Nagar provided residents with irregular 
and tentative access. There, residents had to wait outside the enclosure until the well 
overflowed to siphon off excess water with banana leaves into containers (Interview, 
resident of Gansh Murthy Nagar, 10/03/09). To the great relief of the incipient community, 
sometime before 1981, a temporary water stand-post was erected at the western edge of 
Part I, which was fed directly from the adjacent military compound. At roughly the same 
time as the stand post was connected, legislative enactments creating the potential for 
municipal water provision (as discussed in the previous section) together with insufficient 
water supply triggered the emergence of the first administrative CBO in the settlement, the 
Sri Ganesh Murthy Nagar Hutment Dwellers Welfare Association (HDWA).  
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The CBO, which was registered between 1976 and 1980, includes the original 111 
hutments enumerated by the 1976 census, and is administered by a committee of 11 people, 
composed of nine male and two female members. The first documentary evidence of the 
CBO’s existence in the WDA consists of a letter written to the Slum Housing and Area 
Development Board on February 9, 1983, to procure permanent water and electrical supply 
for the settlement (WDA-HDWA, 1983). The letter specifically references the 1980 cut-off 
date for the regularization of hutments (as per the 1981 Nagpur Assembly Session) and its 
provision of services to slums, as legitimizing the CBO’s many requests for services since 
1980 (which are not present in the archives). The letter further references correspondence 
pertaining to the provision of water for the settlement between a local Member of the 
Legislative Assembly (MLA) and various state departments. Other documentation in the 
archive reveals that the MLA, a Municipal Councillor, and ex-Municipal Councillor 
frequently intervened on the resident’s behalf through letters and meetings with the 
municipality to help procure water for the settlement. However, by October 1984, 
according to a desperate letter from the CBO to the MLA, no permanent water supply had 
been provided to the settlement. The letter goes on to explain that residents frequently 
engaged in quarrels over water, which sometimes erupted into fights that motivated the 
military to stop the flow of water to the one stand-post operating in the settlement. The 
same letter tells the MLA that residents do not have the capacity to buy water from private 
vendors and as a result residents often had to beg for water.  
A plan for four taps and a latrine in the settlement was drawn up by the Bombay Housing 
and Area Development Board by February 1984, and was sanctioned by the city by the end 
of the year. The network plan of pipes and their diameter is calculated to deliver a certain 
amount of water over a certain amount of time at a precise pressure. When the new 
connection was finally established (presumably in 1985) it consisted of four taps fed by an 
unmetered two-inch connection to a new 24-inch diameter water main that supplied Navy 
Nagar. The water main was initially activated for several hours every two days from the 
substation located at Malabar hill, whence water would be delivered to the four standpipes 
in the settlement. Residents would fill containers and ration their supply for the next 48 
hours. Later, water flowed along the water main every day thus doubling the volume of 
water collected by residents in Part I of the settlement. 
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In 1989 the WDA documents the existence of an illegal water tank, called a “suction tank” 
for its ability to draw water by gravity from the water main, that was located between the 
connection to the main and the distribution network (WDA-HDWA, 1989). The water 
department was informed of this augmented infrastructure by a letter written by a HDWA 
committee member alleging that the president of the CBO had collected funds from 
residents for the new tank, and expressed concerns that the illegal behaviour would result in 
the removal of water privileges. Instead of forcing the removal of the tank the water 
department decided to regularize it. The secretary and president of the CBO successfully 
argued that the tank, drawing from the southern end of the municipal water main, was 
necessary because poor flow resulted in insufficient amounts of water to meet the 
community’s needs. The schism between various committee members, which prompted the 
water department to investigate, represents a fracture between two factions in the society 
that is on going in Part I of the settlement. In the 1990s one faction, led by the Singh family 
was successfully ejected from the committee for allegedly stealing funds.21 However, the 
family continues to influence the social dynamic in Part I through various means including 
their control of a muscle gang that intimidates residents and committee members. The 
introduction of an organized gang to influence control of water prodded members of the 
HDWA to organize their own muscle gang. This build-up of actors and tactics between the 
Singh family and the HDWA signals a movement towards violence in control over water. 
Muscle gangs will be explored in more detail in the following chapter, however, the 
immediate point here is that control over water supply to Part I is dominated by the 
committee, but fragmentation in the emergent social hierarchy has caused on going 
tensions.  
In February 1994, other discrepancies were found by the water department between the 
authorized network configuration and its actual manifestation in the form of illegal private 
connections to individual residences. Residential connections are prized assets in the 
settlement as they obviate the need to stand in line for water and then transport it home. 
Further, private connections may feed a large (around 200 litres) elevated domestic water 
tank that, with the force of gravity, feeds internal pipelines connected to faucets and 
                                                
21 The surname “Singh” is a pseudonym adopted to protect the identity of the family.  
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sometimes latrines. The installation of illegal private connections represents a substantial 
revenue stream for the CBO. The price for such a connection in 2010 is roughly INR 
10,000 of which INR 2000 goes directly to the CBO, while the rest pays for materials and 
labour. Finally, private connections may reduce the HDWA’s expenses by negating the 
need to have water distributed at taps, which elsewhere in the settlement is a job performed 
exclusively by women. Despite several opportunities afforded by the municipality to 
regularize the illegal connections for a nominal fee of INR 100 per connection, and threats 
of stopping water unless regularization was undertaken, none of the connections had been 
regularized by 2010. 
In 2008 the leader of the HDWA was arrested after the Singh family complained to the 
police of illegal electricity tapping. The CBO had tapped into municipal streetlights to 
operate their pumping equipment. Such checks on the CBO’s power, together with the fact 
that demand in Part I has not substantially increased due to limited space for development, 
has resulted in the best water service in the settlement. None of the residents of Part I 
complained of water supply problems, and there is enough water to allow members of the 
Singh family, among others, to sell and trade excess water collected for money and 
influence. Beyond this, this section demonstrates that political support for the water 
connection was an important part of the process, with at least three politicians lobbying on 
behalf of the HDWA. The section also demonstrates the occurrence of infrastructure 
augmentation, in the form of an additional water suction tank and individual private 
connections. Further, the implication of the continued existence of this augmented 
infrastructure, whether regularized or not, is that the water department has allowed the 
perpetuation of illegalities either through legal accommodation in the case of the suction 
tank, or, as in the case of the individual connections, negligence or some form of illicit 
agreement. 
6.3.2 Seva Sangh  
By the time residents of Part I received their four water taps in 1985, the alignment of 
desire for water in the rest of the expanding settlement had led to the emergence of the Seva 
Sangh, a CBO originally consisting of 116 member hutments with an administrative 
committee of 11 people composed mainly of male members. The gathering of hutments 
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into the CBO was initiated in 1983 by the secretary who has remained in control of Seva 
Sangh since it was officially registered in 1987; the same year the cut-off date for inclusion 
in the official register had been moved to 1985 by the Congress government (Singh and 
Das, 1995). Supported by a local Municipal Councillor and local MLA, the Seva Sangh 
formally requested a water connection in 1988 for residents of Ganesh Murthy located in 
what came to be known as Part II of the settlement. In negotiations with various 
government bodies, including the Slum Improvement Board and water department, the 
Seva Sangh was “represented” by the Municipal Councillor, who in 1988 secured sanction 
for a two-inch diameter connection and seven standpipes for Part II. The archives, while not 
containing details, also refer to a second 40 X 50 mm connection created in 1993 for 
approximately 100 hutments in Part II that was initiated outside the Seva Sangh, but which 
subsequently came under its control.  
By 1990, two years after the initial water distribution system was completed, the Seva 
Sangh had substantially (and illegally) augmented its infrastructure. A 5,000 litre suction 
tank was installed along with pumping arrangements to collect and distribute water. 
Booster pumps were also reportedly in use as per a 1992 water department report (WDA-
SS, 1992). A booster pump is attached to the infrastructure network between the water main 
and the suction tank to draw extra water from the municipal system, which increases the 
potential capacity of the system (Figure 6.1). The delivery infrastructure was also 
augmented to provide private residential connections, thus creating an additional revenue 
stream. As it had done in the case of the HDWA, the water department offered the Seva 
Sangh an opportunity to regularize the connections (WDA-SS, 28/10/93) but the secretary 
argued (falsely) that the pipes entering individual households were installed to distribute 
privately purchased water and not municipal water. Multiple threats by the municipality to 
cut off water supply were eventually realized, followed by the CBO illegally reconnecting 
the water, and subsequent municipal re-dismantling of the illegal connections. Finally, the 
Seva Sangh enrolled the help of another local Municipal Councillor and the MLA, who 




Figure 6.1 Booster pump being repaired at Ganesh Murthy 
Credit: Author 
The cat and mouse game between various water networks and the State is a constant theme 
that emerges from the archives. In 2005 the city once again disconnected the Seva Sangh’s 
water for having installed two additional 5,000 litre suction tanks, a booster pump, and 
dismantling the water meter that measures consumption (Figure 6.2).22 In response to the 
disconnection, on June 6, 2005 the water department received a pledge on INR 100 stamp 
paper23 to discontinue use of the booster pump and extra water tanks, pay bills regularly, 
not re-connect private connections, and install and maintain a water meter “placed at such 
locations, so as to be always visible for meter readings” ( , 6/6/05). The Seva Sangh’s 
campaign to reconnect the water was aided by the water department receiving “a number of 
                                                
22 There is a large gap in the Seva Sangh water department archive documentation from 1993 to 2005. Similar 
gaps and other curious omissions in documentation were observed in other files as well. Based on inductive 
logic hypothesizing that there are spurious links between the department and CBOs (developed later in the 
chapter) the author surmises that documentation may have been pulled in various files to protect illegal 
behavior committed by water department employees. 
23 Stamp paper is akin to a notarized contract. 
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telephone calls from Municipal Councillor [name withheld] and MLA [name withheld] 
requesting to reconnect the water connection at Ganesh Murthy Nagar Part II” (WD-SS, 
6/6/05). Calls on the 3rd and 4th of June convinced an assistant engineer to inspect the 
situation immediately. On the 6th of June the assistant engineer noted that the offending 
machinery had been disconnected (although not removed) and allowed the reconnection of 
one water network immediately. The second water connection was officially sanctioned for 
reconnection a week later on June 13, 2005. The archives contain no other records related 
to the matter except for a field report made in 2008, which identifies the persistent 
existence of the illegal individual connections. As of 2010 the offending 5,000 litre water 
tanks and booster pump were still present and in use and private connections have become 
the norm in Part II.  
 




In 2010 the Seva Sangh continues to be run by the secretary, or “Bhai”, as he is known in 
the settlement.24 According to residents, the secretary has held onto power over the CBO 
for the last 27 years because of his knowledge of how the infrastructural systems work and 
his ability to negotiate with the municipal departments. Further, the secretary has 
maintained strong connections to local politicians, and admits to writing and visiting the 
local Member of Parliament (MP), the local MLA, and a local Municipal Councillor. 
During the state legislature elections held in Mumbai in 2009, I witnessed the secretary and 
the local Municipal Councillor touring the settlement followed by a dozen or so supporters. 
Additionally, in interviews with residents, the secretary is allegedly unscrupulous in 
enforcing his power over the CBO. No open committee meetings take place and requests 
made by residents for changes or ameliorations to the CBO and its administration are 
simply ignored. More vocal critics of the CBO have lost their water privileges and 
allegedly their homes as well. Finally, several members of the committee are also members 
of the Singh family. The muscle gang protects the interests of the committee by creating 
problems for competing factions (as discussed earlier), by providing physical deterrents to 
those hutment dwellers that would complain of poor service, and by terrorizing those that 
do voice resistance to the dominance of the CBO. 
In 2006 a new CBO, called the Colaba Back Bay Association, was registered to procure 
water and three years later the standpipe infrastructure was erected on the boundary of Part 
II and Part III (Figure 6.3). In addition, a four-inch diameter water pipe connected to the 
network proceeds down the main commercial street into Part III which is controlled by the 
Manav Seva Sameti (another water network examined in 6.3.4) to potentially usurp the 
latter’s territory. While someone else is ostensibly the president of the association, the 
secretary of the Seva Sangh has come to assume control over the administration of the 
network. In an interview with the president of the Colaba Back Bay Association I was 
given the distinct impression that the secretary’s influence with the local Municipal 
Councillor helped to represent the nascent CBO at the municipal level, and his influence 
with the MLA helped to secure funding to pay for the infrastructure (Interview, president of 
Colaba Back Bay Association, 11/11/09).  
                                                
24 The term “bhai”, literally meaning “brother,” is a term of respect that has its roots in Mumbai mafia culture.  
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Figure 6.3 Installing a new water line for the Colaba Back Bay Association 
Credit: Author 
Despite these political allegiances the expansion of the Seva Sangh through the Colaba 
Back Bay Association did not proceed straightforwardly or go unchallenged. The first 
difficulty was convincing residents to become members of the association and handing over 
their identification documents, which are necessary to prove to the water department they 
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are eligible for municipal water service. Residents were apparently fearful of joining the 
group, and the president also encountered friction from residents who were nervous about 
giving him their documents for fear of losing them and their being used to give 
acquiescence to other potential projects (Interview, president of Colaba Back Bay 
Association, 11/11/09).25 Another difficulty in setting up the new network was made by the 
president of the HDWA who complained to the police that the land in front of the 
settlement was not intended to house infrastructural components, and filed a case in the 
city’s High Court under his sister’s name arguing the same. However, as the land belongs 
to the state Collector, the file was thrown out. Former Municipal Councillor Rathod26, who 
controls the Seva Sameti water CBO in Part III, put an additional roadblock in the way. 
Rathod argued with the MCGM that the members of the Colaba Back Bay Association 
were in fact not eligible for the service. Although Rathod succeeded in substantially 
delaying the network, ultimately the Executive Engineer of the municipal water department 
in Colaba sided with the Colaba Back Bay Association, and a suction tank and pumping 
arrangements were installed in the parking lot of the settlement along the road. Finally, the 
president of the Colaba Back Bay Association admitted to bribing police officers to make 
sure there was no trouble moving the project forward – something he later had to repeat 
with the BMC surveyors, and employees of the Collectors office (Interview, president of 
Colaba Back Bay Association, 11/11/09).  
Currently, the Seva Sangh has approximately 216 official members but distributes water to 
approximately 900 hutments in Ganesh Murthy. Nominally located in Part II, the tentacles 
of the network penetrate to areas in Part III, and plans are underway for further expansion 
via the Colaba Back Bay Association. The current distribution network is fed from two 
municipal connections, which each distribute water to nine lanes on alternate days. Four 
male employees turn the valves on and off to deliver water directly to hutments between 
12pm and 7pm, and from 11pm to 3:30am.  There are also 4 stand-posts where the 
employees sell water at the nominal, if not legal, rate of INR 2 per 20 litres. Because the 
                                                
25 Reprisals against slum dwellers that challenge existing water networks may include losing access to the 
existing service (as discussed later in the chapter). Further, a proliferation of CBOs to nominally procure 
services, but in reality used for other purposes such as providing false acquiescence for redevelopment 
schemes (as detailed in chapter VIII) has created emergent sentiments of fear and distrust. These emergent 
factors may otherwise mitigate against the formation of potentially more just schemes.  
26 This Municipal Councillor’s name has been changed. 
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distribution of water is so wide, hutments receive an average of 60 litres a day, rather than 
the 225 litres they are apportioned by the city.27 60 litres of water is not enough for an 
average sized family of five and thus requires additional energy, money, and time to 
procure water from alternative sources in the settlement.   
The Seva Sangh is the second largest (after the Manav Seva Sameti) municipal water 
distributer in the settlement. With 900 hutments paying an average of INR 125 a month, its 
annual revenue from water alone are INR 1,350,000.28 Expenses for employees, water from 
the city, and electricity may equal roughly half of the total, however additional money is 
collected from other sources. The CBO receives money from the municipality for 
maintaining the toilet block in the territory and for managing solid waste. Beyond these 
legal revenue streams, the CBO earns INR 2000 per private connection installation, revenue 
from illegal electrical connections, the sale of land in Part II, the sale of houses, and 
payment from merchants who set up stalls on the commercial street. The secretary also runs 
a restaurant located at the BEST bus station and receives rent from a balwadi, or day care, 
that operates in the territory. Finally, reliable sources suggest that Part II committee 
members receive INR 100,000 each from real estate developers intent on developing the 
slum, who pay the committee for their permission to collect signatures needed to proceed 
with slum redevelopment schemes (to be discussed further in Chapter VIII).  
The Seva Sangh is an important organization in Ganesh Murthy, with 4500 people 
depending on it for a good portion of their daily water requirements. The power it holds 
over water distribution has been leveraged to reduce by more than three quarters resident’s 
legally sanctioned supply of 225 litres per day per hutment. Along with documenting the by 
now familiar infrastructural augmentations, the WDA reveals the extent to which 
politicians intervene on the behalf of the CBO. The archives also depict the complicity or 
negligence of municipal employees not only in allowing illegal infrastructure to persist, but 
also their participation in the ineffective processes involved in rectifying illegalities, as 
displayed in their disconnecting, but not removing, illegal water tanks and booster pumps. 
                                                
27 The city calculates 5 people per hutment with each person apportioned 45 litres each. 
28 This is equal to GBP 18,602 
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Finally, the archives point to the capturing of a start-up water-based CBO in Part II in 1993 
and the expansion of the Seva Sangh through the Colaba Back Bay Association in 2010.  
6.3.3 Mahila Pragati Samiti 
By the year 2000 Ganesh Murthy Nagar had experienced a large migration and was home 
to some 7000 residents. Municipal water supply, however, had fallen well below demand. 
The HDWA and the Seva Sangh received water for only 111 and 216 hutments 
respectively, or a combined total of water for 1635 people. Their water supply had been 
increased through various infrastructural augmentations, which helped address demand 
from the new settlement following a line of flight westward. In response to the burgeoning 
population several social consistencies emerged to procure more water from the city. A 
wealthy businessman assembled a small CBO in 1993, which distributed water to 15 
households from one standpipe. The standpipe was located in Part III on the commercial 
alley, eight feet below ground in a large dug out hole to allow the gravity-fed system to 
function, and members had to climb down a ladder to collect their water. However, the 
small distribution network fell through in 2005 due to unpaid bills (Interview with wife of 
businessman, 11/21/09). Additionally, a private water supplier had taken root in the 
settlement ten years earlier on the main commercial thoroughfare of the settlement, which 
sells water from an underground tank (fed by water tanker trucks) at five to ten times the 
standard rate of municipal water (WDA-MPS, 10/17/00). In 2010 this private merchant is 
the largest single supplier of water in the settlement, selling an average of 100,000 litres of 
water a day.  
Despite these additional sources, the ratio of demand to supply for water continued to be far 
from equilibrium. Triggered yet again by new changes to the cut-off date for inclusion in 
the official slum register, this time set to 1995, several consistencies congealed in the social 
strata along a trajectory to procure water services. The organizer of a start-up CBO 
successfully enrolled a newly elected Municipal Councillor (in 2000), and self-admittedly 
naïve politician, to provide funding and political representation (Interview, 12/15/09). One 
particularly difficult hurdle to overcome in the establishment of the nascent network was 
competition from Municipal Councillor Rathod, who had his own ideas for the territory the 
CBO had staked out. While the nascent CBO was distributing water through 20 standpipes, 
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Rathod was installing marble commemorative signs to his future water network on the 
same alleys (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 11/20/09). The newly elected Rathod 
organized his political clout to destroy the incipient CBO, which he ultimately 
accomplished.  
Literally picking up the pieces of the obsolescent CBO were members of another CBO 
called Mahila Pragati Samiti, which had merged with another CBO called the Sai Seva 
Mandal in 2000 (WDA-MPS, 19/12/00). The president of the Mahila Pragati Samiti is a 
woman of approximately 60 years old and was a former member of the Shiv Sena’s local 
shakha, or slum branch. The vice president of the new CBO is a long time resident of 
Ganesh Murthy, and had captured and developed over 100 hutments in the settlement, and 
still collects a sizeable revenue from the continued rental of these hutments. The CBO 
employs 30 women to distribute water at standpipes, and is the only water CBO in the 
settlement to be run exclusively by women.  
Members of Mahila Pragati Samiti took the defunct pipeline and relocated it to the territory 
now referred to as Part III Backside. The CBO, which officially registered with the MCGM 
to distribute water in 2002, consists of 236 member hutments. The leaders of the 
organization also operate the Banjara Samaj CBO, which is a municipal water distribution 
network based in Ambedkar Nagar. The Colaba Resident’s Welfare Association, located in 
Ganesh Murthy, is another “social work” CBO affiliated with the Mahila Pragati Samiti 
that actively lobbied against the efforts of Rathod in 2000.29  
The Mahila Pragati Samiti’s infrastructural network consists of a cluster of several tanks 
and pumping equipment near Prakash Pethe Marg to collect and push water to a second set 
of tanks and pumps located on the Backside commercial street (Figure 6.4 and Figure 6.5). 
Unfortunately, the archives do not contain information related to the size of tanks or pumps, 
although the president of the CBO asserts that the tank has a capacity of 30,000 litres 
(Interview, president of Mahila Pragati Samiti, 11/15/09). The CBO distributes water 
directly to individual private and semi-private (consisting of two or three hutments) 
                                                
29 Social work CBOs are discussed at length in the following chapter. 
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connections as in Part I and II, and also runs fifty standpipes operated by 30 women. The 
average daily allotment to residents is 70 litres, for which they pay INR 100 a month. 
 
Figure 6.4 Women sitting in front of the Mahila Pragati Samiti’s water tanks 
Credit: Author 
 
Figure 6.5 Network map for Mahila Pragati Sameti and Banjara Samaj pumping arrangements 
Credit: Colaba Water Department Archives 
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Soon after the infrastructure was installed in 2003 (upon receiving a complaint by 
Municipal Councillor Rathod) the water department found an illegal pipe branching off the 
sanctioned network into Ambedkar Nagar behind the bus depot, and took legal action. 
However, the WDA does not contain any information pertaining to the resolution and 
follow up to this intervention. The next document in the archive dates from 2005 in the 
form of a request for police backup to disconnect the water source. In the letter 30 police 
officers were requisitioned for the disconnection, as the previous attempt to disconnect the 
line was met with “stiff resistance from a mob of 100 women and limited police bandobast” 
(MDA-MPS, 15/10/05). The tactics employed by the CBO here recall the aggressive 
communal action embodied by women Shiv Sena cadres as depicted by Sen (2006), and has 
served the CBO leaders well in maintaining their power in Ganesh Murthy’s context of 
otherwise male-dominated water delivery networks.   
In 2006 a municipal inspection found an illegal booster pump and a node in the piping 
network that preceded the water meter. A follow up inspection deemed that a booster pump 
was necessary and should be permitted, but that the one currently being used was drawing 
too much water and a request was made to change the size of the pump. Further legal action 
was taken but as before, there is no documented resolution to the dispute. Curiously, the 
original field report spoke of a node that preceded the meter, but the formal letter sent to the 
CBO and the Executive Engineer of the Water Department mentioned an unauthorized 
meter having been substituted for the official meter, and made no mention of the unofficial 
node. Again there is no follow up documentation to these actions. Several months later, in 
November 2006, the Water Department responded to a complaint placed by a resident of 
Ganesh Murthy about threatening behaviour demonstrated by the president of the Mahila 
Pragati Samiti, by dismissing the complaint and saying it was a matter for the police 
(WDA-MPS, 11/28/06). There is no evidence to suggest that muscle gangs played a past 
role in the enrolment and regulation of the CBO, and perhaps, given the leader’s experience 
with the militant Shiv Sena, there was no need to employ outside muscle components (see 
Sen, 2006). Recently, however, the Singh family’s muscle gang has been protecting the 
Mahila Pragati Samiti’s interests through their association with the Seva Sangh in a 
redevelopment effort (examined at length in Chapter VIII).  
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The archives and supporting interviews surrounding the Mahila Pragati Samiti permit a 
different perspective concerning the assembling of the CBO from those afforded by 
investigations into the HDWA and Seva Sangh files. Consistent with these latter files, 
political representation was necessary to gain representation and funding, municipal 
negligence or corruption is also apparent, and infrastructure was augmented soon after the 
establishment of the water connection. However, what emerges from the file is also the 
convoluted nature of the establishment of the CBO network. Heretofore, the assembling of 
infrastructure and people appears relatively straightforward. The Mahila Pragati Samiti file 
suggests perhaps a more accurate representation of CBO assembling and functioning that is 
far more competitive and contested.  
6.3.4 Manav Seva Sameti 
Historically concurrent with the emergence of the Mahila Pragati Samiti was the 
assembling of the fourth and final water network currently operating in the settlement. In 
2001 a “master plan” to provide infrastructure for Ambedkar Nagar and Ganesh Murthy 
Nagar was conceived by Municipal Councillor Rathod and the state Collector (WDA-MSS 
18/09/01; WDS-MSS 25/09/01). The master plan called for one large water distribution 
network in each settlement and new toilet blocks to accommodate the swelling population. 
Lending itself to a holistic vision for potential up-gradation and re-development is the fact 
that the area comprised by the slums forms a distinct block sandwiched between the luxury 
condominiums of Cuffe Parade and the military installation at Navy Nagar. In fact, the 
block of slums endures as an attractor for holistic development to this day.  
In 2000, while Rathod was competing for land with the aforementioned nascent CBO that 
was ultimately disbanded, he was simultaneously assembling autonomous CBOs in Ganesh 
Murthy to form an umbrella CBO called the Manav Seva Sameti (MSS). In this effort, there 
is only fleeting evidence to suggest that Rathod may have enrolled the help of the Singh 
family muscle gang. Subsequently, however, the two parties have come to represent 
conflicting efforts to redevelop the slum and there is no evidence that any muscle gang 
currently supports the MSS. Rathod enrolled the leaders of these groups, who held what 
Suketu Mehta (2004) calls “powertoni,” the power of attorney over member hutment 
dwellers, with promises of more power. Six CBOs consisting of 32, 136, 9, 33, 29, and 7 
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members, joined the MSS leading to 246 member hutments. In interviews with a former 
leader of an amalgamated CBO and several powerful women in the settlement, expressions 
of betrayal by Rathod abounded as the latter, upon receiving their legal consent to merge 
their groups with the MSS, shut them out of the operation.  
The MSS was officially registered in 2002 and a Rathod loyalist was chosen as president of 
the CBO. He was replaced in this capacity before 2008 by the secretary of the CBO who is 
reputed to be one of the larger landholders in the settlement. Rathod secured funding from 
the MCGM General Budget for the Welfare of the People, and so the State’s engineering 
and bureaucratic machines slowly engaged with the calculations and logistics required for 
the project. Over two years, Rathod and the MSS campaigned to move the project along, 
carving marble signs, writing official letters, and organizing pleas from thirsty slum 
dwellers (WDA-SS). In 2004 a formal contract was signed between the MSS and the city 
for a municipal connection. The cost of the project was INR 1,350,000 and water started 
flowing through the network on August 8, 2004 (Interview, former president MSS, 
11/11/09). Noteworthy is the fact that the Competent Authority and Water Department 
Executive Engineer, ostensibly in charge of the network for the State, refused to certify the 
infrastructural network: but the water was turned on anyways (WDA-SS, 22/9/04). 
The MSS network is the largest in the settlement, running along both commercial corridors 
and servicing 30 taps (WDA-SS, 19/10/07). The existing infrastructure exposes 
inconsistencies between the planned and actualized network. For example, the plan for the 
network called for an 80 mm connection, but a later report refers to an actual connection of 
100 mm (WDA-MSS, 16/3/05). The plan also called for 17 standpipes, but 26 were 
factored into later network drawings, and in 2008 thirty taps were claimed by the CBO. 
Similarly, the municipal technical engineer’s report called for a 28,000 litre suction tank 
and an 11,000 litre auxiliary tank, but curiously, the formal plans approved by the 
Executive Engineer, granted 35,000 and 11,500 litre tanks (WDA-SS, 23/05/01; WDA-SS, 
27/06/01). Rathod later slipped in a request just before work began asking that the tank 
volume be augmented by 50% (WDA-SS, 19/09/02). No follow up on this matter is located 
in the archive but the former president of the CBO asserts that the tank’s capacity is 
100,000 litres (Interview, former president MSS, 11/11/09). 
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The network accesses the municipal water main located underneath Prakash Pethe Marg at 
the southern boundary of the BEST bus depot. There, on the lot owned by BEST, a suction 
tank and pump house collect and feed the network, which terminates at the auxiliary tank at 
the southwest corner of the settlement. The system collects and distributes water daily for 
three hours from 11am to 2pm, and hutments are apportioned 60 litres a day. Operating the 
stand-posts are 30 women who, as of 2010, are paid INR 300 a month for their daily labour. 
They meet with Rathod, who they refer to as “the teacher,” and his assistant, known only as 
“Baby”, every month in one of the buildings Rathod operates out of Azad Nagar: a slum 
located less than a kilometre away from Ganesh Murthy on the eastern side of the 
peninsula. These standpipe operators distribute water to members of the CBO and others 
subscribing to the service. All recipients of water pay between INR 50 and 100 for 60 litres 
of water a day (the higher charge is paid by renters), and must carry the water back to their 
hutments. According to the former president of the MSS, the water networks in Ganesh 
Murthy and a similar network (controlled by Rathod) operating in Ambedkar Nagar, 
produce monthly revenues between INR 200,000 and INR 250,000, or roughly GBP 3000. 
The MSS file in the WDA is completely different from the other three network’s files. 
Firstly, Rathod’s name appears prominently in many documents, rather than fleeting 
references to politicians found in the other files. Further, there are no reports for 
unsanctioned infrastructure and reprimands for unpaid bills. Instead, the file shows Rathod 
and the MSS working in tandem to gain concessions from the State as already 
demonstrated in the requests for augmented infrastructure. Another request for INR 
5,000,000 to extend the network to individual houses was made in October 2007 (WDA-
MSS, 17/10/07). In addition to augmented infrastructure, in June 2007 the CBO wrote the 
water department asking them to revoke the membership of a resident of the settlement due 
to assault upon various members of the CBO, non-payment of bills, and a series of other 
accusations (WDA-MSS, 05/06/07). More demands to remove additional people from the 
MSS membership base followed shortly thereafter, indicating an effort to punish people 
that contravened the CBOs expectations (WDA-MSS, 08/06/07; WDA-MSS, 09/06/07).  
In fact, efforts to delist members of the MSS reveal that Rathod’s 2001 master plan 
exceeded the mere creation and control of infrastructure. The WDA files, together with 
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documentation from the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA), show that attempts were 
made by Rathod to secure the redevelopment rights of Ganesh Murthy through the SRA (to 
be examined at length in Chapter VIII). One trajectory he pursued in this endeavour was 
delaying a competing developer called Plymouth Constructions Ltd. from completing the 
necessary requirements demanded by the SRA. To this extent, the president of the MSS 
wrote a detailed five-page letter to the water department vaulting accusations of beatings 
and fear mongering attributed to 19 “agents” of Plymouth who resided in Ganesh Murthy 
(WDA-MSS, 08/06/07). Among these agents are some familiar names like the secretary of 
the Seva Sangh and the president of the Mahila Pragati Samiti, and there are other powerful 
personages from the settlement as well. In a follow up letter addressed to the Prime 
Minister of India, the president of the MSS accused police officers of working for 
Plymouth (WDA-SS, 08/06/07):  
Officer Salvi even threatened to arrest the President of the Organization (me) in false case. Chances of 
false complaint being lodged by this [sic] agents against me, my committee members and advisor 
[name changed to Rathod] cannot be ruled out in Cuffe Parade Police Station and Colaba Station.  
While the president was working to delay Plymouth, Rathod pursued another trajectory 
towards the redevelopment of the settlements: the collection of resident signatures, which is 
a necessity under SRA guidelines. In this endeavour he used his leverage over resident’s 
water supply to force them to sign over control of their hutments. Those who resisted had 
their water access cut off, like one resident who later wrote in a report to the Maharashtra 
Human Rights Commission (WDA-SS, 07/06/07): 
He [Rathod] is forcing us to sign on certain stamp paper in his office at Pestonji Street, Colabawadi, 
wherein he has set up a video camera to record the proceedings. Before the people are brought to his 
office they are threatened sometimes at their residences, work places and even outside the office and 
are told that if they do not sign their water connection will be cut off, their houses will be demolished 
and false and fabricated cases will be slapped against them due to the money and muscle power that he 
commands. A major portion of the water supply and distribution in Ganesh Murthy Nagar and 
Ambedkar Nagar is controlled by him and people are forced to sign.  
The MSS water network, with Rathod as its leader, functions quite differently from the 
other networks operating in the settlement. Rathod, as a former politician, had access to 
municipal funds and associations with other politicians and municipal employees. He was 
able to use these connections at the state and municipal levels to acquire a robust 
infrastructural network that did not need many illegal augmentations, as they had already 
been sanctioned by the State. However, Rathod took this relationship further, actively 
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pursuing ameliorations and using the State apparatus to combat his enemies, rather than 
defensively playing a cat and mouse game with the water department. Rathod himself is an 
important actor in the settlement assemblage due to his perceived power as a former 
Municipal Councillor, his control over water and toilets, and his continuing role as a real 
estate developer.  
6.4 Patterns of development 
The development of water distribution networks in Ganesh Murthy Nagar reveals several 
noteworthy patterns. Despite reports to the contrary, the assembling of CBOs may be a 
contested practice with contradictory effects on society. The further development of CBOs 
towards gaining water access necessitated the involvement of local politicians, and created 
association with municipal employees, which shaped both the tendencies of State actors 
and the ordering of the nomadic settlement. The emergent space issuing forth from this 
potent mix is a liminal place composed of, but also isolated from, the State apparatus and 
residents of the settlement and which is fiercely guarded by increasingly powerful water 
distribution CBOs.  
6.4.1 Assembling and capturing the CBO 
Few studies have focused on how local CBOs in Mumbai are assembled. What surfaces 
from research conducted by Edleman and Mitra (2006), which is predominantly based on 
statistical analysis of secondary data sources together with a shallow survey, is a benign 
process of group formation culminating in the election of a leader who heads the political 
association. In this thesis archival analysis and interviews demonstrate that, on the contrary, 
the assembling of CBOs may involve contested processes. Further, the historical record 
demonstrates that processes have become more challenging over time. The assembling of 
people in the HDWA and Seva Sangh appears to have been more straightforward than the 
assembling of multiple CBOs to form the Mahila Pragati Samiti and the MSS, and the 
assembling of residents for the Colaba Back Bay Association.  
The enrolment of people consists of assembling their signatures, and importantly, their 
documents to prove they are registered with the electoral office, which qualifies them for 
municipal services. The assembling of signatures and documents leads to powertoni, one of 
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four major powers in operation at the settlement. Powertoni may be strengthened by 
making copies of signatures and documents, or worse, not giving the documents back at all. 
Powertoni allows those who have assembled documents to use them for purposes other 
than those for which they were intended, such as to gain municipal contracts for waste 
management and other services. In cases where documents are not returned, resident’s 
ability to join other CBOs is greatly limited. Unsubstantiated stories in the settlement point 
to other abuses resulting from powertoni such as the sale of hutments and the eviction of 
rightful owners. The multiple ways in which these documents have been abused have 
fuelled fear and distrust amongst residents of Ganesh Murthy, and this is apparent in the 
difficulty the president of the Colaba Back Bay Association had in assembling signatures 
and documents.  
Tensions may arise from assembling various CBOs, as with the case of the MSS. 
Interviews with members of the original six CBOs that combined to form the MSS revealed 
feelings of disenfranchisement, betrayal, and extreme dislike (Interview, residents of 
Ganesh Murthy, 11/29/09). The leaders of the CBOs had all allegedly been promised 
powerful positions in the new CBO, but quickly found themselves on the outside: no longer 
holders of powertoni and powerless to prevent the unjust treatment of themselves and their 
constituent members. Tensions may also arise between social consistencies that are 
competing to collect signatures and documents to operate a water service in the same 
territory.  
The capturing of CBOs to derive personal wealth at the expense of the welfare of residents 
has had two conflicting results in Ganesh Murthy. First, the success of CBOs in procuring 
infrastructure as well as facilitating individual wealth may contribute to a proliferation of 
start-up CBOs. An informal survey of a sample set of 10 alleys, or roughly one third the 
settlement, revealed that there were no fewer than two known CBOs existing per lane. 
Second, along with other factors that are examined in the following chapter, the capture of 
the four water networks in the settlement, has created a general distrust of CBOs in general. 
Interviews with residents throughout the settlement reveal a general malaise in regards to 
CBOs with complaints of being shut out of committee meetings, duplicity and theft in their 
dealings with CBOs, and for over paying for too little water. 
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Distrust is a pervasive sentiment in the settlement and has deleterious effects. Ironically, as 
social consistencies in the settlement congeal towards some from of societal organization, a 
concurrent trajectory of social fragmentation manifests. The organization of CBOs, and 
their subsequent capture and misuse, have fuelled this fragmentation through fear and 
distrust. The lack of trust, in turn, may create barriers towards the formation of new or 
larger social consistencies, which may otherwise succeed in realizing more democratic and 
just governance. Fear and distrust also result in the inability to form a unified body or 
movement, which might otherwise work towards dismantling some of the dominant and 
unjust strata of the settlement. One resident pointed out that there is no unity in GM 
because there is no trust.  
Everyone tries to get ahead over everyone else. They say nice things to you and then go behind your 
back. People don’t care about the greater society. People only care when they have no water. There are 
no credible leaders either. They say, ‘we will’ and never do. They say they will fix things on Sunday 
but Sunday never comes (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy Nagar, 15/11/09).  
The lack of trust and the pervasive sense of fear are important components of the settlement 
assemblage that contribute to a fragmented community whose lack of cohesiveness impairs 
its ability to move towards a more just and equitable society. 
6.4.3 Nomadic tendencies of the State apparatus  
Based on archival data at the municipal water department, gaining access to municipal 
water goes beyond the assembling of people and their documents and following legal 
procedures. It also requires funding for infrastructure and political influence to motivate 
governmental agencies. These components of water access create a niche for local 
politicians, who are motivated by a logic to acquire and maintain votes, and engage in vote 
bank politics; a stalwart component of Mumbai’s political dynamic that is blamed by 
political actors, the middle class, and the media for everything from the proliferation of 
slums to the city’s crumbling infrastructure.  
A vote bank is a bloc of voters from one community that votes consistently for one 
politician or political party. Vote bank politics is the term used to describe the process of 
negotiation between slum dwellers and politicians whereby land tenure regularization, 
stopping evictions, and facilitating the provision of basic amenities are exchanged for votes 
and support at election time (Benjamin, 2005; Mujtaba, 2004). Slum dwellers are especially 
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reliant on political networks for living improvements because of their lack of access to 
other social and economic networks, and so politicians are understood to be in a position to 
exploit this vulnerability (Edelman and Mitra, 2006). Concurrently, politicians must 
compete with each other for office so slum dwellers have been able to leverage their voting 
power into guarantees of tenure and access to basic services (Jha et al., 2004; Aldrich and 
Sandhu, 1995).  
In India, Edelman and Mitra’s (2006), research reveals that while political access is crucial 
for slum dwellers to receive ration cards, acquire land tenure, and gain services, vote bank 
politics does not reduce their vulnerability in the long run. For the most part this argument 
is based on Werlin’s argument (1999) that politicians would rather ignore or exploit social 
and economic tensions rather than promoting community cooperation in the pursuit of slum 
up-gradation. A similar statement about the fragmenting role of vote bank politics is put 
forward by Bhide (2009: 380) when she says that political representatives are interested in 
“cultivating slums as their vote banks perpetually obligated to them thereby dividing 
communities and preventing a larger struggle for housing rights to become a strong and 
effective force.” At Ganesh Murthy, the historical record reveals that vote bank politics 
clearly played an important role in procuring municipal water. Throughout the development 
of the settlement, emergent social consistencies sought the help of politicians to navigate 
their demands through the State apparatus, and relied on politicians for funding to pay for 
the infrastructure. The development of multiple distribution systems has fostered forms of 
fragmentation in the settlement and does indeed leave the community less able to make 
greater demands. What remains to be explained is the various ways this happens.  
The investigation of Ganesh Murthy exposes a novel dimension of this relationship 
between slum dwellers, politicians, and technical networks. While slum dwellers do indeed 
rely upon patron politicians to procure services, there is also a sense in which politicians 
may go beyond normative parameters to maintain the existence of their allies in the slum. 
This comes through in the efforts of politicians to have the Seva Sangh’s water connection 
re-established in June 2005. The local Municipal Councillor and MLA both made several 
calls to the water department to re-establish water connections that were shut down due to 
illegal components having been added to the infrastructure. The calls were made despite the 
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offending infrastructure having been merely disconnected and not removed. In the context 
of significant historical evidence pointing to the eventual reconnection of offending 
infrastructure in the settlement, the efforts of these politicians may be interpreted as 
potentially contrary to the strict legal parameters defined by the State. These nomadic 
tendencies oriented towards maintaining a form of existence outside the legal parameters of 
the State apparatus are most apparent in the work of Rathod, who used the mechanisms of 
the State to create alternative revenue streams in the form of water distribution systems and 
toilet blocks. In fact, this points to another motivational logic underlying politician’s 
actions: to make money. A former politician admitted in an interview that Mumbai’s 
politicians “do not enter politics for votes or for politics, but to make money” (Interview, 
01/05/10). Beyond maintaining vote banks or deriving revenue there may be other 
motivations for these nomadic tendencies. From the perspective of the politician, water 
distribution networks are not only mechanisms for assembling votes, but tactical weapons 
to be used in discrediting or weakening their political rivals. An internal document in the 
WDA (WDA-SS, 05/04/94) describes illegal infrastructure in Parts I and II of the 
settlement and concludes: 
The main problem in these colonies [Ganesh Murthy Nagar] is the dispute between two groups each 
led by Municipal Councillors. There are allegations and counter allegations as seen in the complaint 
under reference and Corporation [the municipal corporation MCGM] is not a party to these allegations. 
During the course of informal conversations with residents of Ganesh Murthy I also 
encountered unsubstantiated reports of contemporary political rivalries that had manifested 
in similar ways. Therefore, water distribution schemes may become metonymic for 
particular politicians and an attack on the former weakens the latter. Considering for a 
moment (to be elaborated upon in the next section) that water distribution schemes are 
elements in the nomadic war machine, the present example demonstrates how these tools 
for maintaining an existence outside the State may be used by State actors to wage war 
against each other. And of course, causalities in these exchanges are borne by slum 
dwellers, whose water service and lives are dramatically affected by the altercations.  
Water distribution networks are also assets that politicians manipulate to manifest desired 
results. A local Municipal Councillor (Interview, 11/11/09) said during an interview: 
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All politicians take money from builders operating on their land. The politicians are paid to get 
signatures by forcing people to sign. They can stop their water from coming, stop them from using the 
toilet, or use force to reach their goal. The only politicians that did not take money are myself and [one 
other]. The government is useless. I am ashamed of the greed displayed by politicians and those in the 
government while those around us live in such poverty.   
The above demonstrates that the provision and maintenance of functioning infrastructure by 
politicians goes beyond merely the establishment of a block of sympathetic voters. The 
association between politicians and water networks manifests in nomadic tendencies on the 
part of the former that use infrastructure as an asset to leverage in the sale of their influence 
to developers, to make money from selling services, and as tools in political warfare.  
Beyond the nomadic tendencies of politicians there is strong evidence to support the 
hypothesis that CBOs also enrol municipal engineers at the water department into their 
networks. The continued operation of private connections in Part I, Part II, and Part III 
Backside, despite their initial and subsequent identification from the early 1990s, suggests 
an undocumented and unofficial permission for the usage. Further, and related to this, are 
patterns in the WDA where illegal changes are documented but gaps appear in the 
resolution of such issues. In the case of the Seva Sangh, the WDA file was missing the 
names of hutment dwellers, their signatures, photocopies of their identification papers, as 
well as a map of the infrastructure network. Other signposts indicating connections between 
CBOs and the municipality include the pervasive non-functionality of meters that measure 
the CBOs consumption of water. The WDA reveal that of the four networks operating in 
Ganesh Murthy, three have dysfunctional water meters, with one of them having been 
broken for seven years. In these cases water consumption is calculated according to the last 
meter reading, and would not take into account changes to the system to draw more water. 
Water meter dysfunction is not limited to Ganesh Murthy, but occurs in approximately 50 
percent of slum water connections in the ward, suggesting either widespread incompetence 
or corruption. In addition to these inductive indicators of enrolment, are direct admissions 
of the bribery of BMC officials, including a water department engineer who admitted that 
corruption was still highly prevalent in the MCGM apparatus (Interview, 12/31/09). Thus, 
the interaction between the nomadic settlement and the State apparatus have led some 
actors of the latter to adopt nomadic tendencies in their pursuit of an existence outside the 
legal parameters of the State.  
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6.4.4 Creative infrastructural configurations 
State infrastructural arrangements for distributing water in slums are designed as 
authoritative arborescent networks that distribute water equitably to a distinct set of people 
segmented from the rest of the community. Water flowing at a precise pressure through the 
municipal main for a discrete amount of time will yield an exact volume of water 
depending upon the size of the connection to the main. These known quantities are then 
engineered to allow water to flow through pipelines, whose diameter ensures that the 
defined number of standpipes receive a precisely calculated amount of water. It is at this 
point that the CBO may then take control of the water to fairly distribute it to members 
lining up with 20-litre plastic containers.  
The water distribution schemes at Ganesh Murthy Nagar, however, reveal completely 
different network configurations resulting in very different outcomes. Whether the network 
was augmented before the infrastructure was in place, as in the case with the Manav Seva 
Sameti, or whether augmentation took place incrementally after the infrastructure was 
functional, as is the case with the other three CBOs, all water networks followed a line of 
flight from State configurations. These augmentations represent important creative 
configurations that fed the growing nomadic settlement and facilitated its spreading out 
over the marsh while surpassing reterritorialized iterations of itself. With some standpipes 
delivering 400 percent of their intended capacity, the peripatetic movement of the 
settlement would arguably have been much more limited without augmentations.  
The establishment of underground water tanks are critical components of nomadic water 
schemes that follow a line of flight away from State networks designed for remote control. 
Holding tanks consolidate water in a state of potentiality, rather than allowing the water to 
manifest equitably through the arborescent network. The capture of the water in the tank 
thus deterritorializes it as a component of the State apparatus and reterritorializes it under 
the authority of the CBO. The addition of booster pumps increases the volume of water 
drawn from the system, and thus the potential and power of the CBO. These basic 
components, manifested in all four of the nomadic water networks, may also be aided by 
larger connections, as is the case with the Manav Seva Sameti, or additional connections as 
in the case of the Seva Sangh. While these changes to the infrastructure increase the volume 
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of water and transfer control to the CBO, other changes to the infrastructure also reduce 
State control, such as the dismantling of water metres. This increases the power [by 
increasing net profit] of the CBO through cost reduction, and follows other cost-cutting 
tactics like the theft of electricity form municipal light posts in the case of the Mahila 
Pragati Samiti and HDWA, or from regular residential meters as was the case with the Seva 
Sangh.  
The supply side of the infrastructure also follows a line of flight from State configurations 
and segmentations. Perhaps the most dramatic example of this in Ganesh Murthy was the 
movement of infrastructure from Part III to Part III Backside to meet the needs of a 
nomadic settlement assemblage as a plurality in transformation. The distribution of water to 
thousands of non-members is another large deviation from State striation and segmentation. 
Additionally, communal standpipes have been replaced to some extent by private or semi-
private connections. Standpipes continue to exist, but water is not necessarily distributed 
equally, as those residents regarded as threats by the CBO administrators are told to stand at 
the back of the line, or are simply refused service by female actors distributing the water for 
the CBO. People who are refused water may then join other disenfranchised residents who 
purchase the illegal sale of water from standpipes operated by other water networks. The 
mixture of State elements and nomadic tendencies manifested in water networks thus 
creates a multitude of hierarchical class distinctions, which contribute to social 
fragmentation.  
The employment of women to distribute water is also noteworthy. All of the 80 employees 
that distribute water for the Mahila Pragati Sameti and the Manav Seva Samiti are women. 
Ostensibly, as men leave the settlement for work during the day, the employment of women 
for several hours each day makes logistical sense. However, there may be other reasons as 
well. This was hinted at by the president of CRIT, who had surveyed the population of 
Ganesh Murthy for the Slum Sanitiation Project follow-up evaluations (discussed in the 
following chapter). He obliquely asserted that there were political reasons why women 
were employed by the CBOs. Residents of Ganesh Murthy clarified this when they insisted 
that: “there is less chances of physical violence against women. The police will not hesitate 
to beat a man, but they will shrink away from touching a woman” (Interview, residents of 
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Ganesh Murthy, 12/23/09). Therefore women employees may provide an important buffer 
between CBO leaders and authorities.  
The settlement is divided into four parts, and each territory holds a position in a hierarchy 
that is partly determined by the quality of water service. The perception of value attached to 
hutments in certain territories in the settlement are judged on several things such as the 
legal standing of hutments, their general quality, susceptibility to flooding, access to 
transportation corridors, and also the quality of water service. In Ganesh Murthy, Part I is 
largely recognized as having the best water supply with no survey respondents complaining 
of water problems. In Part II 46 percent of those surveyed complained of water service, 
however the many private connections are highly valued. Part III and Part III Backside 
have the worst water service in the settlement with 68 percent of people surveyed 
complaining about water service. These figures are reflected in the price of hutments as 
those in Part I may sell for as high as INR 1,300,000 while hutments in Part III may be 
found for as low as INR 300,000. Beyond hierarchies established by territorial water supply 
are intra-territorial hierarchies with those having private connections occupying positions at 
the top, and those denied water at the bottom. Additionally, there are tensions between 
CBO administrators and members, and also between members and non-members of CBOs 
as the latter siphon water away from amounts stipulated by the city to the former. 
The State configuration of water distribution in slums is designed to be administered 
democratically through CBOs and provide water equitably to a segmented portion of 
residents that are officially recognized. However, the admixture of State elements and 
nomadic tendencies results in a centralized abuse of power in Ganesh Murthy. Power 
accrues to those individuals that have the desire and the ability to both gather powertoni 
through the collection of documents, and establish relationships with influential people, 
called touch, such as politicians and municipal employees. With these various associations 
and infrastructural augmentations another important form of power accrues to the same 
individuals: money. The total annual revenue derived from the sale of municipal water in 
the settlement is INR 3,703,875 or roughly GBP 50,000. The cost of this water, calculated 
by the nominal cost of water to slums at INR 2 per 10,000 litres is about 17 Pounds.  
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The revenue generated by water networks pays for the costs of water, electricity, salaries, 
and maintenance. The profits, however, may be used to consolidate power in the form of 
payments to municipal employees that authorize illegal systems, politicians to sanction and 
petition, police officers to turn a blind eye, and muscle gangs to physically enforce the 
emergent power geometry. These costs are paid by residents who receive inadequate 
amounts of water and who bear the social costs of a slum headed towards despair composed 
of life-destroying relationships. Further, the success of water networks have led to their 
expansion and control over waste management services, toilet block management, related 
CBOs that perform “social work,” and private enterprises (all to be investigated further in 
the next chapter) in a trajectory towards greater centralization of power and greater 
domination over the settlement and society.  
6.4.5 Liminal space in the nomadic settlement 
The centralized power that has accrued to water networks has created the conditions for an 
emergent space that exists both between and beyond the State apparatus and residents. This 
liminal space sits between but also encompasses aspects of the State, including the legal, 
material, financial, and administrative components from which municipal services derive, 
and residents, for whom these services are oriented and to whom they are delivered. 
However, much of the management of the CBO service extends beyond these borders as 
well. On the State side of the equation, a “porous bureaucracy” (Benjamin, 1996), 
consisting of local politicians and municipal employees, are enrolled by the CBO to 
accommodate illegal infrastructural provision and augmentation. These State actors exhibit 
nomadic tendencies by shielding illegal components of the network from the State 
apparatus itself. This is a politics of stealth, akin to Bayat’s (1996) notion of quiet 
encroachment, where CBOs quietly gain concessions that remain “illegible before the gaze 
of the state” (Nigam, 2008: 2). As witnessed by the WDA, components of the State 
apparatus may identify augmented infrastructure and sometimes take action against it. But 
ultimately, the porous bureaucracy conspires to shield illegalities and works to maintain the 
status quo. A prime example of such a conspiracy, beyond the continuing existence of 
illegal infrastructure in the settlement, is apparent in the outcome of the aforementioned 
letter written to the Human Rights Commission of the State of Maharashtra to complain of 
water problems. This plea for help against the water network was ultimately deflected by 
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the municipal water department, as actors there were unable to locate the necessary 
paperwork demanded by the Registrar of the Human Rights Commission. This precluded 
the investigation from going any further and maintained the status quo (WDA-SS, 
07/06/07). 
Benjamin (2005) suggests a metaphor for this liminal nomadic space in the form of 
“entrepreneurial grassroots urban politics,” as it conveys a profit motivated and situated 
local politics. However, the dynamic he captures glosses over the violent relations that 
occur in squatter settlements. Daily life in Ganesh Murthy Nagar is not played out in 
“various Associations’ meetings,” (Benjamin, 2005: 247), as indeed these meetings are not 
accessible to regular residents. This is the other side of the liminal nomadic space that is 
ostensibly composed of slum dwellers, but concurrently isolates them from the mechanics 
of power. Both Edleman and Mitra (2006) and Benjamin’s (2005) studies fail to 
acknowledge the potentially contentious and violent processes that take place everyday 
around the formation and maintenance of CBO practices. By discontinuing meetings, or 
holding meetings behind closed doors, and by simply ignoring the requests of CBO 
members, the administrators of the CBO effectively shut slum dwellers out. Further, 
intimidation, ostracization, and occasionally physical violence perpetrated by muscle gangs 
associated with CBOs contributes to forms of domination that muffles the voices of 
residents from travelling beyond their hutments and the narrow alleys of the settlement. On 
occasions when these desiring voices do overcome the perimeter of the settlement, the 
enrolment of politicians, police, and municipal employees effectively leaves little room for 
slum dwellers to be heard. This darkest corner of the nomadic settlement has unfortunately 
emerged as the pervasive space of Ganesh Murthy Nagar. 
6.4.6 Barriers to Entry 
Entry into this liminal space is fiercely guarded. Ganesh Murthy Nagar, with a population 
of 11,000 people, has four de facto water distribution networks. By contrast, Ambedkar 
Nagar, composed of a similar socio-economic base and number of residents, has over 50 
official water connections (WDA, 01/10/10). The water networks at Ganesh Murthy have 
maintained their exclusive access to municipal water through a variety means and benefit 
from a spatial context that favours limited access.  
 203 
As described above, CBOs have effectively isolated residents from the State apparatus by 
enrolling actors in the porous bureaucracy of the State. However, local pressure for 
increased and improved water access still manifests in the settlement. Those who complain 
about poor water distribution risk being the last in line to have their water containers filled 
and having their water access summarily cut off, necessitating the purchase of poorer 
quality water at a higher price, often from further away. Beyond these privations CBOs also 
have alliances with muscle gangs that operate in the settlement that spread fear through 
physical threats and violence. Discussed further in the following chapter, there are at least 
four organized muscle gangs in Ganesh Murthy, and their activities seemingly touch upon 
every illegal activity in the settlement, including the regulation of people’s behaviour so as 
to reduce expectations of better water access.  
Beyond these direct defences, potential CBOs have to overcome emergent factors. Fear and 
distrust of CBOs make it difficult to collect signatures and procure documents. Further, the 
CBO has to approach a local politician for funding and to navigate the CBO through the 
municipal apparatus. Yet local politicians are already affiliated with established networks, 
which make it difficult to gain their acquiescence.  
Beyond these barriers to gaining new water connections is the spatial layout of the 
settlement, which favours the established networks. Ganesh Murthy abuts 50 meters of 
Prakash Pethe Marg, over which lies the water main, and much of this space is taken up by 
a communal area and parking spaces, thus making it difficult to establish a pump house and 
water tank there. This is why Manav Seva Sameti and Mahila Pragati Samiti located their 
infrastructure centres on the periphery of Ambedkar Nagar and the helipad area. By 
contrast, Ambedkar Nagar has 700 meters of contiguous space with the water main and 
numerous access points to the settlement along the road provide space for infrastructural 
arrangements. The networks in Ganesh Murthy guard the remaining open space where 
water distribution infrastructure could be placed. For example, as described above, the 
administrator of HDWA in Part I makes it very difficult for incipient networks to acquire 
space in this territory near the road by arguing with the municipality that the space is 
required for communal use.  
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It takes a special person or group of people to overcome the many barriers to entry: people 
who have the determination to gain powertoni; have the power of touch with local 
politicians; have the economic standing to not wither from water distribution privations, 
and those that can defend themselves against physical threats and violence. Sometimes, 
however this is not enough to gain a new water source. A nascent CBO was allegedly shut 
down by Rathod in 2009 after having assembled the signatures, permissions, and funding 
(Interview, president incipient CBO, 11/20/09). The leader of the incipient network alleges 
that Rathod used his connections with a builder constructing the condominium complex 
next to the settlement to revoke the State’s previously granted permission to put a water 
tank on their land. Since then the fledgling CBO has been unable to secure an alternative 
location. When the president of the CBO went public with the events of their misfortune, 
local newspapers decried the construction of luxury condominiums in an area where slum 
dwellers could not even get sufficient water. Another dimension of this reality, however, is 
the fact that the water mafia operating in the settlement had protected its exclusive power in 
the settlement.  
6.5 Conclusion  
The water distribution ecosystem in Ganesh Murthy is a multiplicity. Residents bring water 
to the settlement from their places of work in the nearby neighbourhoods of Cuffe Parade, 
Navy Nagar, and farther away still, travelling a kilometre or more carrying 20-liter water 
containers. The sea is also used as a source of water for washing up. There is a fresh-water 
spring that flows into the sea where women do their washing, and where some people fill 
their containers. Water may also be borrowed or bought from an acquaintance in another 
part of the settlement with better water access. More formally, four municipal water 
schemes distribute water to about 85 percent of the population. Privately sold tanker water 
is also available for the many that cannot make do with the 60 litters issued per day by 
municipal water schemes. Most people wash up with this water that has previously been 
known to carry cholera, but some are forced to drink it as they cannot afford, or have been 
denied access to, potable water supplied by the city.  
Water access has always been problematic for the residents of Ganesh Murthy but the 
redundancy of the water ecosystem can compensate for irregularities in service delivery. In 
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2010, after having left Mumbai an informant in the settlement reported by email that the 
private tanker system had been shut down by a local politician with affiliations to one of 
the municipal water schemes, and residents were barely managing by exploiting other 
sources of water. Further, services from municipal water schemes are regularly interrupted 
due to some form of illegality; to wit the Mahila Pragati Samiti was shut down for a week 
during my fieldwork when the president of the CBO was jailed for stealing electricity to 
run the pumps that distribute water. The water distribution ecosystem in the settlement is 
highly contested, and often, political clashes between various competing actors are to blame 
for interruptions of service, which can have grave consequences.  
Municipal water schemes are important components in the settlement assemblage, 
providing service to an estimated 85 percent of the population. The CBOs that operate these 
schemes congealed from desiring social consistencies triggered by State legislation 
promoting participatory programs. Under the right conditions, such programs hold real 
promise as transformative processes that may foster inclusiveness and empowerment and 
which may reduce patronage and dependence. As the chapter demonstrates, Mumbai’s 
ongoing experiment with participatory forms of water provision in Ganesh Murthy has 
indeed been transformative; only the results have been the polar opposite of what 
proponents of participatory programmes hope for. 
Older residents describe the original settlement as a socially unified community. However, 
this unity was diluted with the migration of people with diverse regional affiliations, 
following various religions, and showing considerable variation in terms of employment 
and income. This social meshwork of the settlement was incrementally transformed into a 
fragmented and divisive society with distrustful and fearful residents, as water networks 
assumed greater control over water service and relationships of domination began to 
emerge. These “social bads” (Durlauf, 1999) that mitigate against life-affirming 
relationships push the settlement from a slum of hope towards a slum of despair. Beyond 
the daily privations and sense of fear, social bads negate against residents from improving 
their individual livelihood conditions, and they prevent social consistencies from gaining 
force to become transformative community movements. For example, no group has 
emerged in Part III to challenge the Manav Seva Sameti because “the people do not trust 
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any one person, or committee of people, to have power and work on their behalf” 
(Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy Nagar, 15/12/09). The historical exposition of the 
settlement’s development reveals a convoluted and contradictory pattern of development 
such that the organization of society to procure and administer water services concurrently 
worked to fragment and divide the society.  
It is clear from the analysis that the critical failing in participatory water programmes 
stemmed from skewed forms of political affiliations and ineffective regulation. State and 
municipal administrators have not instituted less political and more impartial mechanisms 
to facilitate participatory programmes, as did Bogota with its Community Action programs 
or Valencia, Colombia with its National Programme for Community Development for 
example (Gilbert and Ward, 1984). Instead, the platform erected by the State demanded that 
CBOs work with local politicians to gain funding for their projects and to navigate the 
labyrinthine municipal apparatus. The emergent relationships between politicians and 
CBOs go beyond dependence-based patron-client models, to produce stronger connections 
where politicians use water networks for personal profit and to fight political rivals. Water 
networks are thus assets upon which politicians rely, which may foster illegal behaviour. 
Further, the municipal water department persistently fails to adequately regulate illegal 
infrastructural augmentations. The MCGM does move junior water engineers from office to 
office every two years in part to offset the possibility of close relationships being created 
between employees and members of CBOs. However, senior engineers are not subject to 
this policy, and if indeed there are untoward relationships developing, as the overwhelming 
amount of evidence suggests, then it is likely that it takes place at this medium level of 
government. State actors closely interacting with the settlement thus exhibit nomadic 
tendencies and trajectories in their pursuit of an existence outside strict legal parameters.  
Inversely, through interactions with the State, the nomadic settlement has come to assume 
sedentary lines of ordering resulting in the centralization of power and resulting social 
hierarchies. Water distribution schemes were designed as closed systems, whereby the State 
could remotely control the flow of water to residents from a sub-station on Malabar Hill. 
However, opportunities to circumvent and augment this system were quickly exploited by 
entrepreneurial slum dwellers that moved networks along a line of flight away from the 
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State model. Creative configurations captured the potential of water and derived more 
water from the system. Water tanks transferred control of water from the State to the CBO, 
while booster pumps increased the volume of water for sale. Supply side augmentations 
also increased revenues by expanding the market to unofficial slum dwellers and through 
the installation of private connections. Increased revenues, together with decreasing costs 
from electricity theft and water meter manipulation, led to increased profits that could be 
used for other things such as the enrolment of State actors. Clearly, without enrolling 
elements of the porous bureaucracy the line of flights exhibited by all the networks would 
not have been sustained. These relationships maintain the central control of CBOs to limit 
or stop water distribution to individual members, and add paying customers as they seem 
fit. The inequitable and unjust administration of municipal water services have resulted in 
fragmenting social hierarchies in terms of territorial quality of water service, intra-territory 
quality of service, and multiplied tensions between official and unofficial members of 
CBOs.  
The mixing of State components and actors and nomadic tendencies and trajectories 
followed a line of flight from the original model of participatory water service. The line of 
flight is "both the line of maximal creative potential and the line of greatest danger, offering 
at once the possibility of the greatest joy and that of the most extreme anguish" (Patton, 
1984; 66). Augmentations to water networks produce more water and distribute it to more 
people. They thus feed the hopes and needs of new slum dwellers as they are drawn to the 
nomadic settlement, which continues to function outside the strict parameters of the State. 
Contrarily, augmentations have also resulted in insufficient amounts of water being 
delivered to over-paying residents. They have also contributed to the fragmentation of the 
community into divisive units that are distrustful and fearful of one another, and isolated 
from the State apparatus. This is the emergent space of the nomadic assemblage: a liminal 
space where atomized individuals are isolated from State mechanisms to redress injustices, 
and where the State is kept from regulating and enforcing their interests.  
The water networks are tools of the settlement’s war machine that wages violence against 
the State to maintain a nomadic existence. Water networks enrol and corrupt State actors, 
destroy State equipment, and steal State resources like electricity and water. However, here, 
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the war machine is also turned against its own tribe. Powertoni in the form of signatures 
and documents limit the action of residents and allegedly may lead to the sale of their 
hutments and their subsequent eviction. Touch isolates residents from the State apparatus to 
redress wrongs. The money that accumulates from networks helps to maintain the whole 
assemblage and expand it into other areas of the settlement. These are three of the main 
powers in the settlement and water networks have marshalled these forces to the detriment 
of residents and the community. However, there are other forms of social consistencies and 
power that operate in the settlement that align with water components of the settlement 
assemblage as a plurality in transformation. The next chapter examines these components 
















Ganesh Murthy is an assemblage of numerous components that enable the settlement to 
exist as a residential enclave. People, hutments, and land are perhaps the basic components 
that have generated the possibility for other components to form such as water distribution 
schemes. This chapter examines other municipal services and components of the settlement 
assemblage, some of which share similarities with water networks such as the 
implementation of participatory practices that have gone awry. Participatory programs have 
facilitated several service-oriented components in the settlement, but concomitant with 
access to services is the consolidation of power in the form of CBO conglomerates that 
have come to dominate governance regimes. The consolidation of power, along with the 
continuing fragmentation of society, and the emergence of a defensible space that attracts 
new services and associations puts into question the efficacy of participatory programmes 
in promoting democratic participation and community empowerment at Ganesh Murthy. 
Thus, the chapter identifies and examines these other important components and traces their 
inherent relations, shared associations, and follows these connections as they extend outside 
the settlement 
The chapter is divided into four sections and begins with an investigation of municipal 
services (6.2) that are available in the settlement including electricity (6.2.1), sewer systems 
and alley paving (6.2.2), solid waste management (6.2.3), and toilet facilities (6.2.4). The 
second section (6.3) describes “social work” CBOs and their role in providing sundry civic 
services to segments of the population that would not otherwise have access. The final 
components of the settlement to be examined are muscle gangs, which are the focus of the 
third section of the chapter (6.4). Finally, information from this and previous chapters are 
brought together to create a rhizomatic representation of the settlement (6.5).  
7.2 Municipal services 
7.2.1 Electricity 
Electricity, along with water, was one of the first services demanded from the State by the 
Sri Ganesh Murthy Nagar Hutment Dwellers Welfare Association (HDWA) in 1983 
(WDA-HDWA, 1983). The service was introduced to the settlement three years afterwards 
in 1986 without local participatory components and controlled by the state-run Bombay 
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Electrical Supply and Transportation Company (BEST). Despite the direct control of the 
service by the state, irregularities in local connections manifested. Several residents allege 
that a member of the HDWA committee in Part I conspired with a member of the Seva 
Sangh committee in Part II to illegally connect hutments to the power grid. The member of 
the HDWA has knowledge of electrical wiring procedures and this expertise was put to use 
with the authority of the Seva Sangh member, who maintains strict management of Part II.  
The settlement’s electrical system connects to the municipal grid at two substations located 
in Part II (Figure 5.16). As Figure 7.1 demonstrates, the substations are cluttered with 
meters that measure consumption and wires that then run to individual hutments. In some 
cases wires from the substation run to smaller nodal points with five or six meters attached 
and which then connect to hutments. The result is a cacophony of connections and dangling 
wires running throughout the settlement that make tracing individual connections 
challenging (Figure 7.2). This murky and ambiguous situation was exploited by the two 
committee members who would allegedly connect new wires to the electrical main and to 
existing meters for a fee and collect monthly charges as well.  
 





Figure 7.2 Wires leading out of an electrical substation 
Credit: Author 
In 2006 the Daily News and Analysis (DNA) newspaper ran an article entitled “Illegal 
power lights up Cuffe Parade slums” (Gangan, 2006), which investigates electricity thefts 
in Ambedkar Nagar and Ganesh Murthy Nagar. The article reports that 60 percent of slum 
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dwellers in the two settlements receive unlimited electricity for INR 300 a month, and that 
these thefts cost BEST INR 4,000,000 from 2003 to 2006. The article also quotes a 
community leader in Ambedkar Nagar that alleges that BEST employees are party to 
supplying the illegal electrical connections. The article may have motivated authorities to 
stem the rise of illegal connections because the socioeconomic survey revealed that only 17 
percent of hutments surveyed did not have their own meter. This movement towards 
regulation may also have been aided by the 2003 Indian Electricity Act, which opened 
electrical service provision to private companies. As a result, many residents of Ganesh 
Murthy switched over to a private supplier, which may be more efficient in enforcing their 
services as compared to BEST.  
Despite increased electrical regularization, some actors in the settlement continue to use 
illegal connections, especially residents of pucca hutments that are not eligible to acquire 
formal service due to the nature of their hutments using minimally secured materials. For 
other residents, the price of regularized electricity can be cost prohibitive. Eight percent of 
survey respondents complained of electrical costs being too high. The DNA (Gangan, 
2006), article quoted one residents as saying: “Last year, I took my own meter and I regret 
the decision. My bimonthly bill is now between Rs [INR] 1,500-2,000 for two tube lights a 
TV set and a refrigerator, which earlier used to be Rs 300 through an illegal connection. 
With these rates, why should one opt for a legal connection?”  
Water CBO administrators may also share these sentiments. Members of the CHWA, 
Mahila Pragati Sameti and Seva Sangh committees have been jailed for electricity theft 
used to power their pumps. In 2008, the Singh family, in their continuing battle against 
administrators of the HDWA, reported the latter’s illegal usage of electricity and one 
committee member was arrested. Thus, electricity supply contributes to the power 
geometry in the settlement, but this has diminished in recent years. New electrical 
connections created by the two committee members in Parts I and II added to their revenue 
and strengthened the degree of dependence on which the relationship between the 
committee and individuals is based. Residents were no longer beholden to committees only 
for water, but for electrical supply as well. This relationship contributed to the long lasting 
power of the two committee members who continue to dominate the CBOs and their 
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territories as well. Despite the recent regularization of electrical services in the settlement, 
illegal connections may still feed into the power structure although this is likely to be more 
dispersed among individual hutments that sponsor renters or neighbours for a fee, rather 
than through a more centralized authority like the committee. Further, the continued use of 
stolen electricity reduces costs for water distributors, but rivals may also leverage this 
illegal usage. When this occurs, slum dwellers are burdened with service interruptions, as 
happened when a member of the Mahila Pragati Sameti was arrested for electricity theft in 
2009.  
7.2.2 Sewer systems and alley paving 
The lack of sewer connections in slums are linked to higher rates of mortality and intestinal 
parasites, and are thus important components of settlements that contribute to health (UN 
Habitat, 2003). Proper storm water drainage systems are also important, especially in 
Mumbai, where the annual monsoon can deposit massive amounts of water very quickly, as 
happened in 2005 when almost a meter of rain fell in 24 hours. Without proper drainage 
slum hutments easily become inundated, destroying personal property and rendering 
hutments uninhabitable. Water drains were installed in Mumbai’s slums as part of the 
supply-driven Slum Improvement Program from 1993 onwards. With the Slum 
Redevelopment Program in 1997, the service became demand driven through applications 
from slum dweller cooperative societies. There are several drainage arrangements in 
Ganesh Murthy, reflecting the fact that State and local actors created various territorial 
systems over time. Parts I and II have older drainage systems, which collect water from 
alleys and pump it to a processing plant north of the settlement. The diameter of pipes in 
these systems is small, limiting the volume of water they can handle. For this reason the 
committees act to restrict direct connections to hutments for use as sewage systems. 
Residents of Parts I and II rarely have urinals and must wash clothes and dishes in the 
alleys, where wastewater then drains into the system. These drainage systems were paid for 
and built by the State following a similar process for water service provision. The paving of 
alleys in Parts I and II were procured the same way, and all alleys in these territories are 
paved with stone and mortar.  
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In Part III and Part III Backside drainage and paving arrangements followed from the 
congealing of social consistencies into CBOs in individual alleys. There are some 
exceptions to this such as the role of the Mahila Pragati Sameti in building sewers and 
paving alleys in a larger section of Part III Backside. Another CBO, mentioned in the 
previous chapter for procuring a water standpipe located in a large hole, also had sewers 
built. This CBO built sewers in the late 1990s in each alley from Alley 4 to Alley 11, and 
the president of the committee insisted on using larger diameter sewer pipes. As such, many 
of the hutments in this region accommodate a place to urinate and sinks that drain into the 
system. As these alleys extended northwards, with the building of new or renovated 
hutments, residents incrementally extended the sewer system as well. In Part III Backside, 
similar configurations exist as well as incorporating large drainage systems with removable 
concrete slabs to allow for their cleaning by State employees. The sewer systems in Part III 
and III Backside spill out into the mangrove forest where the high tide gradually removes 
the effluent. Most alleys in Parts III and III Backside were paved through local politician 
funding, but some alleys on the fringes of the settlement are still composed of dirt or 
garbage. 
All the sewer systems in the settlement have diverged from the State system to some 
degree. In Part I and II, the committees have greatly restricted the extension of the system 
to individual hutments. However, several hutments owned by wealthy residents, such as 
some members of the Singh family and a few committee members, do have direct 
connections, which allows these hutments to accommodate toilets and sinks. In Parts III 
and III Backside the original State system accommodates more incremental additions and 
augmentations. This results in the near daily need to unblock lines, which is undertaken by 
the hutment dweller wherever the blockage occurs. Parts I and II also have their problems 
due to the small diameter of the pipes, which are overwhelmed during heavy rainstorms and 
cause flooding to occur (Figure 7.3). Throughout the settlement, flooding during the 




Figure 7.3 Flooding after a light rain  
Credit: Author 
The role of CBOs in procuring sewers and alley paving has generally worked towards 
consolidating the existing power geometry in the settlement, despite their triggering smaller 
social consistencies. In Parts I and II the infrastructure was undertaken by the two dominant 
CBOs, which contributes to their standing in the community as functional, if not corrupt 
organizations. In Parts III and III Backside, the congealing of consistencies to procure such 
infrastructure had a different result. The formation of smaller CBOs towards procuring 
these services could have resulted in various political forces that would theoretically stem 
the domination of one particular CBO. However, because these systems are passive, in the 
sense that they do not require regular centralized management, interest in these CBOs 
waned and eventually dissipated. The wife of the president of the CBO that built sewers 
from Gully 4 to Gully 11 explains this as such (Interview, 11/20/09): 
At the time, people had no money and no basic services. They had to come together to get things. Now 
they have the basic necessities and there is too much political interference. Now no one is interested in 
doing this kind of social work. [Rathod] has taken over the control of society here. 
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7.2.3 Solid waste management 
Solid waste management originally manifested in dumping garbage onto alleys and beneath 
hutments to build up the land, and in newer parts of the settlement this continues to be the 
case (Figure 7.4). Later, residents would throw their garbage onto Navy Nagar, until the 
military compound erected a tall fence to prevent such behaviour. Currently, organized 
solid waste management is funded by the municipal government, which pays local CBOs to 
collect waste off the alleys. The HDWA, Seva Sang and a branch of the Manav Seva 
Sameti, called the Soniya Mahila Mandel, all have contracts with the city. However, from 
the large amounts of refuse throughout the settlement, it is clear that these duties are not 
adequately performed (Figure 7.5). There is little, if any enforcement of the municipal 
schemes, and this results in refuse-filled alleys that attract rodents, all of which leads to 
serious implications for health and safety. As one resident (Interview, resident of Ganesh 
Murthy, 12/21/09) says: “Garbage is a real problem right now. So much garbage has caused 
1000 cases of typhoid, and malaria is on the increase because of it too. The BMC gives 
Soniya Mahila Mandel 40,000 a month to remove waste, but they don’t do anything.” 
Funds directed to the settlement’s CBOs under programs designed to remove waste have 
little impact on the built environment and instead function to solidify the position of CBOs 





Figure 7.4 Build of refuse and debris under a hutment  
Credit: Author 
 






Toilet blocks are important components of the settlement assemblage that contribute to the 
evolving power geometry because they provide an essential service to residents that can be 
withheld. Despite a substantive literature on sanitation in India (Bapat and Agarwal, 2003; 
Burra et al, 2003; Chaplin, 1999; Hobson, 2000;), there is little research existing on 
sanitation in Mumbai in general, and sanitation schemes for slums in particular. This 
section thus contributes to a necessary discussion of slum sanitation in the city and newer 
research being done (Sharma and Bhide, 2005; McFarlane, 2008) on the effects of the 
World Bank’s Slum Sanitation Programme, which commenced in 1997. The following 
section sets the context for slum sanitation policy in Mumbai (7.2.4.1), investigates the 
toilet blocks in the settlement (7.2.4.2), and discusses the role of the NGO SPARC as a 
component of settlement assemblages (7.2.4.3).  
7.2.4.1 Context 
Sanitation services in the settlement are ranked as the second largest problem facing 
residents, with 31.5 percent of survey respondents identifying access and quality of toilets 
as problematic. Sanitation services at Ganesh Murthy, like the majority of slums in 
Mumbai, are insufficient and improperly managed. Many settlements in the city lack 
systems to remove solid waste, rainwater, water used for cleaning, and human excrement, 
which all contribute to health and environmental problems; although the latter is 
particularly dangerous (McFarlane, 2008; Swaminithan, 2003). 63 percent of slum dwellers 
in the city, or 3.92 million people, are reliant on public toilets, largely in the form of toilet 
blocks. For these slum dwellers, there is an average of 81 people to 1 toilet, which is above 
the targeted rate of 50 people per toilet, but variation in this ratio ranged from 273 to 1 and 
56 to 1 (MW-YUVA, 2001). Of the public toilets available, many are in poor working 
order, poorly maintained, over used, overpriced, or simply locked. Of the 37 percent of 
slum dwellers without access to public toilets, only 9 percent had private toilets, while the 
others had to make use of open spaces (BMC, 2000 as quoted in Sharma and Bhide, 2005).  
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From 1970 onwards, toilet blocks were supplied to slums in Mumbai on an ad hoc basis 
and paid for through funds delivered by local politicians working at various levels of 
government. Thus, toilet block creation was supply-driven and largely related to the patron-
client dynamics of vote bank politics. In 1997, however, the World Bank, together with the 
State of Maharashtra, and the MCGM, embarked on the Slum Sanitation Project (SSP), 
which introduced a new paradigm for sanitary service delivery by changing the 
stakeholders involved and thus reconfiguring the relationship between the State and slums. 
The main trajectories of this new paradigm are community mobilization, participation, 
inclusion of the private sector, and cost recovery mechanisms. Increasingly, multilateral 
agencies like the UN and the World Bank advocate that local residents become partners in 
multi-stakeholder sanitation projects to create a sense of ownership and support structures 
for the facilities (UN Millennium Report, 2005; UN Habitat, 2003). Local community 
participation is deemed necessary where, “the state machinery in countries like India is 
considered to be highly corrupt, non-accountable, inefficient, manipulative, non-
participatory, and anti-poor” (Sharma and Bhide, 2005: 1785). Thus, community 
participation is a prerequisite of the SSP (World Bank, 2003), and is intended to further 
grassroots democracy, empower communities, and improve health-related knowledge. The 
participatory component is largely manifested in the enrolment of local CBOs that apply for 
toilet blocks, rather than their being supplied in an ad hoc basis. Members of the CBO pay 
an initial fee to help offset the cost of construction up to 15 percent, and further pay a 
monthly fee into a corpus fund, which the CBO uses to maintain the toilet blocks. Because 
residents have a stake in the project, it is assumed they would provide better maintenance 
than the State could.  
Further changing the stakeholders in the provision of sanitary services under the SSP is the 
exclusion of local politicians, who are theoretically not involved in the process, and the 
replacing of State agencies as general contractors with private contractors. To this extent, 
three contractors were chosen for the SSP: two engineering firms, Babul Uttamchand and B 
Narayan Associates, that respectively received 18 and 13 percent of work orders, and an 
NGO called SPARC, which won 69 percent of work orders. SPARC was the first NGO in 
Mumbai to be awarded construction contracts in the city and the amount of work it received 
was the largest granted to an NGO in India (McFarlane, 2008).  
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SPARC won the majority of SSP contracts for several reasons. Firstly, its bid was INR 10 
million less than its competitors (Patel and Mitlin, 2004). Secondly, it has extensive 
contacts with the State and with the World Bank. Finally, because the NGO is allied with 
two CBOs, the National Slum Dwellers Association, and Mahila Milan, it is involved in a 
number of local community projects and thus has a large slum dweller constituency. The 
connection to this constituency is deemed an important component of the NGO that would 
speed up the process and lead to greater participation of local communities (McFarlane, 
2008). Further, the inclusion of the NGO, as a representative of civil society, adds depth to 
the participatory approach (Sharma and Bhide, 2005).  
7.2.4.2 Toilet blocks in Ganesh Murthy 
In Ganesh Murthy there are four toilet blocks (Figure 5.16) with a combined total of 106 
seats (including five for children), for 10,500 people, which is a ratio of 1 to 99. The most 
basic toilet block in the settlement is located at its entrance along Prakash Pethe Marg 
(Figure 7.6). Built by the MCGM in 1990, it consists of two buildings, one for men with 10 
seats a wall to urinate on, and one for women with 10 seats. There is no water connection 
so residents bring small containers with them when necessary. The toilets are connected to 
the municipal sewer system that runs underneath Prakash Pethe Marg. There is little 
maintenance required of this basic system, which is occasionally performed by MCGM 
personnel, so despite lacking in cleanliness it remains largely functional and open to whom 
ever needs access.  
The second block of toilets, located in Part II is no more elaborate than the first, but does 
feature a water service. This block was built in 1993 by MHADA and has nine seats for 
women, 18 seats for men, and two urinals. The same family has been in charge of 
maintenance since the toilet’s inception and is paid INR 2000 a month by the Seva Sangh, 
who collects a monthly fee from residents of Part II for its maintenance and the sweeping of 
alleys (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 12/9/09). The family makes additional 
revenue by charging INR 1 for water to be used at the toilet block, which is purchased from 
the private water distributor. The Seva Sangh allegedly receives money from MHADA and 
Municipal Councillors to maintain the toilet block, but the funds accrue to committee 
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members that do not invest in needed renovations (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy 
Nagar, 25/10/09). 
 
Figure 7.6 Toilet stall in Part I toilet block  
Credit: Author 
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The other two toilet blocks are located in Part III and Part III Backside and were built in 
2001 as part of the SSP, with SPARC acting as the general contractor. Two CBOs, Jijamata 
Mahila Mandal and Soniya Mahila Mandel were selected by SPARC to manage the toilets, 
and as part of the program, the CBOs collected INR 200 from member hutments to 
contribute to the construction. The resulting toilet blocks are much more elaborate than the 
other two in the settlement. They are both two stories tall, tiled, have toilets for children, 
and have access to the municipal water supply (Figure 7.7). One has 16 seats for both men 
and women, seven urinals, and three children’s toilets, and the other has twelve seats for 
men, ten for women, 2 for children, and five urinals. However, the participatory 
components of the program have not yielded the results expected such as sense of 
ownership, support, or better functioning toilet blocks, let alone increases in health-related 
knowledge, or some sense of grassroots democracy. If anything, the toilet blocks have 
undermined a sense of democracy’s potential and contribute to the consolidation of the 
existing power geometry.  
 
Figure 7.7 Toilet block in Part III  
Credit: Author 
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Contributing to this dynamic is the unjust distribution of toilet passes. Resident-members of 
the CBOs that contributed INR 200 to offset the initial construction of the toilets have not 
received passes to use the toilet blocks as planned, and thus have to pay non-member fees 
such as INR 1 to use the facilities and a similar charge for the use of water (Interview, 
resident of Ganesh Murthy Nagar, 12/21/09). Even children must pay to use the facilities, 
resulting in substantial aggregate fees for families. Only thirty passes have been issued to 
the two toilet blocks and all were given to residents that are directly linked to the 
administration of the CBOs (Shetty, 2005). Additionally, water is allegedly siphoned from 
the municipal supply line and sold to residents for domestic usage rather than reserved for 
use in the toilets, which can lead to a lack of water for this purpose (Interview, resident of 
Ganesh Murthy, 4/12/09). Because contributors were not given passes and because the 
management of toilet blocks is oriented towards earning revenue rather than servicing 
members, there is no sense of ownership of these toilets; rather residents feel their money 
was stolen. As one resident put it, “SPARC should run it. Why did they let the CBO run it? 
They are wasting our money and should do something about it. When they run out of water, 
they just lock the door” (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy Nagar, 12/21/09). 
The two CBOs have subcontracted the management of the toilet blocks to private 
contractors, which is not abnormal within the rubric of the SSP (McFarlane, 2008). 
However, these private contractors limit resident’s access to the service and fail to 
adequately upkeep the facilities. The toilets are only open from 8am to 6 pm and several 
times I visited the toilet block in Part III, it was locked. Children’s toilet seats in both toilet 
blocks are dysfunctional, and in one of the blocks the children’s booths had been turned 
into storage closets. Further, several individual adult toilets were out of order and drainage 
problems were observed. The level of sanitation in the facilities is questionable at best, and 
it is readily apparent that they are not cleaned daily. For this level of service the private 
contractors derive INR 2000 daily revenue from each toilet block (Shetty, 2005), while the 
CBOs earn INR 20,000 a month from renting out the facilities (Interview, former president 
MSS, 9/12/09). Thus, instead of yielding a more knowledgeable, coherent, and empowered 
community, the SSP toilet blocks have resulted in social disenfranchisement and friction 
between normal residents and members of the CBOs. 
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In an article about the SSP, Sharma and Bhide (2005: 1785) note that: “The inherent 
assumption here has been that the NGOs and the CBOs to be involved in the SSP were 
accountable, non-corrupt, and pro-people.” In the case of Ganesh Murthy Nagar this was a 
faulty assumption. The Special Advisor to SPARC, in charge of the SSP for the NGO, 
recalled during an interview that former Municipal Councillor Rathod approached him 
early on in the SSP process (Interview, Special Advisor, 26/10/09). Rathod was intent on 
forwarding the names of certain CBOs at Ganesh Murthy to manage the toilet blocks, 
however, the Special Advisor, having heard of Rathod’s questionable reputation, apparently 
steered the contracts away from the CBOs he put forward. Not to be excluded from the 
project, Rathod facilitated the formation of two new CBOs, the Jijamata Mahila Mandal 
and Soniya Mahila Mandel, that competed with other CBOs to win the management 
contract. Allegedly, the president of the other CBO’s were paid by Rathod to withdraw 
from contest, which ultimately went to the Jijamata Mahila Mandal and Soniya Mahila 
Mandel (Interview, Officer of the MCGM, 01/05/10). The toilets are now locally referred to 
as “Rathod’s toilets.” Thus, even though the SPARC administrators were conversant with 
the power geometry in the settlement to a certain degree, the NGO was still unable to 
successfully negotiate a fitting local administrator, which crippled the participatory goals of 
the project before they even had a chance to succeed. Instead, the toilet blocks are used to 
derive revenue, and in light of the actions of the Manav Seva Sameti as related in the 
previous chapter, are likely used as a mechanism of control over residents.  
Sanitation facilities are substantial assets in the settlement assemblage, and the more 
developed and elaborate they are the more they become targets for capture because of the 
potential revenue and power that may be derived from them. The limited services in the 
Part I toilet have not led to its capture and manipulation by local parties, although the 
continuing power struggle between committee members and the Singh family may 
contribute to this. The toilet in Part II, which is slightly larger, is more directly under the 
control of the Seva Sangh, whose administrators may derive income from municipal funds 
for its maintenance. Nevertheless, these two toilet blocks remain free to use by all. The two 
World Bank toilets, in contrast, were captured upon their inception due to the potential to 
derive money and power. More toilet seats translates to more potential income, and the 
water supplied by the city is a valuable scarce resource in the settlement from which the 
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toilet block administrative apparatus profits from in various ways. Perhaps if the toilet 
blocks were smaller, less elaborate, or offered less services (i.e. water) they would not have 
been an attractive target for capture. At least, the local manifestation of SSP toilets should 
be more flexible and tailored to the specific needs and conditions of particular 
communities. In the case of Ganesh Murthy, the president of an outside verification agency, 
employed indirectly by the World Bank to assess the work done at Ganesh Murthy suggests 
that individual toilets in private hutments would have been a better solution (Interview, 
President of CRIT, 16/12/09). As McFarlane (2008: 13) says of toilet blocks being the only 
option put forward by the SSP: “This inflexibility is remarkable when we consider claims 
that the SSP is ‘demand driven.’”  
7.2.4.3 The NGO as a component in the slum assemblage 
The construction of SSP toilet blocks introduces a new actor into the settlement 
assemblage: the NGO SPARC. SPARC’s performance in the SSP has drawn criticism for a 
number of reasons including their overreach into the realm of construction, their inability to 
mobilize residents, and their sacrificing of radical politics for the agendas of realpolitik, 
amongst others (McFarlane, 2008; Sharma and Bhide, 2005). However, the point I would 
like to make here concerns their continuing influence over slum dwellers through the SSP. 
In slums where SPARC and its partners in the Alliance, the NSDF and Mahila Milan, had 
strong connections with local slum dwellers the handover of toilet blocks to local 
community groups appears to have gone smoothly. Further, in some cases where local 
connections were lacking, as at Ganesh Murthy, SPARC did succeed in transferring power 
over the toilet blocks to strong (albeit corrupt) local CBOs, which thereafter limited their 
ongoing contact with the settlement. However, this was not the case for many settlements 
impacted by the SSP under SPARC (Interview, president of CRIT, 16/12/09). In some 
cases no adequate CBO could be found so SPARC personnel manage the toilet blocks. In 
other cases, CBOs are registered but their administration is alleged to be in name only, and 
it is SPARC that is the de facto administrator. Thus, instead of producing a solid local 
community-based structure that can administer the new toilet blocks, some communities 
have come to rely on SPARC. The toilets may thereby become an unintentional control 
point for the NGO that nonetheless helps to maintain the alignment of their constituency 
base.  
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This base is an important component of the NGO in the current developmental landscape in 
Mumbai. Through the World Bank’s SSP and other interventions in the city (e.g. Mumbai 
Urban Transportation Project, Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project) the relationship 
between NGOs and the State has gone from adversarial to one of partnership. Instead of 
NGOs fighting the State to help slum dwellers procure infrastructure, some NGOs, like 
SPARC, have become small businesses that win contracts from the State to implement 
infrastructural projects. Unlike private contractors, however, SPARC uses alternative 
mechanisms of delivery that redistribute revenue and work back into the community. For 
example, SPARC set up a non-profit construction company, called SPARC Samudaya 
Nirman Sahayak that contributes profits to the Alliance and gives 30 percent of project 
work to qualified members of the community (SPARC, 2011: 
http://www.sparcindia.org/housing.aspx, accessed 10/10/11). 
As an entrepreneurial contractor, SPARC establishes connections and maintains a presence 
with the central State planning apparatus, not only to leverage subsidies from the State for 
public projects and to procure work. In this role, a large and potentially vocal constituency 
is decidedly an asset. As the president of CRIT says of the new NGO paradigm, “you need 
a base network to get jobs; needy citizens who will gather and shout for them [SPARC] to 
help them get things like toilet blocks.” Further, when pitching for a project it is better to be 
a stakeholder rather than merely an individual actor, like an engineering firm. A 
constituency base provides this position as a stakeholder in a developmental landscape 
oriented towards participation, and contributed to SPARC’s successful SSP bid. Thus, 
SPARC’s extended role under the SSP may unintentionally transfer slum dweller 
dependency from political actors to civil society actors. This emergent dependency is then 
translated into enrolment of slum dwellers, which facilitates SPARC’s expanding presence 
in the city’s governance regime.  
7.3 Social work CBOs 
7.3.1 Mechanisms to access civil services 
CBOs that are organized to administer infrastructure and municipal services are but one 
kind of CBO that operates in the settlement assemblage. Another prolific type of CBO 
exists to facilitate forms of civic services or “social work” as it is known in the settlement. 
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This type of CBO may arise in a number of ways. Several CBOs that were assembled to 
procure infrastructure, but have become obsolete due to the passive nature of the 
infrastructure (such as alley paving or drainage systems), have become social work CBOs. 
Similarly, infrastructure CBOs that were replaced by other CBOs may also continue their 
existence under a different rubric. Existing infrastructure CBOs may also manage social 
work CBOs, and the Seva Sangh, Mahila Pragati Sameti and Mahila Seva Samiti all 
operate social work CBOs. Finally, individuals may initiate this type of CBO for a number 
of reasons.   
The ostensible need for social work CBOs derives from slum dwellers’ difficulties in 
accessing social services. Slum dwellers that may be mired in poverty and who do not have 
access to robust social networks may experience economic, social, political, and cultural 
exclusion (Gareau and Sclar, 2004), which leaves them unable to access basic necessities. 
Such necessities in Ganesh Murthy often include getting a doctor’s appointment, being seen 
at a hospital, intervening with school authorities or the police, arranging and paying for a 
marriage or funeral, navigating the State bureaucracy to obtain a ration card or other 
service, or diminishing tensions that may arise between neighbours living in close quarters. 
The need for such services has triggered the formation of many registered and non-
registered CBOs in the settlement, which are oriented towards facilitating these kinds of 
actions. Generally, CBOs of this variety are built around one or several people’s spoken 
and written language skills, access to funds, connections or touch with relevant authorities, 
and a certain amount of moxi to intervene and accomplish something. Generally, the people 
I encountered that run social work CBOs were successful in their chosen domains, educated 
in verbal and written communication skills, and had a degree of confidence necessary to 
establish new connections and demand action.  
As mentioned above, social work CBOs are operated by members of infrastructural CBOs, 
which may make demands on the State in parallel with their infrastructural counterparts, as 
described last chapter. Conversely, social work CBOs may morph into infrastructure-
oriented CBOs. For example, the president of the Manav Seva Samiti started a balwadi, or 
day-care service, when she first moved to Ganesh Murthy. She would ask her clients about 
any difficulties they were experiencing and became a local trouble-shooter. From the 
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connections established at the day care together with her ability to negotiate solutions, she 
registered a CBO, which was eventually enrolled in the Manav Seva Sameti in the late 
1990s to mobilize support of a new water connection for Part III.  
Currently, there are many CBOs emerging in the settlement under the auspices of providing 
social work, but which in fact are used for other purposes. During several days spent 
investigating new CBOs through informal conversations, I encountered several people that 
had started new organizations. There was an organizer of an incipient CBO that “would be 
made in one to two weeks” (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy Nagar, 01/03/10). He 
had apparently assembled 500 hutments in Gully 1, 2 and 3 (in Part III), to procure water, 
toilets, and road cleaning. He was well aware that it would be difficult to get a water 
connection, and expected the Manav Seva Sameti to fight them and “shut our water down.” 
Another CBO had started up two to three months ago in Gully 4 with 39 members for 
“general welfare, infrastructure, repave the alley” (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy 
Nagar, 01/03/12). Another resident said: “Every alley has a society now. Before there was 
no committee, when we went to a nearby gully committee they had no power because we 
were not members. So we decided to make our own society” (Interview, resident of Ganesh 
Murthy Nagar, 01/03/09). In fact, the informal survey I conducted on new CBOs 
demonstrated that there is at least two CBOs per alley in Part III, and the proliferation of 
start-up organizations represents an important development currently taking place in the 
settlement. Informants reviewing the informal survey of new CBOs indicated that many 
CBOs were emerging to assemble powertoni to sell signatures to real estate developers 
intent on developing the settlement. This is an important trajectory that is reconfiguring 
power relations in the settlement, and will be explored in depth in the next chapter.  
Social work CBOs are important components of the settlement assemblage as they provide 
mechanisms for otherwise disenfranchised residents to procure services they would not 
otherwise have access to. However, they may also become important tools to accumulate 
power. A resident may come to rely on the CBO to provide social services and thus a 
relationship of dependence is established. Alternatively, the CBO may provide a much-
needed service, for which the resident feels indebted. One resident I interviewed said he 
was forever indebted to the president of the Singh family’s social work CBO, and thereafter 
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would do whatever the president asked him to do. The resident had been ejected from high 
school and the president of the social work CBO registered him in a different school board. 
A little bribery was needed to convince the principal of the school, but the financial 
investment on the part of the president pays off in the fidelity she receives from the resident 
(Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 11/11/09). These relationships are then leveraged as 
needed. For example social work CBOs attached to water CBOs leverage relationships 
beyond controlling access to water, making it more difficult for the resident to report unjust 
behaviour. Another example is the leveraging of relationships between young adults and 
the Singh CBO in the family’s on going dispute with members of the Part I committee, 
when the time comes for physical fighting.  
7.3.2 Community management role of women in the settlement 
A noteworthy aspect of social work CBOs is that, to the extent of my research, the vast 
majority are run by women, which points to a gendered dimension of social networks in the 
settlement. Gender-oriented studies of slum dwellers in Mumbai are increasing (see for 
example Saigal, 2008 or Sen, 2006; 2007). However, the various roles women play in the 
functioning of Mumbai’s slums, which entails different needs and different planning 
interventions (Moser 1989; Moser and Peake, 1987), and the motivations underlying their 
behaviour continues to be understudied and ill-accounted for in planning decisions. This 
section then serves as an indication of where further research may be oriented towards 
crafting appropriate planning interventions that take account of the important role women 
play in Mumbai’s slums.  
Various scholars (Saigal, 2008; Roy 2005; Foster, 1999) have demonstrated that women, 
whose roles are traditionally tied to the domestic sphere, are excluded from full 
participation and status in political, civil, and social strata. Women’s struggle for inclusion 
in politics as full citizens is often contested and their incorporation in public life is 
inherently different from men due to their sexual embodiment as women (Pateman, 1989). 
Feminist scholars (Yuval Davis, 1999; Anthias and Yuval Davis, 1989) argue that the 
notion of citizenship needs to be extended beyond the nation state, which is normatively 
associated with the masculine and the public domain (Saigal, 2008). Citizenship should, 
these scholars argue, include multiple layers of collectivities including family, ethnic 
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groupings, trade unions, state, and supranational groupings for example, to properly 
understand the political roles women engage in. Still other scholars argue that community-
based action should also be considered as “acts of citizenship” (Mirza and Reay, 2000; 
Naples, 1998). However, as Lister (1998) argues citizenship in this capacity must exceed 
self interest and depends on the identification with a wider collectivity to achieve common 
ends. Supporting a broader conception of politics beyond the formal public sphere, Morgen 
and Bookman (1998: 4, as quoted in Saigal, 2008: 74) define political activity as “activities 
that are carried on in the daily lives of ordinary people and are enmeshed in the social 
institutions and political-economic processes of their society. When there is an attempt to 
change the social and economic institutions that embody the basic power relations in… 
society—that is politics.” 
Addressing the paucity of research into women’s lived experience as community-based 
actors, Saigal (2008) adopts this framework for understanding political activity and 
citizenship in the context of women’s roles as teachers in a Mumbai slum. The author 
(2008: 74-75) concludes that her research subjects do indeed engage in political action by 
working towards “the collective agenda of educational inclusion of marginalized children.” 
Women teachers running balwadis interpreted their role as community caregivers grounded 
in interpersonal relationships with a desire to socially advance the disadvantaged. The idea 
of singularly altruistic motivations of teachers running balwadis, however, is challenged by 
findings at Ganesh Murthy, which suggest a more self-interested, if not less political, 
motivation. I interviewed two women that run balwadis at Ganesh Murthy, and they 
communicated to me similar motivations grounded in a desire to help those less fortunate 
than themselves (Interview 11/08/09 and 12/03/09). Their words, however, are tempered by 
additional research into the multiple connections between the balwadis and various other 
social consistencies. As mentioned previously, the leader of the Manav Seva Samiti runs a 
balwadi, and this platform for assembling associations with other people was parlayed into 
the creation of a CBO, which later led to her becoming the president of the largest 
municipal water network in the settlement. Day cares, by their inherent assembling of local 
people and their trust, provide a venue to establish strong connections, which may then be 
parlayed into other associations. To cite another example, a member of the Singh family 
operates a day-care from her house, and when she encounters parents with difficulties she 
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sends them to her sister who runs a social work CBO. Thus, at Ganesh Murthy, these 
modes of citizenship, performed under the rubric of community development, are exposed 
as concurrently serving the interests of associated organizations, thus helping to enrol more 
people and consolidate the power of the networks. This is certainly political action as it 
impinges on the local power structure, but it is not remotely akin to notions of citizenship 
advanced by Lister (1998).  
Running a balwadi or social CBO are venues through which women may come to 
participate in the political landscape of the settlement, where gender roles are otherwise 
circumscribed by traditional morays. In general, it is observed that the father figure of 
resident families is responsible for earning income. The mother figure generally tended to 
domestic duties and child rearing. As a group of women explained to me: “Men provide 
food, a house, and work. Women have to take care of everything else (Interview, residents 
of Ganesh Murthy, 12/23/09).  
This has several observable effects. Men are largely absent from the settlement during the 
day as 92 percent of residents are employed outside the settlement. Thus, women spend 
more time in the settlement, and as they are charged with domestic duties, such as 
collecting water, cleaning drains in front of their hutments, purchasing food and other 
activities, they have more occasions to meet and talk with other women, which may lead to 
the formation of social consistencies. Further, because women’s duties concern hutment 
management and child rearing, there is motivation to address inequitable, unfair, or non-
existent services.  
As a result of this dynamic, women may play a larger role than men in the settlement’s 
social meshwork. For example, a group of women asserts that there were 20 key female 
figures that played leading roles in developing Part III (Interview, residents of Ganesh 
Murthy, 12/23/09). Presently, the presidents of the Mahila Pragati Sameti and the Manav 
Seva Samiti are both women, as are the 80 employees employed by these networks. As 
described last chapter, there may be underlying reasons, beyond logistical concerns, why 
women occupy these positions. Their embodiment as women, may work to a degree to 
safeguard them from physical abuses doled out by authorities.  
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A female social meshwork may also facilitate networks of communication. A long standing 
dispute between male members of the Singh family and the private water distributor’s 
family was apparently intensifying, when female members of the families intervened. The 
mothers and wives of the two family patriarchs met to discuss ways to resolve the conflict, 
which they ultimately did, thus avoiding continued conflict and physical violence. Yet, it 
should be understood that women do not only play a passive or secondary role, acting on 
behalf of male actors as in the case of the water-tap distributors and presidency of the 
Manav Seva Samiti, or alongside male actors as the case of the disputing families suggests.  
A case in point is the Mahila Pragati Sameti water distribution network. This CBO is run by 
two women that have built up extensive wealth and power in the settlement seemingly 
without the help of men. The vice president is unmarried and apparently owns over 100 
hutments in the settlement, from which she derives revenue from rent. Unfortunately, she 
was not willing to be interviewed for this research. The president of the CBO, roughly 60 
years old, migrated to Mumbai from Bangalore some time in the 1970s and became a cadre 
in the Shiv Sena political party, from where she probably learned tactics including the use 
of violence and physical force. As Atrayee Sen (2006; 2007) demonstrates, several 
economically poor female slum dwellers in the 1980s joined the Shiv Sena and learned to 
use violent collective action to gain control and power over a range of important factors in 
their lives. This was apparent in the last chapter through the water department archives, 
which reported over 100 women associated with the Mahila Pragati Sameti having 
organized to disrupt regulators and police. I was also witness to two instances where the 
employees and administrators of the Mahila Pragati Sameti organized to disrupt an eviction 
and demolition in one instance, and a physical fight between the leader of the CBO and a 
leader of another CBO as the former defended new infrastructure that had been added to 
her network. The tactics of aggression, physicality, and violence, which were possibly 
learned from her days in the Shiv Sena have benefited the president as she sought to fight, 
and continues to fight Rathod and a host of other competing actors to maintain her power in 
the settlement. 
This rather sprawling section is not meant to be representative of the role women play in 
community management at Ganesh Murthy. Indeed, this was and is not the point of the 
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research. Rather, in identifying and unravelling some of the social consistencies operating 
in the settlement, a gendered dimension became apparent and this section examines this to 
the extent of the empirical data available. The section demonstrates that women’s roles are 
both diverse and significant. The role of women and gendered networks may constitute an 
important trajectory for further research into creating appropriate planning interventions 
into Mumbai’s slums. 
7.4 Muscle gangs 
7.4.1 Context 
To write a chapter about important components that contribute to the functioning of Ganesh 
Murthy Nagar it would be inaccurate to omit the various muscle gangs that operate in the 
settlement. Gangs have long existed in cities; however, the proliferation of these groups in 
connection with the increase of squatter settlements has led to the investigation of these 
phenomena beyond their traditional domain of study in the field of criminology to include 
other branches in sociology (Weinstein, 2008), history (Davis, 2006) and geography 
(Hagedorn, 2008). The proliferation of gangs throughout the world is associated with 
increased patterns of urban migration, immigration, economic and social marginalization, 
and weakened states (Hagedorn, 2008). Gangs that emerge from this social, political, 
spatial and economic morass are frequently understood as the manifestation of expressions 
of alienation and nihilism. At Ganesh Murthy, however, gangs have emerged to fill a 
regulatory and enforcement vacuum in the settlement, by maintaining a visible presence, 
using surveillance techniques, and physically enforcing the unilateral terms set by water 
CBOs.  
There is little if any consensus as to what exactly constitutes a gang and further definitional 
problems arise in differentiating between gangs, mobs, mafia and organized crime groups 
(Esbensen et al., 2001; Ball and Curry, 1995). Generally, distinctions are based on age and 
the degree to which associations between actors are formalized. Beyond the definitional 
problems surrounding the term ‘gang’ that derive from logical forms of identity (as 
explored in Ball and Curry, 2001), is the observation that gangs are not stable entities. As 
Hagedorn (2008: xxv) says: “Today’s youth gang might become a drug posse tomorrow or, 
in some places, even transform into an ethnic militia or a vigilante group the next day.” The 
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transformative power of gangs is also noted by Ball and Curry (2001: 240) who define 
gangs as “integrated but mutable” and comprising “adaptive mechanisms for dealing with 
other significant social systems in its environment.” As associations between a gang and 
other entities grows, so does the potential for entrepreneurial behaviour, and these loosely 
connected entities may be flexible enough to change and follow a new trajectory; they are 
not “stable, clearly defined entities” (Hagedorn, 2008: xxv). The mutability of gangs not 
only creates definitional problems but points towards a creative adaptability.  
7.4.2 Gangs in Ganesh Murthy 
There are currently five gangs operating in the settlement, and the most elaborate and 
powerful of these has its origins in a time and place outside of Ganesh Murthy Nagar. 
Before it was destroyed in the mid to late 1970s a squatter settlement named Dandy 
(located in Navy Nagar) was home to five percent of Ganesh Murthy’s current residents. 
There, two friends allegedly operated an illicit smuggling ring that brought items into the 
country through the naval base. With the 1949 Bombay Prohibition Act and import barriers 
placed on gold, electronics goods, and luxury items in the 1960s, illicit marketplaces 
emerged in the city to address desires for these products, and the two friends worked with a 
larger mafia network to supply goods to the market. The two friends, with reputations as 
good fighters, thus accumulated money and status in Dandy, which they brought with them 
to Ganesh Murthy when Dandy was destroyed by Naval authorities. The friends had 
married sisters of the Singh family in Dandy, who also moved to Ganesh Murthy along 
with two other sisters, a brother, their parents, and their uncle’s family. It is likely the two 
friend’s smuggling activities continued at Ganesh Murthy. Apurtham Jockin, the founder of 
the National Slum Dwellers Federation, identified Ganesh Murthy as a gateway for illegal 
items smuggled into India via Navy Nagar in the late 1970s and 1980s (Interview, 2/17/08). 
Corroborating this information is an informant’s account of a Ganesh Murthy hutment, 
rented out by one of the two friends, in the 1980s that was raided by police who found 
“crores worth of drugs, guns, and money. [The owner] knew what they were doing. They 
were part of his connections from the old days”30 (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy 
Nagar, 12/18/09).  
                                                
30 A crore is equal to 10,000,000 
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In Ganesh Murthy Nagar the Singh family proved prolific and now counts over fifty 
members living in Parts I and II. Shortly after arriving in the settlement three of the family 
members joined the Part I HDWA committee, but were later allegedly expelled for stealing 
committee funds (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy Nagar, 11/15/09). One of the 
sisters that had been on the committee then created a social work CBO with over 200 
members. Known as “the don”, she is a local authority figure in the settlement that is often 
called upon to settle disputes. Her husband, one of the original friends from Dandy, was 
allegedly murdered in a police encounter in the 1980s.31 The Don’s brother-in-law, the 
original friend from Dandy, sits on the Seva Sangh committee and is the highest-ranking 
member after the Secretary. He and his wife (who operates a day-care) sired a son named 
Pradeep32, who joined a young gang operating in the settlement during the 1980s.  
The 1980s were a period of elevated violence in Mumbai. By then, small gangs that often 
originated in slums had congealed into organized mafia groups engaging in illegal 
smuggling activities (Weinstein, 2008). These groups fought with each other for control 
over territory and goods. Inflaming this dynamic was the right wing, Hindu-oriented Shiv 
Sena political party that adopted a strategy to re-territorialize the political orientation of 
Mumbai’s squatter settlements. This was done by creating associations with local 
goondas33 in squatter settlements that would intimidate and violently coerce support from 
local residents (Lele, 1995; Hansen 2001).  
One of these goondas, associated with the Shiv Sena, lives in Ganesh Murthy Nagar, and 
had enrolled Pradeep into his gang in the late 1980s. The gang then consisted of the goonda 
and his brother, and another set of brothers that were connected to the former by marriage. 
With impunity derived through their associations with the Shiv Sena, the gang would 
allegedly eve-tease, rape, and cut residents on their way to fetch water at the spring located 
along the road to Geeta Nagar. They would also steal items from homes and resell them to 
                                                
31 To stem the tide of growing gang violence in the 1980s the police came to rely on “the encounter”, which is 
essentially the murder of a suspected criminal by the police, without due legal process. According to Mehta 
(2005), encounters were often sanctioned by the police hierarchy and could be manipulated from outside 
groups like gangs that had nurtured powerful connections within the police hierarchy. Under the regime of the 
encounter suspected criminals were murdered and this created an attractor that diminished criminal activity in 
the city (Interview with police officer, 01/04/10). 
32 Pradeep’s name has been changed to protect his identity. 
33 Goonda mean thug 
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make money. Owners of stores and retail stalls located on the main commercial street were 
forced to pay protection money to the brothers and those that did not pay would be roughed 
up and reported to the authorities under false pretences. It was in this context that Pradeep 
learned to fight and exert physical intimidation for money and power, which he then 
parlayed into his own gang. 
Pradeep’s new gang operated in proximity to his hutment and engaged in eve teasing and 
demanded protection money from residents and businesses. In these endeavours Pradeep 
was encouraged by his father, a former fighter with connections to larger mafia groups, and 
his aunt (the don), who recognized the power that accrued to those able and willing to exert 
physical force in negotiations. These family members motivated the larger family network 
to financially support Pradeep and his family while maintaining his violent activities and 
increasing his influence in the settlement. The family also contributed to the success of the 
gang by providing influence at the Colaba police station through an uncle stationed there. 
Further, younger members of the family in their teens and twenties work for the gang in 
various ways such as performing errands, attending to daily tasks, and fighting when 
necessary; although fighting is now mostly done by non-family members.  
The family’s war machine has been used repeatedly to engage and escalate conflicts. The 
gang was a force used against the private water merchants operating in the settlement. 
Pradeep allegedly sought to collect funds from the water merchant but the enterprise was 
vigorously defended by their own gang, led by a family member with a vicious reputation 
for not hesitating to fight with weapons. The tensions between these two parties were eased 
by the intervention of mothers and wives, who negotiated a peace as discussed earlier. 
Pradeep’s gang also engages the Part I committee in the form of threatening their 
supporters and upsetting the workflow of the territory’s civic services. In response, the Part 
I committee recruited two brothers in the territory to defend the committee, who now 
operate their own gang with about 35 members. The two factions go through cycles of 
elevated tensions, which have resulted in large fights. In November 2009, for example, I 
experienced one of these fights during a celebration of one of the Singh family’s children. 
A member of the Part I gang attended the celebration, which took place in an alley of the 
settlement, but he brought with him a guest who was not at welcome. As tensions escalated 
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a member of the Part I gang called in 15 reinforcements, one of whom was hit over the 
head with a bottle by Pradeep’s gang. A general melee ensued while the person that was 
stuck by the bottle went to the police station to file a First Information Report (FIR), 
against his aggressors. However, four hours after arriving at the station, no one would take 
his information. An informant reported that the police came under Pradeep’s influence for 
INR 100,000 and told me “you can’t have any power without touch” (Interview, resident of 
Ganesh Murthy, 11/15/09). 
While the tensions between the Singh family and the Part I committee continue, Pradeep’s 
gang have created other associations. There is some evidence to suggest that the gang was 
involved in Rathod’s attempts to secure water distribution in Part III in the late 1990s, 
through alleged connections between the MMS and the social work CBO run by Pradeep’s 
aunt (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 17/11/09). Currently, however, the gang is 
aligned against the MMS through connections with the Seva Sangh and the Mahila Pragati 
Sameti. The gang, which is composed of some 100 members, is employed by these two 
water networks to intimidate and abuse customers that protest the unjust conditions of 
water service delivery.  
The gang’s enforcement of the water CBOs unilateral terms regulating water access 
compliments other techniques they use to maintain power in the settlement. The gang is 
reputed to have informants all over the settlement, and I encountered this force early on in 
my fieldwork while I was conducting the socioeconomic survey. I noticed that I was being 
followed by a couple of young kids – maybe seven years old. When I confronted them, they 
told me that Pradeep had asked them to keep an eye on me. Pradeep maintains this 
surveillance apparatus partly through a cricket league he runs in the settlement, where every 
week on Saturday eight teams composed of Ganesh Murthy’s youth play cricket on a pitch 
in Navy Nagar. The cricket matches provide a mechanism to maintain a more legitimate 
and less threatening group identity, works to consolidate his influence over adolescents, and 
also attracts children into the fold. Contributing to a sense of surveillance are tactics of 
presence and visibility. The gang seemingly does not waste an opportunity to demonstrate 
their presence through large gatherings that are held outside Pradeep’s hutment every 
fortnight or so. The hutment is located along one of the main transportation corridors of the 
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settlement, so these large gatherings, which include loud music and often alcohol, provide 
an arena to demonstrate not only the gang’s visibility and presence in the settlement, but 
also a sense of wealth, and thus power.  
Beyond their associations in the settlement, Pradeep’s gang is also allegedly part of the 
largest criminal ring operating in Colaba, together with two other groups in Ambedkar 
Nagar. Pradeep is responsible for distributing and re-selling the stolen items. The gang also 
acquires significant revenue from their associations with various real estate developers that 
are intent on redeveloping Ganesh Murthy Nagar. Under the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme 
(SRA), the current policy in force to redevelop slums in the city, a developer must acquire 
the signatures of 70 percent of the settlement, or 70 percent of a pocket in the settlement, to 
give their permission for future development. Theoretically, residents should come together 
themselves and decide to redevelop their settlement, and then approach a developer. 
However, at Ganesh Murthy, developers approach CBOs and gangs to collect signatures for 
them, for which they pay hundreds of thousands of rupees. Pradeep’s gang has been so 
employed for several years, and have become adept at producing signatures. The gang 
regularly forges documents and provides false thumbprints for their “validation,” with 
members using their toes so that anyone looking close enough would not notice the same 
thumbprint being used over and over again. Intervening more directly in resident’s lives, 
gang members ostracize those that do not sign by promising that problems will come their 
way, and ensuring their isolation from their community when these problems do arise.  
Pradeep and his gang have become one of the most formidable and fractious groups in the 
settlement. One resident asserts that he “is the biggest problem in Ganesh Murthy. If you 
are not with him, he will make trouble for you” (Interview, 11/13/09). Pradeep’s gang 
enforces elements of the water oligopoly and coordinates developer signature gathering, 
and both these processes take advantage of and threaten residents. The success of the gang 
may motivate nascent gangs currently congealing in the settlement. As of 2010 there was a 
small gang forming in part III composed of 6 young men who recently moved to Ganesh 
Murthy. They rough people up, engage in “problem solving” activities for individuals, 
steal, and do “political” work such as motivating people to attend political rallies. Three 
members sought to stake their reputation by attacking the private water enterprise. They 
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roughed up members of the business and on November 25, 2009 smashed the windows of 
their retail outlet. The response elicited was more violent. The leader of the family 
enterprise slapped one of the incipient gang members, and then his fighters gave him a 
beating. This was followed by inflicting lacerations with a barber’s knife, which they had 
procured from a nearby saloon on the main commercial street. The youth received 70 
stitches on his chest and 50 stitches on his arm, for a total of 120 stitches, which prompted 
him to go to the police to press charges.  
While in the hospital convalescing, the leader’s wife and family went to see the youth and 
gave him money for him to drop the charges, which he subsequently did. However, three of 
his gang attacked the leader directly, for which two brothers were in jail and one was on the 
run from the police (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 12/15/09). The incipient gang 
has sought an alliance with Pradeep, but as there is already an agreement in place with the 
private water seller, there could be no formal association. Nonetheless, members of the 
gang have apparently accepted money from both Pradeep and the private water seller for 
small favours, which demonstrates that the larger gangs are attempting to enrol the start-up 
into their established networks.  
The above examination reveals that gangs have become important components in the slum 
assemblage. At Ganesh Murthy, their enrolment has become a necessity for larger 
organizations to defend their interests through physical violence and techniques of 
surveillance. In a sense, then, gangs function as a type of social glue that maintains the 
functionality of networks by motivating the adherence of individual people. These war 
machines, however, are not only oriented towards residents to keep them in line, but are 
also oriented against one another in what has become a constant battle to maintain and 
expand influence and power. Muscle gangs are not only a perverse form of social glue, but 
also concurrently represent and embody the forces of friction and fragmentation that 
necessitate the glue. The investigation of Pradeep’s gang in particular also reveals that 
gangs have an ability to adapt quickly to changing circumstances. They create associations, 
shift alliances, and rapidly respond to opportunities that present themselves. Gangs, because 
of their flexibility and adaptability, are very successful social organisms in the context of a 
constantly evolving settlement with ever shifting social dynamics.  
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7.5 Rhizomatic assemblage 
The settlement assemblage is populated by a plurality of actants and consistencies with 
overlapping and convoluted lines of associations the emergence of which have led to 
various instances of injustice and inequality. Identifying important components of the 
settlement, understanding how they emerged, and mapping their interrelationships is 
essential to understand not only how the settlement functions internally, but also how State 
and multilateral organizations affect the power geometry as a plurality in transformation. 
Investigating one dimension of the settlement, such as water distribution, waste 
management, or sanitary systems for example, is not enough to adequately represent the 
entirety of that segment’s functionality and influence. Components of the settlement must 
be investigated together with others within a temporal dimension of the settlement’s 
evolution to derive an adequate representation of the assemblage, its functionality, the 
power geometry, and the effects various components have on residents.  
7.5.1 Congealing consistencies and stratification 
The emergence of social consistencies has taken place over forty years of the settlement’s 
history in confluence with its spatial development. Throughout this history, change has 
remained one of the main constants. Because there is little regulatory oversight, the spatial 
attributes of the settlement are in constant flux, accommodating the needs and desires of 
various social actors, consistencies, and their potentials for the future. Just as the land and 
built environment are fluid components of the settlement, so too is the social stratum, in 
which various overlapping networks are assembled, held together, dissolved, and realigned 
due to a diverse array of factors.  
Water networks were some the first social consistencies to emerge in the developing 
settlement and they each form a base layer for the macro organization of society in each of 
the territories. Their emergence, triggered by state legislation, soon followed a line of flight 
from State-designed water systems. Thereupon, water networks established relationships of 
dependence with residents, where the former leverages this dependence to gain greater 
concessions from the populace. With the enrolment of politicians and MCGM employees, a 
defensible space of operation emerged that is both composed of and isolated from the State 
and residents. This liminal space of the settlement employs war machines that aggresses 
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upon the State and residents. The operational space of water networks controls access to 
State funds and information about State programs and in this way has acquired the 
administration of other municipal services. 
Electrical supply was an early target for members of the HDWA in Part I and the Seva 
Sangh in Part II, and although the service has become regularized in recent years, informal 
connections are still apparent, while the revenue and power accumulated by the above 
mentioned CBOs have facilitated their expansion of power. Similarly, the procurement and 
management of sewer systems and alley paving in Parts I, II and Part III Backside helped to 
consolidate the position of the CBOs within their territorial social strata. In Parts I and II 
waste management is controlled by their respective water networks and the Manav Seva 
Samiti controls waste management for Parts III and III Backside. The same organizations 
have come to control toilet blocks as well, with the Seva Sangh directing the management 
of sanitation facilities in Part II and the Manav Seva Samiti controlling facilities in Parts III 
and III Backside. Thus, water network CBOs have expanded and consolidated their 
operations to become stratified components of the assemblage: now seemingly a native part 
of the settlement’s functional ecosystem, rather than existing tentatively within the overall 
instability of the intensive assemblage.  
Alongside the management of infrastructural services the stratified water networks are 
buoyed by social work CBOs that may lobby on their behalf, extend their networks beyond 
spatially defined parameters, and increase resident’s level of dependence by controlling 
access to other services. Beyond these associations, the CBOs are connected to other social 
consistencies that increase their reach in the settlement through religious affiliations, 
familial networks, day cares, friend groups, schools, and other associations. Thus, it 
becomes clear through the assemblage analysis that these CBOs are in reality not just 
CBOs administering limited infrastructural arrangements, but conglomerate assemblages 
composed of diverse components that dominate most, if not all the services in their 
territories. 
7.5.2 Resistance 
Assemblages are inherently unstable entities that are caught between virtual potentials and 
actual, or extensive, realms of reality that have reached some state of equilibrium. Because 
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of this inherent instability, there is always potential for resistance, and this manifests in the 
slum assemblage in diverse ways. For the most part, resistance in the settlement takes place 
in small-scale actions and movements because the functional strata of the settlement, 
dominated by CBO conglomerates, have effectively fractured society into small units that 
are generally disinclined to forge larger compounds because of a lack of trust, and because 
of effective enforcement of local policies and actions. Examples of resistance already 
discussed in previous chapters include individual communications with State regulators and 
direct communications with CBO administrators.  
Other types of resistance may include conversations about the unfair infrastructural 
arrangements in the settlement. A group of women I interviewed had such discussions and 
advanced their position of resistance to writing letters addressed to a local Municipal 
Councillor and authorities in Delhi. However, the writer’s fears of retaliation by those they 
accuse prevented them from ever sending the letters – though they still keep the letters in 
the hopes that someday they will be in a position to send them. I observed other micro-
resistances in the actions of some of the gang members associated with the Singh family. 
Gang members who had grown tired of their associations with the family chose to leave 
their mobile phones at home so they could not be contacted. Others no longer spent much 
time in their hutments so that the gang would not know where to find them. Others still, 
presented their inability to work with the gang under the guise of having to perform 
schoolwork or having to attend to sick family members.  
Residents may be more vocal in resisting the trajectories pursued by various CBO 
conglomerates. At a public meeting called by members of the Seva Sangh to introduce a 
new real estate developer interested in redeveloping Ganesh Murthy, one resident spoke up 
publicly about her reservations about the project and managed to scuttle the meeting. The 
resident alleges that a member of the Singh family gang at first offered her money to 
suppress her feelings about the project. However, when she persisted in raising questions 
around the settlement they took action against her nephew, who had served time in jail. A 
member of the family allegedly entered a false complaint to the authorities at the Cuffe 
Parade police station, which can have serious implications for a convicted criminal because 
after accumulating too many complaints police can banish or even encounter a person. The 
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resident who had complained was forced to apologize to the family and then had to send 
her nephew away from the settlement so that he could no longer be used as a lever of power 
for the family to exploit (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy Nagar, 11/13/09).  
Micro forms of resistance may take place across the settlement on a daily basis, but the 
fragmentation of society, together with CBOs being firmly entrenched in the settlement’s 
strata have not yielded significant breakthroughs in affecting the power geometry. Larger 
scale demonstrations of resistance, though rare in the settlement, have also met with little 
success as witnessed by the strenuous efforts of an incipient CBO assembled to procure 
water as described in the last chapter. Nonetheless, in an assemblage no one actor or 
component totally dominates all the others, so again there is always potential to change the 
power geometry, and there was seemingly such a shift in power that I observed at the tail 
end of my field research.  
There is evidence pointing to the diminishment of the MSS’s power over their territory. 
This initially became apparent through various informal conversational interviews with 
residents conducted at the end of my fieldwork that were less likely to not complain about 
the MSS, compared to interviews I had conducted at the beginning of fieldwork. 
Additionally, large blocks of power in the settlement have created associations through 
which they may attack the MSS. Through common associations with the Singh family, the 
Seva Sangh and Mahila Pragati Samiti have formed an alliance to enter a participatory slum 
rehabilitation scheme. A member of Mahila Pragati Samiti asserted that the domination of 
the settlement by the MSS was coming to an end, and had plans to capture the SSP toilet 
blocks through an acquaintance with Jockin Appurtham, one the leaders of the NSDF and 
the Alliance (Interview, 11/23/209). An additional indication that a large shift in power 
may be occurring in the settlement is evident in the new, but not yet functional, water 
pipeline controlled by the Seva Sangh that penetrates MSS territory along the main 
commercial street. Besides these shifts in power relations and new infrastructural 
arrangements it is also observed that with the construction of second floors more people are 
moving to the settlement as renters. It is possible that new migrants are making demands 
upon owners for better water services, which owners could seemingly charge more for. 
This may constitute a force for new and renewed demands for better water access. The 
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emergence of these various factors signals the potential to shift power away from the MSS 
to smaller, more democratic organizations, but unfortunately, with infrastructure in place it 
is likely that established CBOs will quickly move to consolidate the territory. This, sadly, 
would not seem to benefit residents at all.  
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter contributes towards a more holistic account of the functioning of the 
settlement by identifying municipal services that are available in Ganesh Murthy and 
demonstrating their constitutive associations with other components such as muscle gangs 
and various social consistencies in the settlement. The majority of services discussed in the 
chapter were procured by, or eventually came under the control of, CBOs that had initially 
been organized to administer municipal water schemes. Waste management services, alley 
paving, toilet block administration and in some cases sewer construction and maintenance 
are all services that were absorbed by existing water delivery based CBOs. In the case of 
electricity, its initial distribution also benefited water-based CBOs in Parts I and II, but 
have since become mainly regularized under State auspices. The capturing of additional 
services by corrupt CBOs consolidates the emergent hierarchical ordering in the settlement 
by enhancing centralized authority in increasingly stratified CBOs. The liminal space of 
domination in the settlement is thus expanded and concomitantly so is the scope for 
injustice, inequality and the movement towards a slum of despair. 
The examination of municipal services in Ganesh Murthy in this and the previous chapters 
demonstrates that a recurring pattern contributing to access and later the stratification of 
power in the settlement has been the improper implementation of participatory programs. 
Participatory programmes in Ganesh Murthy Nagar have facilitated the assembling of 
various forms of power in the settlement: powertoni, touch, money, and muscle. These 
powers are operationalized through a governance platform isolated from residents and the 
State that fragments society and limits the potential of new consistencies to penetrate the 
power geometry in the settlement. Participatory programs in Ganesh Murthy, proceeding 
through local politicians without adequate checks on regulation and enforcement, yield 
uneven and unjust local governance regimes.  
 246 
Thus, it becomes clear that in older slums like Ganesh Murthy Nagar, where the power 
geometry has become more stratified, participatory policies may not trigger the most 
optimal solutions for service provision. However, even in new settlements, participatory 
policies can be problematic. In McFarlane’s (2008) investigation of the SSP, slum residents 
consistently did not mind if the CBO in charge of the new SSP toilet block made extra 
money from the asset as long as the service functioned according to expectations, and on 
the surface this seems to be an adequate position for the moment. However, the 
examination of Ganesh Murthy demonstrates the real problem with this kind of 
relationship. Money accumulated beyond that required to meet basic needs, may be 
translated into political and bureaucratic touch and local muscle enforcement, from which 
the emergence of CBO conglomerates may arise. Where SSP toilets may not be an 
immediate problem for residents, the potential for uneven distribution and unjust 
relationships to emerge is a looming threat to all slum populations reliant upon 
participatory programmes. 
Enmeshed within powerful, participatory programme-triggered CBO conglomerates are 
various other CBOs and social consistencies that extend the range and influence of the 
networks. Some CBOs were formed to act as “independent” lobby groups for their 
associated service provision CBOs. Many CBOs provide access to other important services, 
such as health care, educational access, police services, ration cards, or other services such 
as helping to organize and pay for a funeral or marriage. In addition, day cares, technical 
schools, friend groups, and familial and religious affiliations have all been marshaled in the 
consolidation of CBO conglomerate influence.  
Woven into this social fabric of dominance is the specter of violence that emanates from 
muscle gangs that have relationships of exteriority with CBO conglomerates. Gangs exist 
independently through various forms of criminality but they also play a key role in holding 
conglomerates together through fear and the promise of violent reprisal. Gangs translate 
fear into a malevolent social glue and act as mechanisms of visible authority, surveillance, 
and enforcement. Further they are sometimes gatekeepers allowing access to other 
networks through their inherent associations.  
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Thus, water networks form a base organizational stratum of society upon which other 
diverse forms of organization have been assembled. However, rather than playing a 
unifying role in the settlement, the CBO conglomerates they have engendered have fostered 
distrust, fear, and disenfranchisement, fragmenting society and diminishing the potential for 
social consistencies to emerge to challenge this stratified order. In the final chapter of the 
thesis examines the potential cooptation of this stratified order into a larger assembly of 
actors that threatens the very existence of Ganesh Murthy, by focusing on the Slum 
Rehabilitation Scheme and the various private real estate developers that have been 


















As the previous chapters demonstrate, Ganesh Murthy Nagar emerged from a confluence of 
actors and forces with distinct logics, embedded within hierarchies, and moving along 
diverse trajectories. This chapter examines a newer set of components in the form of real 
estate developers and slum redevelopment policies, and their impact on the settlement 
assemblage. Real estate developers intent on redeveloping squatter settlements function 
according to a profit oriented logic that is ordered within an assemblage consisting of 
geographical location, developmental policies, and political and economic currents. 
Redevelopment policy, in the form of the Slum Redevelopment Scheme, functions 
according to a logic comprised of progressive land tenure reform, participatory guidelines 
and neoliberal developmental ideas. The potential to redevelop the settlement and the 
introduction of real estate developers to Ganesh Murthy have motivated emerging alliances 
and sharpened rifts in the settlement, spurring the reassembly of sociomaterials that are 
intensifying the unequal and unjust relations already apparent in the settlement.  
The chapter then, focuses on the effects of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS), which 
facilitates the potential to redevelop slums in Mumbai, together with several real estate 
developers working in Ganesh Murthy Nagar. The first section examines Mumbai’s slum 
redevelopment strategies (8.2) by detailing polices that led to the creation of the SRS 
(8.2.1), the mechanics of the scheme (8.2.2), and results and problems with it (8.2.3). The 
second section investigates positive and negative attractors present at Ganesh Murthy for 
redevelopment (8.3). The third section surveys various developers interested in Ganesh 
Murthy (8.4). The fourth section provides an intensive empirical examination of the work 
of one developer that played a large role in advancing the potential to redevelop the 
settlement (8.5). The final section analyses the patterns of behaviour that have been 
triggered by the SRS (8.6) including those stemming from associations between developers 
and residents of Ganesh Murthy (8.6.1), associations between developers and the state 
(8.6.2), and finally competition between developers to develop the settlement (8.6.3). 
8.2 Redevelopment strategies 
Mumbai has long struggled to manage slums from their origins in the city in the 19th 
century. As previous chapters have demonstrated, the city’s policy towards slums has 
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evolved from negation, to tolerance, to acceptance. This section examines the evolution of 
the current policy in place, in the form of the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme, and describes its 
basic mechanisms as well as results and problems that have manifested.  
8.2.1 Evolving strategies to eliminate squatter settlements from Mumbai 
In the mid 1980s, following Mumbai’s failed strategies of slum clearance and slum up-
gradation, the government of Maharashtra initiated an unconventional pilot project in the 
city called “Slum Reconstruction.” The strategy was to redevelop squatter settlements by 
demolishing existing slums and building higher-density, medium-rise apartment blocks for 
slum dwellers in their place that were cross subsidized by state and federal actors (Dua, 
1989). The project signalled a substantial move away from past strategies of clearance and 
up-gradation. The former consisted of eradicating the settlement and relocating the slum 
dwellers to another site, which opened up the land to commercial development. However, 
as slum dwellers are loath to relocate away from their current jobs and upset their 
livelihood patterns, slum clearance projects often resulted in physical confrontations and 
political conflict. The latter strategy of up-gradation gave squatters a degree of land tenure 
and could include State provision of basic amenities, infrastructure, and housing finance 
loans. Ganesh Murthy gained its first public services from such rehabilitation programmes, 
but the strategy ultimately failed to convert many slums into more formal configurations in 
the city (O’Hare, 1998).  
The Slum Reconstruction initiative was supported by slum dwellers that hoped to receive 
more valuable housing, and its initial success led to a citywide mandate under the 1991 
Slum Redevelopment Scheme (SRD). This was later modified in 1995 through suggestions 
made by the State appointed Azfulpurkar Committee, which was composed of State 
bureaucrats, representatives of civil society (including members of SPARC), and private 
developers (Burra, 2005; Mukhija, 2001). The modifications made to the SRD became the 
Slum Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS), which is the current policy in force and is administered 
by the Slum Rehabilitation Authority (SRA). The SRS pertains to all squatter settlements 
that are located on state land and all hutments that were built before 1995. The basic 
components of the 1991 scheme are integrated with market components by encouraging 
private real estate developers to redevelop squatter settlements for profit, which reduces the 
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state’s financial commitment to redevelopment. The SRS was adopted shortly after national 
economic liberalization policies had opened India to foreign investment, which 
dramatically increased real-estate prices in Mumbai. In fact, increased demand and 
speculative trading would propel real estate values in the city to some of the highest in the 
world in 1996 (Nijman, 2000), which provided incentive for developers to engage in slum 
redevelopment schemes for profit. Thus, the logic underlying the SRS is a product of 
neoliberal currents towards urban management that diminish the role of government in 
urban interventions in favour of market mechanisms. Within this framework, the logic of 
private developers was accommodated to bring land onto the formal market for profit and 
participatory guidelines were included in alignment with representatives of civil society to 
meet community needs.  
8.2.2 Mechanics of the SRS 
The SRS theoretically functions through the participation and self-organization of squatter 
residents that apply to the SRA for a redevelopment project. The whole slum community 
may be involved in the project, or only a pocket of the slum that is serviced by an access 
road (State of Maharashtra, 2009). In either case 70 percent of residents in the territory to 
be redeveloped must sign on to the scheme for it to be considered by the SRA (Nijman, 
2008). The SRA then transfers the legal title of the land from the state to the community, 
thus representing a large portion of the state’s financial contribution to the scheme. The 
squatter community may then engage a developer to demolish the settlement and build new 
medium-rise buildings, or they may manage these themselves if they are able to secure the 
necessary funding from outside sources. During the demolition and construction phases of 
redevelopment slum dwellers must be housed on site in temporary lodgings (Mukhija, 
2000). 
Key to the enrolment of a developer is the “sales component” of the scheme. This refers to 
the excess number of residential units above those required to re-house squatter residents, 
which are to be sold on the open market for profit. The amount of units that can be 
constructed on any given piece of land is restricted by the Floor Space Index (FSI) 
attributed to the land, which regulates the amount of built-up area. On a hectare of land 
with an FSI of 1, for example, one hectare of area can be built. In Mumbai the nominal FSI 
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is 2.5, although this may be less in environmentally sensitive areas or more in high priority 
development areas. 
The redevelopment process is regulated by the Development Control Regulations for 
Greater Bombay and Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and 
Redevelopment) Act, 1971. If, under these regulations, there is not enough space to build 
an adequate sales component, the developer is entitled to Transferable Development Rights 
(TDR), which allows them to build on state-owned lands to the north of the original site, in 
congruence with on going efforts to limit the densification of South Mumbai. TDR 
provides a degree of flexibility to facilitate redevelopment schemes and it may also be 
traded on the open market once its value is set at the moment of completion of the original 
project (Burra, 2005).  
8.2.3 Results and problems 
At the time of its inception the SRS was an innovative strategy to integrate multiple 
stakeholders in addressing continuing squatter settlement proliferation in Mumbai 
(Mukhija, 2003). Theoretically, there is a degree of community participation as residents 
assemble and organize to hire a developer and participate in the planning of the new 
buildings. The strategy is facilitated by the state that contributes land and integrates market 
forces in cost recovery mechanisms through the sales component of the scheme.  
Despite the innovative qualities of the program various problems with the SRS have been 
identified. Deshpande (2004) reports that the SRS has not generated significant 
redevelopment as only 26,000 new households had been produced as of 2002. Many 
squatter settlements are located in risky areas such as in marshes or on hillsides, or are 
poorly located in the city; all of which reduces the potential profits derived from the sales 
component of the scheme. Additionally, Nijman (2008) suggests that developers find ways 
of passing on their costs to slum dwellers to increase their profit margin. Finally, slum 
dwellers may not be the final proprietors and beneficiaries of the new housing. Slum 
dwellers may be convinced to sell their units before they are built to the developers who 
then resell them at a higher cost on the open market. Further, costs associated with living in 
formalized housing, such as taxes and maintenance costs, may prove too expensive for 
slum dwellers to absorb (Shaw, 2004). Another problem with the SRS is that it is reliant 
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upon market values of real estate in Mumbai, such that when prices are high, developers are 
more inclined to commence projects. When prices are low, however, or when there is less 
capital flowing in the market, as witnessed after the global economic recession following 
2008, demand to redevelop may decrease. Academic research has not yet shed much light 
on how the SRS may affect slum dwellers themselves, and this chapter aims to address this 
omission.  
8.3 Ganesh Murthy’s attractors  
The SRS creates the potential to privately develop slums and thus functions as a motivating 
attractor for developers keen on making profits from slum redevelopment. From this 
perspective, Ganesh Murthy constitutes a virtual singularity signalling strong potential for 
capital accumulation. The settlement is located in Ward A, at the southern most tip of the 
peninsula. This alone gives developers the chance to trade TDR for any other property 
available to the north and thereby increasing the value of the TDR. Ward A is well 
positioned to access the two main north-south railway lines in the city, and many important 
financial institutions such as the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Mint, as well as 
the corporate headquarters of several multinational and domestic corporations. As such, the 
settlement is nestled among some very wealthy neighbours, such as members of the 
Ambani and Tata families, and neighbourhoods, such as Cuffe Parade and Nariman Point. 
Ganesh Murthy is also located on the Arabian Sea, which not only allows for potentially 
marketable views, but offers an equally important dimension in congested and often 
sweltering hot Mumbai: fresh air blowing in off the sea. Finally, the settlement is adjacent 
to the military compound of Navy Nagar, which generally creates the perception of 
heightened security, which is an important consideration after the terror attacks in Mumbai 
in November 2008. Considering the many assets the settlement has in relation to its 
geographical position, in the words of a community leader in the settlement: “Ganesh 
Murthy is a VIP area” (Interview, 27/11/09). Most residents of Ganesh Murthy feel the 
same way. 55 percent of residents would rather stay in the settlement as is, rather than 
moving somewhere else into new residential units. 14 percent said they should receive new 
housing on site, while less than a quarter would be happy to move to new residencies in a 
new location. Six percent of residents said they would ultimately have no choice in the 
matter and would do what they were told. Given the generally substandard state of housing 
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in the settlement, people’s strong desire to stay in the same location might not bode well for 
redevelopment efforts.  
Concomitantly, however, there are several negative attractors related to the site that may 
repel the interest of developers. According to U.P.S. Madan, Project Manager of the All 
India Institute of Local Self Government, former member of the Indian Administrative 
Services, and former Vice President of MHADA, the largest hurdle in the way of 
redevelopment efforts at Ganesh Murthy is the limited FSI available for construction 
(Interview, 23/11/09). The land of the settlement is affected by tidal movements, and is thus 
subject to Coastal Regulation Zone (CRZ) legislation and is specifically defined as CRZ II 
land. Until early 2011, the FSI of CRZ II land stood at a maximum of 1.33 instead of the 
nominal 2.5 applicable to most of the city, making it extremely difficult to secure adequate 
sales units to make redevelopment worthwhile.34 Aggravating this negative attractor is the 
growing population of the settlement. An Assistant Engineer at the SRA, who is familiar 
with Ganesh Murthy, says it will be difficult to sort out all the people in the settlement who 
arrived post 1995 (Interview, 16/12/09). On this subject, Madan says that the large increase 
of people means there is a high degree of sub-tenancies (around 20% according to the 
socioeconomic survey), and “sub-tenancies make it difficult because they do not qualify for 
housing in the case of redevelopment, so they will either refuse to leave or demand 
payment for leaving.”  
There are other singularities that work to repel developers from developing the settlement. 
The Assistant Engineer at the SRA notes that because the settlement is so close to Navy 
Nagar it will take a non-objection clause (NOC) from the Ministry of Defence to build 
there. Additionally, the Metropolitan Rail Transportation Project (MRTP) is trying to 
reterritorialize the area as a rail shed to facilitate a proposed rail line. In arguing for the land 
the MRTP is relying on the 1967 BMC Development Plan for the city (revised in 1984 and 
1991), which reserves the land for a railway depot. The rail depot would have to be 
integrated into any residential project if the MRTP succeeds in securing the land. Further, 
the BEST bus depot and proposed helipad would likely have to be integrated in any large-
                                                
34 In early 2011 the government announced changes to CRZ building regulations, which increased the FSI to 
between 2.5 and 4 and reducing the no-construction zone from the high tide line from 200 to 100 metres.  
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scale project, and certainly complicates any potential redevelopment effort. Finally, the 
Mumbai Metropolitan Regional Development Authority’s (MMRDA) interpretation of the 
land at Ganesh Murthy complicates potential redevelopment efforts. The MMRDA is the 
Special Planning Authority for the Back Bay, and the Town and Country Planning Division 
of the MMRDA defines the land at Ganesh Murthy and Ambedkar Nagar as water on their 
Development Plan. Thus, as far as the MMRDA is concerned, there can be no development 
at Ganesh Murthy, because not only does the settlement not exist (in accordance with 
standard Development Plan procedures that do not acknowledge the existence of squatter 
settlements), the land does not exist either. 
8.4 Developers circling 
Despite negative attractors repelling potential developers from redeveloping Ganesh 
Murthy, there has been significant interest in the settlement. There are five confirmed 
developers that have sought signatures for redevelopment schemes, and there are five more 
that are talked about in the settlement. As of March 2011, three schemes have been 
submitted to the SRA to develop all or parts of Ganesh Murthy and one developer 
continues to collect signatures for a potential redevelopment scheme submission. The end 
purpose of these various builders is not immediately clear. Some builders genuinely appear 
to be interested in redeveloping the settlement, while others are seemingly only interested 
in reterritorializing the land under the SRA to receive money from other builders that might 
come along afterwards.  
In all cases, efforts to redevelop Ganesh Murthy have caused malaise amongst residents. As 
one person in the settlement (Interview, 11/01/09) says: “There is so much fear of builders 
here. Why are they working in secret? Why do they pay for signatures?” The whole process 
of redevelopment is murky for residents, who are generally not knowledgeable about laws 
or rights related to redevelopment. Further, they are offered money to sign long legal 
documents written in Marathi (which most immigrant residents do not comprehend). If they 
do not sign, they are threatened to do so. Redevelopment then, is accompanied by a sense 
of fear related to the loss of services, documents, and hutments. Redevelopment efforts also 
exasperate existing fault-lines in the settlement between territories, service providers, rents 
and owners, and those belonging to various social consistencies.  
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For the real estate developer, redevelopment is a process of assembly: of permissions, 
political allies, financing, plans, and slum dwellers. As regards the latter, developers enrol 
various social consistencies (mainly CBOs and muscle gangs) to help in the assembling of 
signatures and this can lead to a broad range of problems for residents. This section surveys 
all the developers that have held an interest in Ganesh Murthy, and is followed by an in 
depth examination of Plymouth Constructions Pvt. Ltd., which worked to assemble a 
multitude of components and advanced the redevelopment of the site from a virtual 
possibility to something closer to actuality.  
8.4.1 Ganesh Murthy’s developers in history 
In 1999 the developer, Raj Yoge Builder, came to Ganesh Murthy to engage the settlement 
in the context of the SRS (Interview, 22/12/09). Apparently they accumulated 90 percent of 
the signatures they required, but there was a quarrel between the four partners of the 
company and the development scheme was scuttled. An important artefact that remained, 
however, was a map of Ganesh Murthy that was reassembled into the plans of a second 
builder that approached the community in 2003 called Plymouth Constructions Pvt. Ltd. 
Plymouth worked through various CBOs to collect signatures and was interested in 
developing the entire block including Ganesh Murthy, Ambedkar Nagar and Rajak Nagar. 
They enrolled 75 percent of the residents for the SRS by 2005, but various court cases and 
institutional inconsistencies conspired to delay the scheme, which remains in a state of flux. 
Sneh Developers was brought to Ganesh Murthy in 2006 by a CBO consortium composed 
of the secretary of the Seva Sangh, the president of Mahila Pragati Samiti, and the two 
leaders of the Singh-family social work CBO. Members of the consortium apparently 
received INR 100,000 for their work with the developer, much of which consisted of 
collecting signatures. Sneh submitted their proposal to the SRA in 2009 for a pocket of the 
slum that corresponds to the Seva Sangh’s extended territory (including that of the Colaba 
Back Bay Association) and Mahila Pragati Samiti’s territory (Figure 8.1). However, the 
intentions of the developer to actually redevelop the site are questionable. Upon 
investigation, the paperwork outlining the scheme submitted to the SRA is only half 
complete. Further, as the Assistant Engineer at the SRA attests, the developer’s financial 
capacity is far too limited to redevelop the site (Interview, 16/12/09). Because of these two 
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facts it is possible that Sneh is merely trying to reterritorialize the settlement to later sell 
this control to a developer that is genuinely interested in redeveloping the site.  
 




In 2006 Darshan Doshi Builders started collecting signatures, and like Sneh, they submitted 
their proposal in 2009. The Darshan scheme corresponds to Rathod’s territory and in fact 
Rathod is one of the proprietors of Darshan, along with his father and another partner. The 
latter said that Darshan offered residents INR 500 for signing with them and that they had 
collected 1300 signatures (Interview, 18/12/09). The fact that other developers (Plymouth 
and Sneh) had submitted schemes to the SRA did not trouble him, and he felt confident that 
they could “work something out”. With the Assistant Engineer’s indication that Darshan 
also did not have the financial assets to develop the site, the partner’s statement can be 
interpreted as a desire to sell their interest in the settlement, rather than a desire to 
redevelop it.  
As of March 2011, Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. Ltd. was continuing their efforts to collect 
signatures in both Ganesh Murthy and Ambedkar Nagar, which they initiated in 2008. 
Pallonji is a large multinational developer that recently completed an SRS redevelopment in 
Tardeo, Mumbai. A friend of the Singh family, who has ties with Pallonji, introduced the 
company to the settlement (Interview, friend of Singh family, 14/01/10). Since then, the 
secretary of the Seva Sangh and the president of Mahila Pragati Samiti have allegedly 
provided them with access to their records of the settlement’s residents. Members of the 
Singh family war machine and their social work CBO are among those employed to 
convince residents to sign with Pallonji. Leading members of the war machine allegedly 
provide a show of force for those residents that are initially unwilling to sign. Close friends 
of the leaders of the gang have expressed feeling of isolation, exclusion and fear when they 
or their parents would not sign. Threats have escalated into violence for those who continue 
to withstand the muscle gang, although usually other tactics are employed first, such as 
losing access to water or toilets. Leaders of the muscle gang nd CBO actors have apparently 
been paid INR 200,000 for their services. Additionally, Pallonji offers an INR 5000 
finder’s fee and INR 10,000 to sign with them (Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 
20/10/09).  
Other smaller developers have allegedly tried but failed to collect enough signatures at 
Ganesh Murthy, often as part of a scam perpetrated by various social consistencies in the 
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settlement. The scam is run by leaders of muscle gangs, water distribution CBOs, and 
social work CBOs that enrol developers in a potential SRS scheme and receive payment for 
collecting signatures or allowing agents to work in their territory. Once paid, however, the 
actors do not collect the 70 percent of signatures necessary, so the developer unplugs their 
apparatus from the settlement, while gangs and CBOs search out new developers. In 2007 
Zoom developers commenced their operation in Ganesh Murthy. They were brought in by 
an ally of the secretary of the Seva Sangh, but only collected 30 to 40 percent of the 
signatures required and thereafter left the settlement. An ally of Rathod’s allegedly brought 
in Bollster Developers. Members of the Singh family CBO together with a muscle gang 
operating in the settlement apparently attracted Diwan Builders. Another member of the 
Singh family brought Satyan Tandon. Finally, there are unconfirmed stories of Handa 
Developers being introduced by two brothers that had at one time operated the muscle gang 
that introduced Pradeep into the business. However, there are few traces of its passing 
presence.  
8.5 Plymouth Constructions Pvt. Ltd. 
Plymouth Constructions Pvt. Ltd. has been trying to redevelop Block VI of the Back Bay 
Reclamation Scheme for eight years. During this time actors in the company have 
assembled diverse components to advance the potentiality of the project. However, strong 
opposition to their redevelopment efforts have delayed their progress and in the meantime 
other developers have used components assembled by the company to take a lead in 
redeveloping the settlement. The following, then, recounts the efforts of the developer to 
enrol and hold together an assemblage of actors in the most sustained effort to redevelop 
Ganesh Murthy Nagar so far.  
8.5.1 Attracted to a Holistic Vision 
Plymouth Constructions Pvt. Ltd. is run by the son (the Director) of a wealthy businessman, 
whose company Liotlier Group is involved in real estate, financing, and construction 
supplies all over India. For example, in 2010 Litolier announced plans to build four five-
star hotels in New Delhi, Chennai, Mumbai, and Goa (Pal, 2010). When the Director of 
Plymouth Constructions returned from the college he attended in Lugano Switzerland in 
2002, he “wanted to do something good for the people, and good for the city, so I became 
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interested in this plot of land [Block VIof the BBRS]” (Interview, 22/12/09). Certainly, 
with offices on the 10th floor of Free Press House in Nariman Point with a view of the Back 
Bay, the Director was drawn to the large tract of squatter settlements sitting in one of the 
most expensive areas of Mumbai. The SRS provided a mechanism to approach and 
redevelop the settlement and so he first enlisted the help of an expert on SRA regulations. 
He then registered Plymouth Constructions Pvt. Ltd. under which the work could be 
accomplished.  
The Director was attracted to the idea of redeveloping the entirety of Block VI of the Back 
Bay, including Ganesh Murthy, Ambedkar Nagar, Rajak Nagar, the MHADA transit camp, 
the helipad, and the bus depot. He envisaged not only new residences, but a school, sewage 
treatment plant, hospital, dispensary, jetty, water way, and the re-plantation of mangroves 
(Interview, 22/12/09). Such a redevelopment plan lies outside the scope of the SRS, as it 
involves other components besides squatter settlements and residential units, yet it would 
also have to include the SRA, which is the sole planning authority for squatter settlements. 
A holistic development of the entire area seemed only natural to the Director, as it had to 
former Municipal Councillor Rathod many years earlier. Such a large development would 
necessitate the assembly of multiple associations with political entities such as the Urban 
Development Department (UDD), which defines the terms of development for the state, the 
MMRDA as the special planning authority for the Back Bay Reclamation Area, MHADA, 
BEST, the Metropolitan Commissioner, and most probably the Chief Minister of 
Maharashtra, among other political offices and officers.  
8.5.2 Assembling political institutions and defining the project 
The first step in the process of redeveloping the site was to enrol important government 
agencies. To this extent Plymouth purportedly sent a letter of intention to the MMRDA, 
MHADA, and UDD in November 2003 (Assertion by the Director of Plymouth 
Constructions, PIL 45, 2007: 98). The exact contents of the letter and any responses are not 
known as they are not included in the public interest litigation, but official letters were 
written three months later to MHADA and UDD outlining Plymouth’s broad vision 
(Letters, Director Plymouth Constructions, 06/01/04 and 04/02/04). However, these 
authorities replied that unless the file was submitted as per SRA guidelines, they did not 
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have the power to sanction the plan. This required a survey (submitted in March 2004) and 
plans for a transit camp to house residents during construction (submitted July 2004). 
MHADA was a critical ally for Plymouth to enrol as its two-hectare transit camp sits in the 
middle of the potential redevelopment zone and their cooperation is integral to any holistic 
redevelopment vision for the area. Plymouth asserted that the existing transit camp, built in 
the 1980s, was dilapidated and in urgent need of repairs. They argued that if MHADA went 
ahead with redeveloping their site in the form of multi-story buildings to include a sales 
portion of the new edifice as a cost recovery mechanism, the units would not fare well on 
the market because they are surrounded on all sides by squatter settlements and do not even 
have a road giving access to the MHADA land. The only solution, as advanced by 
Plymouth, was to develop the entirety of Block VI of the BBRS. The CEO of MHADA 
ultimately agreed with the holistic vision and wrote the Commissioner of the MMRDA to 
enrol that agency along the trajectory of a holistic redevelopment (Letter, CEO of MHADA 
to the Metropolitan Commissioner of the MMRDA, 02/06/04).  
Concurrently, Plymouth filed the redevelopment plans with the Deputy Collector for South 
Mumbai that administers the land on behalf of the state and as such is responsible for 
implementing and executing the scheme for redevelopment. However, the Deputy Collector 
directed Plymouth to the SRA as the competent authority. The SRA, in turn, directed them 
to the MMRDA as the special planning authority (SPA) for the BBRS. In fact, there were 
two competing authorities for this redevelopment project: the MMRDA as the SPA for the 
BBRA, and the SRA as the planning authority for all slum redevelopment projects in 
Mumbai.  
Plymouth pressed the MMRDA to classify the redevelopment as an “Urban Renewal 
Infrastructure Development” due to its inclusion of roads, a jetty, water ways, a hospital 
and a school rather than merely the construction of residences (Letter, Plymouth to 
Additional Metropolitan Commissioner, MMRDA, 07/08/04). The MMRDA had creatively 
altered plans for the BBRS in 2000 when it rezoned parts of Block VI from industrial usage 
(an historical trace of the 1967 Development Plan calling for a rail shed) to residential and 
communal usage (Notification No BBR.1092/60/CR-6/92/UD-11 dated 9/6/2000). This 
was strictly illegal under CRZ legislation, which prevents rezoning of land in coastal areas. 
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Nevertheless, that MMRDA had rezoned the land suggests that certain creative planning 
could be accommodated and Plymouth pursued this course. If the developer had been 
successful in classifying its scheme as an infrastructure project instead of as a slum 
redevelopment project, residents of the squatter settlement could be defined as Project 
Affected Persons (PAP). The reterritorialisation of residents as PAPs would make it much 
easier to remove them from the site, which would create more space for private residences 
to be sold at market value.  
Ultimately, the MMRDA claimed to be the competent authority and the scheme was filed 
with a small SRA cell embedded within the MMRDA. The Second Amendment to the 
MMRDA Act (2002) states that the MMRDA is a Slum Rehabilitation Authority when 
infrastructure is involved in a project. Although there is no documentation supporting or 
confirming any decision to define the Plymouth scheme as an infrastructural project, this 
was the reason given by the MMRDA to the Deputy Collector to justify the MMRDA as 
the competent authority instead of the SRA. “MMRDA is the Slum Rehabilitation 
Authority for the implementation of Slum Rehabilitation Projects for housing the Project 
Affected People (PAP housing) affected by vital public viz. MUTP & MUIP”35 (Letter 
from MMRDA to Deputy Collector, 12/02/05). While the MMRDA somewhat spuriously 
assumed the authority to supervise the project, the Deputy Collector was deemed to be the 
competent authority to implement and execute the SRS (Notification No. G.N.H.D. No. 
Gavasu, 13010KR-375/Zopasu-1, 18/05/02).  
8.5.3 Assembling slum dwellers 
Plymouth had to gain the acquiescence of eligible residents that could prove they had been 
on site since 1995. To this extent the developer took the locally unusual step of directly 
approaching residents through public assemblies in the settlement. Plymouth also, however, 
enrolled the secretary of the Seva Sangh who helped facilitate the creation of 22 CBOs 
registered according to the Bombay Cooperative Societies Act, 1925 (PIL 45, 2007: 93). 
These societies garnered powertoni over their members to legally negotiate with Plymouth, 
which offered the SRA requisite 225 square foot residences and free temporary housing 
during the construction period.  
                                                
35 MUTP is Mumbai Urban Transportation Project. MUIP is Mumbai Urban Infrastructure Project. 
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The developer then entered into agreement with the 22 societies for the right to redevelop 
the settlement, including transferring the power of attorney to Plymouth to approach 
various authorities necessary to redevelop the land. The societies also gave Plymouth lists 
of all their members, the majority of which had been on site before 1995 and had the 
necessary documents to prove this. Following, the developer’s network of local agents, 
consisting primarily of the Singh family muscle gang and social work CBO, entered into 
individual negotiations and agreements with residents. In this way Plymouth assembled 
some 3300 households into its redevelopment assemblage, which represented more than 70 
percent of the eligible population in Block VI, by January 2004. For some, signing with 
Plymouth offered the promise of moving into new residences, while for others it was the 
beginning of years of water access privation, toilet block access privation, threats, and 
physical abuse. Rathod, at the head of a competing development company would use 
everything in his power to unplug residents from the Plymouth assemblage and scuttle the 
project. Many slum dwellers suffered through the competition to redevelop the settlement 
(this discussion continued in section 8.5.5).  
8.5.4 Assembling land 
With residents and State institutions enrolled in the development assemblage, Plymouth 
thereafter worked to reterritorialize the land. Some of the land in Block VI of the BBRS 
was officially recognized by the State apparatus, but zoning particularities and CRZ 
legislation prevented redevelopment there. Further, the land that housed 11,000 people at 
Ganesh Murthy and about the same amount of people in Ambedkar Nagar did not officially 
exist. Therefore Plymouth and its allies engaged other actors to help them reterritorialize 
the land under the redevelopment assemblage.  
8.5.4.1 Changes to the Development Plan 
Several important zoning changes to parts of the area were also necessary to facilitate the 
project and MHADA took the lead in petitioning the MMRDA to make the necessary 
adjustments to their Development Plan. MHADA asked the MMRDA for the following 
changes: to diminish the width of the road leading from Prakesh Pethe Marg towards the 
sea from 45 metres to 13 metres; to redefine MHADA’s land from “transit camp” (which 
places certain restrictions on development possibilities) to simply “residential”; rezone 
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Rajak Nagar from “Parade Ground” to “residential;” and to define Ganesh Murthy and 
Ambedkar Nagar as “residential” (Letter, MHADA to MMRDA, 02/06/04). In response to 
these requests the MMRDA in its 111th meeting on 06/07/04 changed the zoning of the 
parade ground and the transit camp. Strangely, however, the Development Plan, current as 
of December 2009, does not indicate that these changes were made. No other mention is 
made by the MMRDA of diminishing the width of the road or declaring the two squatter 
settlements as residential zones.  
8.5.4.2 Changes to the high tide line 
Sixteen months after Plymouth first informed the UDD and MHADA of its broad vision for 
the holistic redevelopment of Block VI, in March 2005, the Collector commenced a survey 
and boundary demarcation of the squatter settlement area as demanded by SRS protocol. 
During the process it became apparent that the high tide line (HTL), as demarcated in the 
MMRDA Development Plan, was incorrect as it was shown to pass through the bus depot, 
which, built in the 1960s, prefigured the drawing of the plan (Figure 8.2). The HTL was 
originally drawn in 1997 by the National Hydrographic Office of the Indian Navy and was 
printed at a 1:25,000 scale. The MMRDA transferred this line to their Development Plan, 
which was drawn at 1:5000 scale and ultimately they made a mistake drawing the line, 
which was closer to the shore than in the original demarcation. As the MMRDA-defined 
HTL limits the amount of land that may be potentially developed, Plymouth pushed for the 
UDD to appoint the Centre for Earth Science Studies (CESS) in Trivandrum to determine 
the current high tide line. This request was accommodated in June (Letter, UDD to CESS, 
02/06/05).  
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Figure 8.2 Demonstrates the different versions of the high tide line 
Source: Centre for Earth Science Studies  
CESS submitted their report in August 2006, which shows the current HTL further west, 
towards the sea, than as had been drawn by the MMRDA (CESS, 2006). CESS argues that 
the HTL had shifted seaward due to reclamation work that had taken place in the Back Bay 
from the 1960s onwards. Ultimately, it concluded, part of the land under question for 
redevelopment falls into CRZ I, while the majority of the land is in CRZ II, and thus 
redevelopment of the squatter settlements is permissible. However, rather than change the 
HTL to its current location, which would create more land for construction, the UDD seized 
upon the CESS assessment that the extended HTL was due to reclamation. The UDD 
decided that the land between the 2006 and 1998 high tide lines was CRZ I, while the land 
to the west of the 1998 HTL was CRZ II.  
Either Plymouth had failed to fully enrol the UDD, or unknown competing forces were at 
work to derail the project. The 1998 demarcation of the HTL shows a 90 degree angle, 
which results from scalar limitations in accuracy. Because of this artificiality, seemingly an 
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argument could have been made to smooth out the line according to the natural topography, 
as CESS had indicated, which would have gained more land for construction. Nevertheless, 
Plymouth may have been sufficiently content that CESS and UDD had ruled that 
redevelopment could go forward and did not push for more land. 
This partial victory for Plymouth, however, was immediately mitigated by the Chief of the 
Town and Country Planning Division (T&CPD) of the MMRDA, who threw up another 
hurdle. “The land to the west side of the BEST Depot, Helipad and Parade Ground is 
shown as ‘Sea’ in the sanctioned Development Plan of the BBRS, in view of this the 
resettlement of slum on the plot under reference can not be considered” (Letter, Chief 
T&CPD (MMRDA) to UDD, 21/12/05). Exclaiming his frustration with this turn of events, 
the Director of Plymouth said: “It looked like land. There were houses there and people 
living in them. They had ration cards and photo-passes. But in the end, this land was not 
really land” (Interview, 22/12/09).  
8.5.4.3 City survey number 
Despite the Collector having received taxes from residents living on State land in Ganesh 
Murthy and Ambedkar Nagar for many years, and despite the government having issued 
photo-passes enabling residents of these lands to vote in national, state and municipal 
elections, the land on which residents were identified did not officially exist. Therefore, 
Plymouth pursued another course of action to normalize the land through the creation of a 
civic survey number. As such, at the behest of the developer, the Revenue Department of 
the State sought permission from the Settlement Commissioner, Land Records, based in 
Pune, to allot a civic survey number. The latter granted its permission in February 2007 and 
the Revenue Department allotted the settlements Civic Survey No. 658, thus officially 
recognizing the existence of the land for the first time, almost forty years after the first 
squatters started living at Ganesh Murthy. Shortly thereafter the Commissioner of the 
MMRDA allegedly told the Director of Plymouth and other stakeholders of the project that 
the bus depot, helipad, metro, slum dwellers, and sales portion of the project should be 
combined, and in October 2007 Plymouth supplied the plan (Interview, Director Plymouth 
Constructions, 22/12/09). Clearly, actors in the MMRDA were not aligned with the 
Commissioner following the trajectory initiated by Plymouth with the Chief T&CPD 
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bisecting it. Other problems also hampered the developer as detailed in the following 
section. 
8.5.5 Competing redevelopment assemblage 
In accordance with SRS protocol the Collector is obliged to verify the list of squatter 
residents furnished by the developer to assess their existence, eligibility for inclusion in the 
SRS, and their consent to the proposed scheme. To this extent advertisements were taken 
out in newspapers, and broadsheets were posted in the relevant squatter settlements on 
March 16, 2007 to notify the public of the list of names and the status of their eligibility. 15 
days are granted to object to the Collector’s findings, after which a survey is conducted to 
determine the consent of residents. On March 31st, the Commissioner of the MMRDA 
received a letter from the Manav Seva Samiti saying the consent of its 600 members were 
fraudulently obtained by Plymouth and demanding that the members be removed from the 
scheme (Letter, Manav Seva Samiti to MMRDA, 30/03/07). A similar letter was received 
by the Commissioner a few days later from the Shivaji Banjara Seva Society (from 
Ambedkar Nagar) claiming its 1078 members wished to be removed from the scheme 
(Letter, Shivaji Banjara Seva Society to MMRDA, 03/04/07). Several letters purportedly 
written by members demanding that they be removed from the scheme accompanied these 
letters. 
As explained in Chapter VI these two CBOs are affiliated with former Municipal 
Councillor Rathod, and through further investigation by the Collector, it became apparent 
that the CBOs were trying to derail or delay Plymouth’s redevelopment efforts. The 
Collector established that of the 1678 members put forth by the two CBOs, only 437 were 
on the list for verification, and of these 171 did not even exist. Further, several of the letters 
submitted by the CBOs from individual members were found to be written by former 
members who had expired (PIL 45, 2007). Other members of the CBOs thereafter wrote 
authorities to complain of the CBOs false representation of their desires. Following, 
Plymouth requested the Collector to call upon the residents to assess the validity of the 
CBO’s claims. The Director of Plymouth alleges that Rathod worked to block the proposed 
hearing by arguing with the person in the Collector’s office in charge that the hearing was 
not the right way to sort the problem out and threatened them that no one would show up 
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(Interview, 22/12/09). The Director also alleges that Rathod argued that the posters put up 
around the slum to advertise presence at the hearing were not sufficient. Apparently, 
Rathod said people had complained individually, and even though their names were all on 
one list produced by the CBO, they should be contacted individually. Thereafter, the 
Collector hand-delivered letters to the 266 authentic members of the CBOs that had 
allegedly desired to be removed from the scheme to appear before the Collector for 
verification. Finally, in June 2007, 165 residents of the 266 called upon appeared before the 
hearing, where 158 people stated they supported Plymouth’s redevelopment efforts while 7 
remained neutral (PIL 45, 2007).  
The Director alleges that once the MMRDA changed the zoning of the parade ground and 
transit camp to residential (in 2004) Rathod approached him requesting 25 percent of the 
profits to be generated from the redevelopment (Interview, 22/12/09). When the Director 
refused, he alleges that Rathod started to intimidate the residents of Ganesh Murthy with 
goondas and by limiting or cutting off their water as explained in Chapter VI. After the 
hearing, the Director alleges that Rathod summarily cut off water access to everyone who 
had attended, after which the Director supplied water via daily tankers for 16 months. It 
must be understood that tanker water is not the same quality as municipal water. Residents 
generally drink municipal water without boiling it, which they would not do with tanker 
water. Further, the Director alleges that Rathod approached him again after the hearing 
demanding 25 percent of the profits or he would make more trouble for the developer.  
Following the four-month delay in Plymouth’s redevelopment efforts due to assessing the 
consent of slum dwellers, and some time after the Director’s refusal to give in to Rathod’s 
demands, a public interest litigation (PIL) was filed on June 23, 2007 by four residents 
living in or around Ganesh Murthy and Ambedkar Nagar (PIL Writ Petition No. 45 of 
2007, High Court of Judicature at Bombay). The PIL was filed against the UDD, the 
MCGM, MHADA, SRA, MMRDA, State Housing Department, Revenue Department, 
Deputy Collector, and Plymouth Constructions, to prevent: “Government lands occupied by 
the slum dwellers from being usurped by Developers who are hands in glove with several 
Government officials to make wrongful gains from the said property” (PIL 45, 2007: 6). 
Plymouth argued in its defence (submitted in October 2007) that the entire PIL was a 
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fabrication lead by Rathod to prevent the redevelopment from proceeding. As one of the 
petitioners is a member of Rathod’s Shivaji Banjara Seva Society and another is a member 
of a society led by an ally of Rathod, and considering Rathod’s involvement and interest in 
the squatter settlements as described earlier, it is probable that Rathod was involved in the 
PIL. According to the Director, during the proceedings at the High Court the judge called 
the petitioners to the witness stand and asked them each how much they earned. When they 
responded that they earned INR 3000 per month the judge questioned how they could 
afford INR 30,000 on Right to Information fees and legal costs. Unable to provide a 
suitable answer, the plaintiffs lost the case and were each penalized INR 10,000 by the 
court. Pursuant to this, Rathod, ever intent to delay or derail the redevelopment, brought the 
case to the Supreme Court in Delhi where in late 2007 the original verdict was upheld (PIL 
45, 2007).  
The ultimate scuttling of Plymouth’s efforts to redevelop Block VI came from a different 
tactic employed by Rathod: the enrolment of the mass media. On August 25 and 26, 2007 
the Hindustan Times published a two part investigative report on Plymouth’s 
redevelopment activities entitled “Mumbai’s costliest land – FREE” in the first instance and 
“Voices against land handover grows” in the second (Upadhyaya, 2007a: Upadhyaya, 
2007b). A follow-up article appeared in the paper on August 30 entitled “Cuffe Parade 
slum now a hot potato” (Upadhyaya, 2007c). The articles were a masterstroke in Rathod’s 
efforts as the articles uncritically reflect his unfounded and incorrect accusations. Rathod is 
quoted as asking: “How can the government allow development on this land? It falls under 
the coastal regulation zone and has mangroves” (Upadhyaya, 2007a). The paper failed to 
inform its readers that development is possible under CRZ, only at a lower FSI than 
normal. Instead the paper submits that the settlements sit in a “no-development land” 
(Upadhyaya, 2007b). The paper also asserted that Plymouth had only amassed 413 eligible 
signatures (Upadhyaya, 2007a). Although Plymouth claimed to have collected 3300 
signatures, the fact is that by August 2007, the Collector had not yet established the number 
of eligible signatures collected.  
Further, by quoting the Principal Secretary of the Environment Department as saying they 
did not receive any proposal from Plymouth, the article suggests that there was intent to 
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circumvent this step in the process, but there is no proof that this was the case, as by 2007 
Plymouth was only at the stage of qualifying the residents eligibility and viability of the 
scheme (Upadhyaya, 2007b). A quote from a member of an NGO demonstrates how the 
newspaper failed to place information in the proper context, and merely reflected Rathod’s 
self-interested perspective. A member of the NGO CitiSpace is quoted as saying: “It is 
shocking that any government could plan this type of destruction to mangroves by 
redefining the tide-line to suit the builder” (Upadhyaya, 2007b). Certainly the HTL was 
redefined by CESS as it had been inaccurately drawn by the MMRDA and had changed due 
to siltation by reclamation objects. However, the updated HTL did not benefit Plymouth, as 
they were ordered by the UDD to plan according to the previously defined HTL in 1998 
(albeit one redrawn correctly).  
These newspaper articles reflect a logic derived from historical precedents demonstrating 
overwhelming evidence that developers and politicians form a nexus to illegally develop 
land in Mumbai. Rathod thus aligned his logic, oriented towards control of the land for 
profit, with that of the newspaper to great effect. The articles performed this role by 
creating untenable associations between the government and Plymouth, from which the 
government then had little option but to withdraw from. The head of the UDD said 
(mistakenly) that his agency had nothing to do with changing the HTL: “It was done by the 
Central Government” (Upadhyaya, 2007b). Similarly the Commissioner of the MMRDA 
said: “We have not submitted any proposal for redevelopment scheme of Cuffe Parade 
slums. We are not the competent authority to do it” (Upadhyaya, 2007c – italics added). As 
a result of the articles and the backlash that ensued, the MMRDA-SRA cell ejected the 
Plymouth file from their offices and sent it to the SRA (Interview, Executive Engineer 
MMRDA-SRA cell, 18/12/09). However, as of January 2010 the SRA had lost 75 percent 
of the file (Interview, SRA Assistant Engineer, 16/12/09). Further, the scheme was received 
by the SRA only after receiving the schemes from Darshan and Sneh, thus giving priority 
to the latter two.  
By 2009 there was still some room for Plymouth to manoeuvre in filing for an 
infrastructure project that might take precedence over the purely residential concerns of the 
SRA. Further, the leader of a CBO distributing water in Ambedkar Nagar affiliated with 
 271 
Rathod confided to me that Rathod might be willing to negotiate with Plymouth (Interview, 
18/11/09). However, in 2009 Plymouth’s assemblage towards an holistic plan for the 
redevelopment of Block VI followed an absolute line of flight. The logic aligning 
MHADA’s interests with that of Plymouth’s (to create excess flats to sell on the open 
market) was altered and the MHADA component withdrew and plugged into another 
assemblage. Just before the national election in 2009, a Plymouth employee alleges that a 
powerful local politician with connections with the national Congress Party wanted to 
demonstrate development in the area to garner votes. The politician and the political 
network of the Congress Party allegedly convinced MHADA to redevelop the transit camp 
and pushed the MMRDA to approve the new plan (Interview, 12/22/09). As of February 
2010, construction of temporary housing in the transit camp was progressing to facilitate 
the new development. The same year MMRDA allegedly told the Director that they could 
not accept his 2007 plan, as asked for by the Commissioner, because there was insufficient 
FSI (Interview, 12/22/09).  
8.6 Patterns of behaviour 
The Slum Rehabilitation Scheme has the potential to vastly change Mumbai’s residential 
landscape by triggering associations between real estate developers and slum dwellers: 
associations that were few and far between before the SRS was created. The potential 
outcome of such associations, manifested in the conversion of unhealthy, environmentally 
questionable squatter settlements into formal buildings, is life affirming for more than 
merely squatters, but for an entire city. However, after some twelve years of SRS-triggered 
developer interest in Ganesh Murthy Nagar, the results have only thus far been life 
destroying for the thousands of residents affected by resultant patterns of behaviour. 
Additionally, the SRS has been a site attracting illegal behaviour by various government 
officials. This section, then, explores patterns of behaviour created by associations triggered 
by the SRS between squatter residents and developers, state bureaucracies and developers, 
and competition between developers.  
8.6.1 Patterns of behaviour between developers and squatter residents  
The SRS follows participatory guidelines by prompting slum dwellers to advance a 
common cause towards better housing by assembling and then choosing a developer to 
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redevelop their settlement. However, as demonstrated throughout this thesis, various forces 
such as fragmentation and the stratification of power work against the formation of 
inclusive social consistencies. Despite the intentions of the SRS, the contingent set of 
translating logics that implement the schematic in practice can displace desired outcomes. 
For example, stratified components of the settlement, following a logic of desire for profit, 
seized upon the SRS guidelines to approach developers and the majority of developers 
interested in Ganesh Murthy have been drawn to its basin of attraction in this way. The 
problem, as described earlier in the chapter, is that the local components never had any 
intention of redeveloping the settlement. They worked to ensure the 70 percent threshold 
was not reached so that they could contact another developer and earn more money through 
finder’s fees, fees to work in the territory, and fees collected from assembling signatures. 
Throughout, residents of Ganesh Murthy may be forced to hand over their documents, sign 
documentation they do not understand, and risk losing not only access to services, but 
potentially their hutments in the process. Because of this and other abuses of the SRS many 
residents of Ganesh Murthy are fearful of builders, despise the various social groups that 
facilitate the trickery, and have become antipathetic to the whole idea of redevelopment in 
general. 
An alternative pattern to squatter-initiated associations with developers is for developers to 
approach residents. Specifically, developers approach the leaders of powerful CBOs to 
assemble signatures for them, because these groups already hold power over residents 
through powertoni and the control of basic necessities. Plymouth Constructions Ltd. 
approached the Seva Sangh, and naturally Darshan Doshi Developers approached its CBO 
allies in Ganesh Murthy and Ambedkar Nagar. In fact, this practice appears to be 
widespread as confirmed by the architect for the Sneh scheme, and by a partner in Darshan 
Doshi (Interviews, 17/12/09 and 19/12/09). This nuance in the squatter-developer 
relationship is important because here the developer takes the initiative and drives the 
development towards a trajectory that might not be in the slum dweller’s best interests. In 
the case of Plymouth’s efforts it is apparent that the goal was to declare the redevelopment 
scheme as an infrastructure project to facilitate the displacement of the residents of the 
settlements. In the case of Darshan it appears that the goal was to reterritorialize the land 
and hold it until a larger developer offered to buy them out. An Assistant Engineer at the 
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SRA was convinced that both Sneh and Darshan did not have the resources to develop the 
site, and the comments of a Darshan partner and the Sneh architect appear to support this 
view. These two instances do nothing to ameliorate the lives of residents and in fact make 
life more difficult for them as they had to repeatedly face threats and intimidation during 
multiple processes of enrolment. 
The insertion of developer components in the settlement assemblage has had multiple 
effects on the residents of Ganesh Murthy. In the first instance, the logics driving 
developers, many CBOs, and some other consistencies in the settlement are geared towards 
generating profit. Thus, there is an underlying logic that aligns these components, the 
integration of which has worked to consolidate the power geometry in the settlement. For 
example, a powerful resident of Ganesh Murthy who is the leader of a CBO composed of 
local merchants suggests that the committee members of water distribution CBO 
conglomerates receive INR 1,200,000-1,400,000 from developers for permission to operate 
in their area. With committees in Ganesh Murthy numbering approximately ten people in 
average that is INR 100,000 per committee member. However, in the case of Part II, where 
the secretary of the Seva Sangh holds most of the power, he gets the “lion’s share” 
(Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 27/11/09). Money also accrues to muscle gangs that 
are employed to forcibly collect signatures, and two such gangs are known to have been 
paid for such services. Beyond money, other forms of power such as touch, or the 
perception of touch, may accrue to those with associations to developers.  
However, the integration of developer components in the settlement assemblage has also 
reconfigured the power geometry in the settlement to an extent as well. Firstly, because 
developers often work through existing CBOs to access residents and obtain documents and 
signatures, there has been a proliferation of CBOs in the settlement to take advantage of the 
potential to make money as explained in the previous chapter. Secondly, documentation 
procured from the SRA demonstrates that the Sneh scheme was led at the local level by the 
secretary of the Seva Sangh, the president of Mahila Pragati Samiti, and leaders of the 
Singh family. Previously, according to records at the Water Department, antipathy existed 
between the Seva Sangh and Mahila Pragati Samiti. However, the introduction of the SRS 
realigned these components towards two related common goals. One goal is the pursuit of 
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money, which they collected from Sneh. The other goal is the contestation of Rathod’s very 
powerful hold over the settlement through his CBO conglomerate. Interviews with 
residents, members of the Singh family, and members of the administrative committees of 
the Seva Sangh and Mahila Pragati Samiti revealed a deep dislike and desire to fight 
Rathod and his assembled components. The SRS and the mobilization of Rathod’s assets 
towards redevelopment triggered the congealing of these various actors. A key component 
in this new consistency is the Colaba Back Bay Association, with its water network that 
extends into Part III, because it localizes a territorial point of friction between the 
adversaries and creates the potential to derail Darshan Doshi. Figure 8.1 shows the 
contested territory in a map produced by the SRA to geographically locate the extent of 
both schemes. Rathod, through the collection of signatures and documents for the Manav 
Seva Samiti, has acquired the powertoni to move towards reterritorializing a part of the 
settlement under the SRS. The assembling of overlapping powertoni via the Colaba Back 
Bay Association, however, creates the potential to contest Darshan. It remains to be seen 
how this contestation will manifest itself in the actual realm, but nevertheless, the 
congealing of actors has done nothing to liberate or improve the lives of regular squatter 
residents.  
Associations between developers and squatters also expose latent fault lines in the 
settlement’s social strata. While the opportunity to redevelop the squatter settlement might 
initially seem universally appealing, there are many people in the settlement opposed to 
redevelopment. Renters are generally opposed because they are not eligible for the benefits 
of the SRS, so there is an underlying tension between owners and renters that may be 
heightened in the sphere of redevelopment. Merchants along the commercial roads in 
Ganesh Murthy are also not in favour of redevelopment. One storeowner said that, “those 
with stores along the road are making good money and do not want to redevelop as their 
economic livelihood will be threatened” (Interview, storeowner, 13/11/09). Other 
entrepreneurs who profit from the settlement equally do not want to see it redeveloped. The 
private water distributor, for example, would lose its business, and some landlords who 
depend on rent would lose their revenue if the land were redeveloped. Finally, CBOs that 
profit from residents do not want to redevelop. Not only business owners, entrepreneurs, 
infrastructure administrators, and social work CBO leaders are against redevelopment. 
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Many people in the settlement oppose redevelopment, or more specifically the idea of 
redevelopment, because they fear they will lose their homes and livelihoods.  
It appears there is good reason behind this sentiment beyond Plymouth’s intention to 
relocate residents. The SRS is premised upon the developer earning a profit, and if there is 
no profit to be earned there will be no redevelopment. As such, there is provision within the 
SRS to allow squatters to be relocated if the sales portion is too small to make the project 
economically viable (State of Maharashtra, 2009). The SRA does not recognize this 
problem, however. An Extra Engineer for SRA thinks the slum dweller’s fear of being 
transferred in “baseless.” “Their complaints of being moved doesn’t sit because they sell 
their flats once they are given them anyway” (Interview, 16/12/09). Further, the 
redevelopment process is open to a number of problems and initial plans are constantly 
changed. For example, SRA documentation of the only operational SRS project in Ward A 
shows that addition of floors, environmental assessments, slum dweller demands, and other 
factors have led to many changes, all of which delays the process. Unfortunately, as the 
MHADA “transit” camp demonstrates, many temporary transit camps have become 
permanent fixtures in the city. One well-informed resident in the settlement absolutely 
guarantees that whatever builder might be successful in garnering enough signatures they 
will not provide the current residents with housing at the Ganesh Murthy site. He expresses 
the concerns of many residents when he says: “People are digging their own graves by 
attracting builders to the site as they are sure to be removed” (Interview, 27/11/09).  
The SRS has triggered the addition of developer components in Ganesh Murthy and this 
has reassembled contingent relations and orientations in the settlement assemblage 
manifesting in social fragmentation, CBO associations, increased tensions, and fears. A 
plethora of illegal and sometimes violent behaviour stems from these new relations as well. 
For example, water networks, muscle groups, and CBOs falsify records to attract and fulfil 
commitments to builders. This was apparent when the Collector examined the 1678 
member’s signatures submitted who apparently wished to withdraw from the Plymouth 
scheme and found that only 437 were on the list for verification and of these 171 did not 
even exist. As examined in Chapter VI, water access is used as a lever to convince people 
to sign with a certain builder, and many people in the settlement have lost their water 
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access as a result. Further, as examined in Chapter VII people are ostracized, terrorized, 
beaten, and in some cases murdered for their resistance to being enrolled in redevelopment 
schemes. This is not only the case when muscle gangs initiate associations with the 
developers, but is part and parcel of the logic of redevelopment. One resident of Ganesh 
Murthy asserts, “all builders pay to show muscle power” (Interview, 27/11/09). Further, a 
businessperson with intimate knowledge of large-scale slum redevelopment schemes 
explains the tactics used by large developers this way: “They approach slum dwellers at 
night with two bags in their hands. One bag is filled with money, the other bag is empty 
and is for their head if they don’t sign. This is how it needs to be.” Thus, although the SRS 
has the potential to ameliorate the lives for squatters and land-owning citizens of Mumbai, 
the translation of this potential through the alignment of developers and local stratified 
social consistencies governing the practical implementation of the policy has the potential 
to further fragment an already weak and divided squatter society and produce life-
destroying conditions that may endure for many years.   
8.6.2 Patterns of behaviour between builders and the State 
As Chapter IV demonstrates, the relationship between the State and developers has been an 
enduring and seminal component in the evolution of Mumbai. Although the logics dictating 
the development of land for each set of actors are different, there is significant overlap in 
their desire to profit from the process. Because of this history, the SRS cannot be 
considered to cause illegal behaviour, however, the above examination demonstrates the 
emergence of questionable associations and curious cleavages surrounding SRS 
implementation, and points to the necessity of reorganizing this policy of providing formal 
housing for Mumbai’s poor.  
In the process of engaging with the SRS, Plymouth Constructions assembled several 
government agencies in its quest to redevelop Block VI. First among those enrolled by the 
developer was MHADA, which was a key association for Plymouth as MHADA thereafter 
lead the enrolment of subsequent State agencies. MHADA had been charged with 
redeveloping their aging transit camps under the Sukthankar Committee with the idea that 
one-story buildings be replaced by multiple storied buildings with the excess units being 
sold on the market to generate revenue. Further, their site in the BBRS had apparently been 
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selected for redevelopment (Letter, MHADA to MMRDA, 02/07/04). With the desires of 
MHADA and Plymouth aligned, a productive association was formed such that it was 
MHADA that pushed for the rezoning not only of their own land from “transit camp” to 
residential, but also from “parade ground” to “residential,” zoning the two slums as 
residential and diminishing the width of Prakash Pethe Marg. This requested was made as 
“it would be desirable to consider the development of the entire slum around MHADA’s 
transit camp”: curiously and ambitiously beyond the immediate needs of MHADA (Letter, 
MHADA to MMRDA, 02/06/04: 3). Also curious is that the request was made not by a 
project manager or someone further down the bureaucratic hierarchy, but by the CEO of 
MHADA. No mention of Plymouth was made, but the letter was produced by Plymouth in 
their defence of the PIL launched by Rathod’s associates.  
The MHADA-Plymouth association was productive. The MMRDA changed the zoning of 
the transit camp and the parade ground. This rezoning is illegal according to CRZ 
regulations, which prohibit zoning changes within areas affected by tidal motions. Perhaps 
this is why the zoning changes are not reflected by the current MMRDA Development 
Plan. Also spurious is the MMRDA’s initial willingness to act as the competent SRA for 
the redevelopment scheme. The MMRDA would legally be the SRA if the project were 
declared a vital public project under the MUTP or MUIP, as they claimed in 
correspondence with the Deputy Collector in Colaba. However, there is no evidence 
supporting the claim that the redevelopment was declared as such. It appears that this 
legislation was invoked merely to take control of the project, and this argument is 
substantiated by the Commissioner of the MMRDA who stated unequivocally: “We are not 
the competent authority to do it” (Upadhyaya, 2007c). The person who initially made these 
claims with the Deputy Collector, and who facilitated the changing of zoning is the 
Executive Engineer, SRA Cell, MMRDA. When I interviewed the Executive Engineer in 
his office about Plymouth he was decisively curt and defensive. He said that he had 
informed Plymouth that their request to define the scheme as an infrastructure project 
would have to be assessed by the MMRDA (via a survey and through interviews with 
squatter residents) and that he informed the developer that the proposal did not go through 
in 2005, at which point he said he transferred all the documents to the SRA (Interview, 
18/12/09). These statements do not add up with his letter to the Deputy Collector where he 
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asserted in no unspecific terms that the MMRDA was the competent SRA because it was an 
infrastructure project. Further, an Assistant Engineer at the SRA reports that he only 
received the Plymouth file from the MMRDA in October 2009, four years after they had 
allegedly been sent: and only 25% of the file at that.  
Another questionable association between Plymouth and a State agency exists with the 
Urban Development Department via MHADA. MHADA had requested UDD to reassess 
the high tide line based on a transcription error committed by MMRDA. This request was 
forwarded from the UDD to the Centre for Earth Science Studies in a letter dated June 2, 
2005, wherein UDD writes: “As directed, you are hereby requested to carry out fresh 
demarcation in 1:5000 scale plan and inform this department at an earliest” (Letter, UDD to 
CESS, 02/06/05). The transactions appear to be straightforward, which begs the question 
why the head of the UDD denied that his agency had anything to do with it, and went so far 
as to misdirect attention to the central government (Upadhyaya, 2007c).  
From the evidence in this section there can be little doubt that extralegal associations 
between developers and State bureaucracies and officials continue to exist in Mumbai. A 
high-profile example of such collusion came in 2010 when the Chief Minister of 
Maharashtra Ashok Chavan was asked to resign his post by Congress Party officials 
because three of his relatives received condominiums in a corruption-riddled real estate 
project (which just happened to be located adjacent to Ganesh Murthy Nagar) (Daily News 
and Analysis, 2010). In light of the frequency and range of such collusion it is tempting to 
suggest that costs of such relationships make redevelopment projects more expensive. 
Further, and in relation to this, State and local government bureaucracies in Mumbai are 
dense, inefficient, and often wanting for motivation to engage in problem solving. This 
density and desire to deflect responsibility occurred in the case of Plymouth being shunted 
from one agency to the next for an initial opening into the redevelopment project, and this 
type of obfuscation occurred several times in my attempts to get information. Successfully 
cutting through this bureaucracy takes power and money. As one resident of Ganesh 
Murthy asserts, redeveloping slums requires “force, money, political pressure, and takes 
johl [bribes]” (Interview, 12/9/09).  
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8.6.3 Competition between developers 
Squatter residents, local CBOs, and State officials and institutions are all actors that were 
assembled by various developers under the auspices of SRS projects. Additionally, 
however, associations between competing developers may emerge. The SRS creates the 
potential to reterritorialize the land under legal auspices, which essentially adds another 
layer of value onto the land. Squatter residences have value, and they are rented out and 
sold according to market prices. This is true for legal, notified squatter residences, and 
illegal ones as well. This is one layer of value. However, when the potential exists to 
assemble this land and construct legal edifices on it the value of the land can increase 
greatly, which has lead to a set of tensions in the settlement.  
The potential value of the land has attracted ten developers to Ganesh Murthy, who have 
driven up the price of land with time. Some of these developers may use the SRS to 
develop the land, such as (possibly) Plymouth and Sapoorji Pallanji. Others, however, use 
the SRS to reterritorialize the land in order to profit from larger developers willing to pay 
them for it. This is almost certainly the case with Sneh and Darshan. As explained by the 
Assistant Engineer at the SRA, it takes a lot of resources to redevelop a squatter settlement, 
and smaller firms such as Sneh and Darshan simply do not have these resources. Further, as 
mentioned previously, Sneh did not even bother to complete the necessary forms, either 
because they were in a rush to submit, or because they thought it would not be necessary in 
any case. Other firms seem to make a business of this kind of behaviour. Shree Lekhe 
Developers filed a scheme to develop Ambedkar Nagar in October 2009, and have filed 
three other schemes in Ward A with the SRA previous to this. They were preparing another 
redevelopment scheme proposal in the area when I visited their makeshift offices in the 
Fort area of South Mumbai in December 2009. In the two years they have been operational 
they have not undertaken any work beyond submitting proposals to the SRS, and the 
organization does not appear to have the resources to develop a large tract of land. 
Competition between developers for the right to develop squatter settlements under the 
SRS has consequences that hurt residents in many ways. As one resident put it: “Bring one 
builder. Do the work properly and do it for the people. Otherwise don’t bring anyone” 
(Interview, resident of Ganesh Murthy, 15/11/09). Firstly, competition between developers 
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drives up the cost of the land, to the point where moving to a slum may no longer be 
affordable for some people. The cost of purchasing a hutment in Ganesh Murthy Part I in 
the 1990s was reportedly INR 100,000 and in Parts II and III new hutments could be 
purchased for a fraction of this cost, or sometimes for nothing but the cost of materials if 
one was willing and able to capture the land. In 2010 the cost of a hutment in Part I is INR 
1,400,000: a 14-fold increase. Residents of Ganesh Murthy are aware that luxury 
condominiums being constructed next to the BEST bus depot are being sold for INR 
11,000,000. So, even if lower-cost housing produced by SRS yields units that sell for INR 
5,000,000 an INR 1,400,000 investment will produce a 3.5-fold yield. This simple 
arithmetic has driven up the price of land and residences in Ganesh Murthy to the point 
where accommodation has become unaffordable, which is unfortunate for expanding 
families that wish to stay together.  
Increased competition has also driven up costs for the developer, which will likely be 
passed on to the eventual residents of the new buildings (Nijman, 2008). Developers offer 
incentives for signing with them in Ganesh Murthy. Signing prices have increased from a 
couple hundred rupees to thousands of rupees, televisions, and include finder’s fees for 
those able to enrol other residents in the developer’s network. Developers also appear to 
ameliorate their residential offerings, but this may be just a sham. Competition to develop 
Dharavi has led to increased carpet area above and beyond that demanded by the SRS, and 
now residents in Ganesh Murthy are asking for similar terms. This would be a positive 
development for residents except that developers are doing everything they can to promise 
more but deliver less. Communal space and even the area of balconies may be factored in 
to the floor space equation, which accomplishes nothing for squatter residents.   
Competition between developers can become destructive and costly as well, as 
demonstrated in the ongoing battle between Darshan and Plymouth. Rathod has contested 
Plymouth’s bid to redevelop Ganesh Murthy and Ambedkar Nagar, not for the good of the 
residents or the environment as he has espoused on several occasions (Upadhyaya, 2007c; 
Interview, Rathod, 05/01/10). Instead, Rathod’s intent was to delay and derail Plymouth 
until his own firm, Darshan, was able to file its own scheme with the SRS. The Collector’s 
office was thus forced to hand deliver letters and convene a hearing, all of which takes up 
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public resources. Similarly the court cases brought before the Bombay High Court, and the 
Supreme Court of India utilize public resources.  
The most harmful outcome of this competition between developers falls upon the residents 
of squatter settlements. Through repeated demands for their signatures, residents are 
confronted with intimidating tactics involving physical threats, curtailment of infrastructure 
access, and more. Further, residents may be caught in the crossfire of competing 
developers, as was the case with Darshan and Plymouth. Residents were requested to go to 
court, write letters, and otherwise act on behalf of the developer. All of these activities take 
time, and place the resident in awkward positions that contribute to a sense of fear and 
vulnerability.  
8.7 Conclusion 
This chapter examines the SRS and related components contributing to Ganesh Murthy as a 
settlement assemblage, and thus contributes to a more holistic account of the settlement and 
its potential in the future. The SRS is a policy intended to redevelop slums through 
participatory guidelines and market mechanisms. The former intends for slum dwellers to 
participate in the process, making it more responsible and responsive to their needs. The 
latter is intended to decrease costs to the State and engage market efficiencies. Diverse 
interests and their respective operating logics drive the policy.  The outcome is theoretically 
positive for all stakeholders: squatter residents achieve new housing, developers realize 
profits, and the government may be credited with reducing slums and facilitating formal 
housing.  
The examination of the implementation of the SRS in Ganesh Murthy, however, reveals a 
far more convoluted and erosive process, which results from the translation of the policy 
through various components acting in accordance to their own logic, which reconfigures 
the policy trajectory along emergent lines. The participatory component of the SRS is 
actually captured by stratified CBO conglomerates and their associates that pursue a profit-
motivated logic, not a logic of common beneficence as presumed by the policy. Even if 
democratically oriented social consistencies emerged to approach a developer, how could 
they assemble 70 percent of the settlement to agree to the plan? Powerful factions within 
the settlement would demand to be included, which would reassemble the consistency and 
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alter the trajectory. On the level of slum dweller participation the policy cannot be effective 
outside of a space not yet inhabited by stratified levels of power. Do these spaces even 
exist? 
Developers, driven by profit, may well be unwilling to work with weaker sections of 
society and prefer powerful local partners that can assemble signatures. The alignment of 
desire for profit also enrols State employees and politicians manifesting in behaviour that 
often contradicts their ostensible purpose of serving the public for the greater good. Profit 
motivated developers will take measures to increase their profits, whether through 
purchasing hutments, purchasing new flats and reselling them on the market, and relocating 
residents, all of which contradicts the aims of the policy. Further, competition between 
developers may not result in increased efficiencies, but in unethical and underhanded 


















9.1 Reflections on outcomes 
This thesis aims to understand how inequalities and injustice emerge and continue to evolve 
in Ganesh Murthy Nagar. To do so it examines the emergence, organization, and socio-
spatial morphology of the settlement to better understand how various indigenous and 
exogenous components of the settlement assemblage align to produce emergent 
relationships and sociospatial configurations. The need for this research is based on the 
global proliferation of slums and their attendant social, economic, spatial, and political 
inequalities. Concurrently, however, slums may demonstrate many positive attributes, and 
the thesis strives to recognize these factors and build upon them towards developing more 
sustainable communities. To this extent I have been mindful of emergent conditions that 
contribute either to a slum of hope, where life-affirming relationships reduce vulnerabilities 
and facilitate improved livelihood conditions, or to a slum of despair, where life-destroying 
relationships erode self determination and negatively affect possibilities for improved 
livelihoods.  
To address the general aim of the thesis I follow three main investigative lines of inquiry. 
The first is to identify components of the settlement that facilitate its existence as a 
residential enclave and trace their emergence and evolution in time. The second line of 
inquiry I follow is to map the constitutive associations inherent in the ordering of these 
components both in the settlement and beyond its borders to State, civil society, and private 
actors. The third line of inquiry seeks to determine how these components interact with 
each other to determine their constraining and enabling effects. To investigate these lines of 
inquiry the thesis adopts a methodological strategy that addresses three perspectives from 
which data is mined: an ethnographic political perspective in which local relations of power 
unfold; an historical perspective through which the settlement and its functional 
components emerged and evolved; and a developmental perspective which stems from 
outside the settlement, yet which plays an important role in the settlement’s existence. The 
aims of the thesis, the lines of inquiry, and the methodological strategies adopted are thus at 
once broad and deep, and this presented opportunities and challenges for the intellectual 
representation of the settlement’s dynamics and for the collection of data that informs the 
analysis.  
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The choice of assemblage theory is well suited to represent and address the broad dynamics 
inherent in the settlement and within the larger context of the city. From an ethnological 
perspective the existence of slum dwellers is one of assembling. At a basic level, materials 
are assembled to create land and build hutments. At a more politically overt level, 
materials, signatures, funding, and permissions are gathered to procure infrastructure and 
other municipal services. So, from this basic standpoint the gathering process inherent in 
assemblage theory has a direct convergence with the reality of the settlement’s inhabitants.  
Further, the importance of historical precedent and processual emergence inherent to 
assemblage theory melds well with the evolution of the settlement over forty years and 
provides theoretical space to incorporate these ideas into the present functioning of the 
settlement. The historical perspective of the study, which investigates and combines various 
processes contributing to the settlement’s evolution, demonstrates moments of positive 
emergence but also identifies moments when processes become corrupted. Generally, the 
historical evolution of the settlement shows that policies enacted towards the ostensible 
betterment of slums and their inhabitants ultimately contributed to negative outcomes 
resulting in a fragmented society with limited capacity to reverse its trajectory towards 
despair. 
Understanding the city as an assemblage of assemblages provides a potent model for 
representing and understanding the settlement within a larger developmental context. 
Political assemblages, NGO assemblages, developer assemblages, and settlement 
assemblages are each composed of diverse components that are gathered together in a 
dynamic hierarchy and made to operate according to the convergence of different logics. 
Components of each of these assemblages and the logics that drive them plug into and plug 
out of other assemblages, thus gathering, holding stable, rupturing, and reassembling a 
given assembly. 
There is a distinct sense of fluidity attendant to social groupings and the built environment 
at Ganesh Murthy Nagar, and assemblage theory is well attuned to this flux. The theory is 
oriented towards emergent conditions in an evolving context and this contributes to the 
representation of a nomadic settlement that is not subject to the same rigid regulations and 
their enforcement over sociospatial processes as compared to more State controlled parts of 
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the city. That being said, the study demonstrates how State and nomadic tendencies 
migrated; resulting in emergent patterns of hierarchy and centralization of power in the 
nomadic settlement, and illicit or informal tendencies in policies, politics, politicians, and 
bureaucracies. These informal/formal mixtures have been investigated before, perhaps most 
adroitly in an Indian context by Roy (2009) and her examination of informal tendencies at 
the Bangalore urban planning department (see also Benjamin, 2008; 2005). This study adds 
to this line of inquiry and advances it further by connecting nomadic and State tendencies 
and exposing the transference of tendencies throughout related assemblages. At Ganesh 
Murthy this potent mixture contributed to the conditions that pushed the settlement towards 
a slum of despair by giving rise to a liminal space where the war machine, a metaphorical 
term for an assembly that aggresses upon the State, becomes a literal force that is turned 
upon its own people.  
The networked and rhizomatic character of assemblage theory, as employed in the thesis, 
incorporates many of the essential components of the settlement in a holistic fashion and 
demonstrates their interconnections and emergent outcomes. It shows that land, water, 
hutments, alleys, infrastructure, policies, politicians, slum dwellers, real estate developers, 
muscle gangs, NGOs, CBOs, bureaucracies, State employees and others are ambiguously 
and irreconcilably entangled. The empirical and intensive orientation of the investigation 
into the processes that connect, constrain, and enable these actors has contributed to 
minimizing reductionist and over-generalized pitfalls.  
The opportunities to understand a squatter settlement from the perspective of assemblage 
theory are thus considerable because of the open and relational nature of the analysis. 
However, this also poses certain challenges within the time and cost limitations of doctoral 
research. Figuring out which assemblages, groupings, or trajectories are most important to 
the settlement, rather than predefining these terms takes a good measure of faith, patience, 
and time. Further, because the interrelations of assemblages in the city are nearly limitless, 
it is challenging to know where to draw investigative boundaries. I would have liked to 
pursue certain investigative trajectories further like the gendered dimension of the 
settlement, muscle gang consistencies, and political and NGO assemblages more 
thoroughly. 
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The pursuit of these investigative trajectories, however, impinges on the methodological 
strategies that I employ to gather data. Deciding to not predefine specific components for 
research (e.g. infrastructure, political affiliations, etc.) as far as possible within the limits of 
my own being was a choice I made based on Latour’s (2005) insistence to allow actors to 
demonstrate what is or is not important in an assemblage. The socioeconomic survey was 
paramount in helping to specify which components of the settlement were important to 
residents and therefore which components the thesis should concentrate on. From there, I 
pursued another methodological maxim of Latour’s, which is to follow the actor along a 
performative chain of action that ultimately results in the functional component in question. 
Assemblage theory methodology is based on fine-grained empirical study involving a deep 
descriptive narrative of how things come together. This has important implications in the 
rhizomatic nature of the fieldwork I pursued, which involved sitting in on meetings of 
gangsters, visiting far-flung districts all over the city, meeting with important State 
officials, and plumbing the depths of many archives, besides spending a lot of time in the 
settlement learning from residents through interviews and participant observation. The 
nature of this methodological strategy is wide open, and again allows for opportunities, but 
creates challenges as well.  
Overall, in attempting to allow residents of the slum to define their reality to the greatest 
extent possible is an overwhelmingly positive aspect of the strategy because it does not 
immediately limit or pigeonhole observations or concerns into predefined categories, which 
may not adequately represent the local situation. On the other hand, there are challenges 
with pursuing this strategy, and I would like to relay three of these. Although I had engaged 
in a broad range of readings about slums in general and slums in Mumbai in particular 
before commencing field studies, while “following the actor” I encountered many other 
aspects of slums that I was not adequately conversant with. The limited nature of my 
knowledge on these issues required long hours of reading every night to better understand 
the dynamics involved in a particular area of enquiry to allow for a more substantial 
engagement with these issues the next day. Thus, a more narrowly defined and targeted 
research agenda would facilitate fieldwork, but it may also mitigate against potentially 
discovering and representing important aspects of reality. This relates to a second 
associated challenge that manifested as investigative dead-ends. After discovering a line of 
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performative ordering, and pursuing it to the greatest extent possible with various kinds of 
research, occasionally the investigate trail would end abruptly, with traces no longer 
apparent, or would simply end without bringing much more to bear on the larger aims of 
the investigation. This is a necessary component of following the actor, but it can be 
discouraging and is time consuming. Finally, in following the actor, I made decisions that 
led to my feeling uncomfortable in some situations. There are a lot of illegal activities that 
take place in Ganesh Murthy, and in order to understand processes involving service 
delivery, redevelopment, or local enforcement of regulations for example, it is necessary to 
investigate illegal or informal elements. Safety and security are paramount, but 
occasionally following the actor brings a researcher into contact with insalubrious actors 
that demand a heightened sense of caution.  
Thus, to conclude my reflections on the outcomes of this research, I feel the thesis has been 
by and large successful in investigating the reality of the settlement’s functioning and 
understanding how potential realities may have been actualized to produce a more equitable 
and just residential enclave. The application of assemblage theory for this research is 
positive and presents a promising way to better understand the functioning of slums within 
the context of other urban assemblages and their co-constitution. However, there are 
challenges associated with the theory and its application concerning the breadth and depth 
of analysis, and although methodological strategies can mitigate some of these challenges, 
there are certain pitfalls to be avoided here as well.  
9.2 Summation of key findings 
Mumbai has been in existence for centuries, and from the colonial period onwards, the 
driving motivation behind the city’s development has been a desire for land. The alignment 
of this desire in governance regimes and business interests forged the city’s present 
peninsular form from seven distinct islands. Mumbai’s urban planning assemblage, 
dominated by politicians, state and municipal bureaucracies, and business interests, pursued 
the reclamation of land in the Back Bay for over a century, despite the best interests of the 
city and her residents. However, various other components plugging into the planning 
assemblage, including NGOs, the Bombay High Court, citizens and central government 
bureaucracies, each with their own logic governing their actions, were able to delay and 
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finally derail the complete reclamation of the bay. The assemblage of actors ordering the 
city’s urban planning, together with the bay’s built components and natural processes 
created not land, but its potential in the form of a marshy mangrove forest from which 
Ganesh Murthy ultimately emerged. 
The potential for land at Ganesh Murthy Nagar in the 1970s coincided with a city system 
increasingly far from equilibrium between demand and supply of formal housing. Migrants 
were drawn into the incipient settlement’s basin of attraction by employment at Cuffe 
Parade and Navy Nagar and motivated by the potential for land held out by what was then a 
marsh. Currently, the settlement is composed mainly of these migrants and their families 
that hail from three countries and eighteen different states in India. This regional 
heterogeneity is mirrored in the religious, employment, and economic diversity in the 
settlement. The diversity of residents in terms of regional origin, occupation, and salary, 
and the absence of strong familial connections established by the socioeconomic survey 
points to a loose and tentative meshwork of informal consistencies, rather than any kind of 
unifying thematic or identity.  
These residents contributed to three intensive processes that acted as the engine of the 
settlement’s growth and its morphological evolution: the processes of moving to the marsh, 
reclaiming land there, and building hutments. These nomadic processes, occurring outside 
the norms of the State apparatus, informed the logic behind the settlement’s existence, 
which is oriented towards the self-organization and creation of affordable lodging for 
migrants coming into the city in search of better opportunities to improve livelihoods. 
Under this logic the nomadic settlement was successful not only in creating a sense of 
community amongst residents, but also, through the distributed, heterarchical, and 
redundant structure of this engine, land was successfully reclaimed that housed increasing 
numbers of people where government and private actors failed in this endeavour. However, 
despite initial thoughts to the contrary, as reflected by the hypothesis, emergent 
relationships between the State and the nomadic settlement incrementally shifted this slum 
of hope to a slum of despair. 
It is apparent that this shift was triggered by changes to the logic of the State in the 1970s 
from one that sought to negate slums through demolition, to one that was more tolerant of 
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slums as possible housing solutions. The changing logic of the State manifested in 
programmes to provide water at Ganesh Murthy via four elementary standpipes. Later, the 
State again altered its logic for providing services to slums from a supply-driven model to a 
demand-driven paradigm that incorporated participatory components. New policies adopted 
by the State triggered the formation of social consistencies in Ganesh Murthy to procure 
water and other services, which altered the operating logic of the settlement itself. 
The nomadic settlement, which had largely existed outside of the State apparatus, being 
neither planned, sanctioned, or regulated, thus became partially reterritorialized under the 
State, which manifested in the segmentation of the settlement into Part I. The mixing of 
State and nomadic tendencies also altered the logic of the social space of the settlement 
towards a more hierarchical society with administrators of CBOs gaining centralized power 
derived from the power of attorney signed over by residents and through influence with 
local politicians. As the nomadic settlement continued to expand geographically and 
demographically the State incrementally incorporated portions of it resulting in Part II, Part 
III, and Part III Backside, and concurrently triggered more local social consistencies with 
hierarchical effects on social organization. 
The logic governing the acquisition of water (and later other services and amenities), and 
the processes involved in gaining the service required the incorporation of another 
component in the settlement assemblage: the politician. Instead of directing the provision of 
services to slums through a locally removed and more objective authority, it was directed 
through local politicians that would fund projects and steer them through the State 
apparatus. The logic governing Mumbai’s politicians, to acquire and maintain votes and 
make money, came to be aligned with the profit-oriented logic governing the administrators 
of CBOs in charge of water distribution. Both administrators and politicians relied on each 
other to meet their needs. Further, the mixing of State and nomadic tendencies affected the 
positionality of the politician such that they sought an existence beyond the strictures of the 
State. 
The insertion of the politician component into the slum assemblage and the subsequent 
alignment of the politician’s logic with that of CBO administrators facilitated a line of 
flight from the State-designed water distribution model. The new model captured the 
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potential of water in suction tanks, thus transferring the power over water from the State to 
the administrator. The new model also compliments the nomadic tendencies of the 
settlement in the sense of escaping State regulation through evading water meters, 
procuring more water from the system through booster pumps, and more fluidly moving 
out over the territory through private connections and incorporating an increased customer 
base. Nomadic water distribution systems facilitated the growth of the settlement by 
providing more water to more people, which concurrently generated more revenue and 
consolidated the power of the CBO administrators. Such people could now pay to enrol 
other components such as State employees in charge of regulation and enforcement, and 
muscle gangs that had previously maintained a more nomadic existence outside the scope 
of infrastructural components of the settlement.  
The confluence of politicians and administrators within the context of State efforts to 
capture parts of the settlement all contributed to the ongoing fragmentation of society, 
which, because of its diversity, never benefited from a unifying logic in the first place. 
What emerged from the alignment of politicians and administrators, operating in an 
increasingly fragmented social milieu, is a liminal space that is composed of residents and 
State elements, but which equally isolates these actors from each other. Together with 
muscle gangs, a veritable war machine emerged to dominate this space of inequality and 
injustice, where residents pay too much for too little water, have little recourse to redress 
their situation, and are confined in their everyday actions by fear and distrust. Politicians, 
administrators, State employees, and muscle gangs all work together to hold stable this 
liminal space because it is mutually beneficial. Further, because State actors and residents 
are isolated from each other there is very little potential for an ameliorated space to emerge. 
Further, the liminal space carved out by politicians, administrators, State employees, and 
muscle gangs acts as a strong basin of attraction. New CBOs that emerge to procure or 
provide access to other services are either sent on a line of flight by the war machine or are 
reassembled through their incorporation in CBO conglomerates. Also, new programs 
initiated by the State to improve or introduce new services are steered towards CBO 
conglomerates by their political allies. Even the Slum Sanitation Project (SSP), that 
purposefully circumvented local politicians and was knowledgeable of certain power 
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relations in the settlement, could not prevent the capture of toilets by one of the CBO 
conglomerates. The SSP at Ganesh Murthy, organized by the World Bank and 
operationalized by SPARC, follows a logic of demand-driven participatory practice 
towards mobilizing communities and creating a sense of community ownership. However, 
a CBO conglomerate was able to use this logic to create the antithesis of the desired 
outcome.  
The most recent components to plug into Ganesh Murthy are developer assemblages. These 
components were introduced to the settlement through the Slum Rehabilitation Scheme 
(SRS) that is founded upon progressive thinking to reduce the proliferation of slums, 
neoliberal logics of introducing market mechanisms to devolve the role of the State, and by 
participatory logic. The developer assemblage, driven by profit, is not subject to the policy 
logic, and therefore developers actively try to limit competition, invert participatory 
guidelines to infiltrate settlements, and employ local war machines to collect signatures. In 
the case of Ganesh Murthy, where developer assemblages, CBO conglomerates, and muscle 
gang components align in the pursuit of profit, little progress has been made in the 
advancement towards stated policy goals. Instead, more fear, more violence, and more 
fragmentation of society has ensued. 
The analysis of Ganesh Murthy’s evolution over forty years demonstrates that there were 
many opportunities for potentially positive outcomes to emerge from State and multilateral 
initiatives to improve the quality of life in the settlement in terms of providing access to 
services and building communal assets such as a sense of ownership over facilities, 
educational benefits from participatory efforts, and the mobilization of communal identity 
and unity. However, weaknesses with policies, their translation into reality, together with 
the powerful mixture of State and nomadic tendencies, conspired to profanely invert the 
positive potential of interventions. The emergent result of these factors is a slum of despair 
with unequal and unjust relations, pervasive feelings of fear, and a fragmented populace 
with seemingly little capacity to marshal a counter force against the nomadic war machine. 
Given this situation, the following section examines the implications for slum policy in 
Mumbai and its implementation.  
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9.3 Implications for slum policy and implementation  
The analytical dimension of assemblage theory is useful to understand policy creation and 
implementation, because both processes may usefully be conceived as the assembling of 
components wherein the alignment of desire and logic produces emergent trajectories that 
may have the force to reorient intended purposes. If desire and logics governing the actions 
of actors in an assemblage are sufficiently known, properly assessed, and accounted for it is 
my contention that emergent relations may be, to a certain extent, planned for. This 
knowledge may thereafter be marshalled to adjust components towards better targeting 
intended outcomes.  
The first part of this assessment is to analyze the desire and logic of individual actors 
involved in policy making. For example, the state government of Maharashtra, an important 
stakeholder in all slum-related policies, adopts a position of being pro slum dwellers with 
public notices like: “Slums have constituted an integral part of Mumbai’s cityscape for 
several decades… It is imperative to enhance their standard of living” (SRA web site, 
http://www.sra.gov.in/: accessed June 13, 2011). However, recent comments by the former 
Chief Minister of Maharashtra that slums stand in the way of development, together with 
increased demolitions of slums, point to other priorities. These priorities have been shown 
to favour economic development at the expense of slum dwellers.  
Another important actor in Mumbai’s development agenda is the World Bank, which is 
currently funding many major infrastructure projects in the city, and was the key sponsor of 
several projects for slums such as the SSP and earlier attempts to integrate infrastructural 
arrangements. Through these programmes the World Bank has demonstrated its pro-slum 
dweller credentials, but goals to improve the lives of slum dwellers may be mitigated by a 
well intentioned but sometimes ill-fitting need to incorporate participatory elements and by 
neoliberal economic paradigms that reduce the role of government in favour of market and 
cost recovery mechanisms. It is important to realize that communities are not homogenous 
and policies must be flexible enough to accommodate emergent patterns. In the case of the 
SSP there should have been latitude to consider better-suited sanitary solutions for Ganesh 
Murthy Nagar such as the introduction of individual domestic toilets.  
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Other actors that are a part of the slum development dialogue and increasingly involved in 
policy-making decisions are local NGOs and civil society organizations. Rights-based 
development organizations function primarily to mobilize communities and reduce their 
vulnerability. However, the logic informing how this may be accomplished is changing 
within an evolving developmental landscape, and this can prompt changes in desire. NGOs 
must consider not only their primary constituents, but also their ability to attract funding, 
maintain their visibility and place with the developmental landscape and act within the 
realpolitik of contemporary urban planning. The sometimes-conflicting desires of NGOs 
can result in lost opportunities to fulfil their primary function.  
Another policy making actor examined in the thesis are real estate developers that are 
motivated by profit that operate according to a logic that employs any means possible to 
acquire land inexpensively and sell as much of it as possible at the highest price possible.  
Finally, politicians are ostensibly elected to represent their constituents towards the 
formation of a more equitable, just, and democratic society, but the desire of the politician 
may also be tainted with a desire for re-election and a desire to make money. The logic 
informing the latter two desires has been shown to generally trump the logic towards the 
desires of constituents, thus manifesting in relationships with slum dwellers characterized 
by dependency and domination. 
Within this set of policy making actors, potential alignments of desire and logic may be 
skewed away from genuine efforts to improve the lives of slum dwellers. Historically and 
into the present day urban policy in Mumbai is aligned along the desire of government and 
private developers to bring more land into the formal market for economic development. 
This is the overwhelmingly dominant trajectory of urban planning policy from early 
manifestations of land reclamation, to the Back Bay reclamation fiasco, to the current 
policy of slum redevelopment. What is needed to align the many disparate stakeholders in 
Mumbai’s development assemblage is strong leadership that has heretofore been absent in 
the city. Strong leadership must identify potential emergent relationships and leverage these 
to advance a fair and just vision that is mutually beneficial and fosters common 
understanding and cooperation. This is a tall task, but one that is realizable, as 
demonstrated by the successful combination of State, market, and civil society 
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organizations in the creation of toilet blocks in Pune led by the former Municipal 
Commissioner of Pune Ratnakar Gaikwad and SPARC (Burra, 2001). 
An assemblage analysis can equally be brought to bear on the implementation of policies. 
Policy is translated into reality by diverse actors that come together to perform their roles 
according to overt and covert desires and logics. The emergent relations that form from the 
alignment of desire can greatly affect how policies are realized locally. Policies aimed at 
reducing slum dweller vulnerability must clearly find a way of better integrating local 
politicians with infrastructure delivery programs. Current slum infrastructure policy 
implementation guidelines do not necessarily have arms length funding mechanisms and 
therefore require slum dwellers to form relations of dependency with local politicians. This, 
of course, is aligned with the desires and logic of politicians to maintain office and make 
money, but it does injustice to slum dwellers and facilitates hierarchies in slums that further 
erodes democratic principles. That said, representatives of the local populace must also be 
part of the process. Here there is clearly tension between maintaining local self-governance 
and democratic ideals, and the possibility of their capture and abuse.  
In terms of implementing participatory programmes, the thesis has demonstrated that every 
such programme in Ganesh Murthy has failed to meet broad goals of community 
mobilization and increased responsibility. Participatory programmes have triggered State-
oriented centralization of power and social hierarchies, and together with politician 
interference, have facilitated the emergence of a defensible liminal space that does injustice 
to both the State and slum dwellers. The participation of local actors is theoretically a 
positive element of policy frameworks, but to be successful, participatory interventions 
must be accompanied by a robust understanding of the local power geometry, and a 
significant commitment to early and ongoing community mobilization to create and 
maintain consensus. Where SPARC was able to mobilize communities through their 
partners in the Alliance, the SSP toilet blocks were relatively successful. In the case of 
Ganesh Murthy, however, where the NGO had few connections with the settlement, their 
lack of knowledge and inability to mobilize the community, only reinforced existing 
patterns of domination.  
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Finally, in terms of slum redevelopment, with the potential to realize large profits from 
redeveloping Ganesh Murthy, developers may do whatever they can to gain control over 
land through the SRS. This includes enrolling powerful State actors to rezone territories, 
alter tide lines, and define projects so as to remove or limit the amount of slum dwellers to 
be relocated on site. Developers will also enrol community leaders and muscle gangs to 
force the consent of slum dwellers. The alignment of desire and power in the realization of 
slum rehabilitation schemes at Ganesh Murthy has been shown to have had a disastrous 
affect on the community, and on the lives of individual slum dwellers.  
Perhaps, instead of disregarding the potentially emergent trajectories that result from the 
alignment of desire, power, and logic, these elements may be conceived to constitute the 
potential that policy implementation should be designed towards. For example, the 
entrepreneurial logic of CBO administrators could potentially be marshalled into market-
based water distribution schemes. Alternatively, unwanted patterns of behaviour that 
emerge from policies must be avoided. For example, slum dwellers reliance on politicians 
for moving projects through a dense and unresponsive bureaucracies signals the necessity 
for improvement or arms-length administrative mechanisms.  
To better frame policies and improve their implementation requires time and effort to 
develop extensive knowledge of specific localities. More than this however, it takes strong 
leadership with the political will to improve the lives of slum dwellers and the land they 
live on, which is not sufficiently in evidence. Instead, slums like Ganesh Murthy Nagar are 
reminiscent of Aravind Adiga’s rooster coops. For Adiga in his dark novel, White Tiger, the 
rooster coop is a pen that limits the actions of its inhabitants, preventing them from 
reaching whatever potential they may have, without the necessity of outside regulatory 
surveillance. Instead, “the coop is guarded from the inside” (Adiga, 2008, 194). Ganesh 
Murthy is similarly a coop, with a handful of residents conspiring with outside actors to 
prevent the population at large from claiming their basic rights of equality, justice, and 
democratic choice. Residents of Ganesh Murthy live with fear, violence, and life-destroying 
relationships in a slum of despair. They need better relationships with State and corporate 
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Questionnaire for Socioeconomic Survey 
 
I am a university student from London, England conducting research on informal 
settlements. This questionnaire is designed to understand living conditions in Ganesh 
Murthi Nagar. I am not affiliated with any governmental body, nor with any NGO. The 
questionnaire is confidential and anonymous. It will not be shared with anyone. Do I have 




1. What religion are you and your family? 
2. What caste are you and your family? 
3. Your family is from which region in India? 
4. How many people are in your household? 
5. How long have you been living in the settlement? 
6. Where did you live before? 
7. Why did you move to Ganesh Murthi? 
8. Who are the main people you rely on in times of difficulty? 
Economic Questions 
9. How many people work in the household? 
10. Where do they physically work? 
11. Doing what? 
12. What kind of house is it36 – Pucca, Semi-pucca, kutcha? 
13. Is there electricity? 
14. What is main source of drinking water? 
15. Does house have a toilet? 
Network Follow Up Questions 
                                                
36 Pucca: Flooring, roof & walls should be cemented 
  Semi-Pucca: Temporary roofs: could be with cemented floor & wall or any one of it. 
  Kutcha: Plastic roof, plastic walls, on stilts with wood floorboards. 
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16. Do you belong to a CBO? 
17. Do you belong to a political party? 
18. Are you active in temple/church/mosque activities? 
19. Do you like living in Ganesh Murthi? 
20. Why or why not? 




Interview Guide for Semi-Structured Interviews with Ganesh Murthi Residents 
 
I am a university student from London, England conducting research on informal 
settlements. This questionnaire is designed to understand living conditions in Ganesh 
Murthi Nagar. I am not affiliated with any governmental body, nor with any NGO. The 
questionnaire is confidential and anonymous. It will not be shared with anyone. Do I have 
you consent to proceed with the questionnaire? _____________________ Signed. Date: 
 Location: 
 
Personal questions about Ganesh Murthi 
1. Do you like living in GM? 
2. What do you like about it? 
3. What do you dislike about it? 
4. Where would you prefer to live? 
5. Do you feel frightened that you will have to leave someday? 
6. Do you know anyone who has had their house demolished here? 
7. Where do you think threats to the settlement come from? 
8. What can be done/what is done to fend off these threats? 
Political questions about GM 
9. Do you own your house? 
10. Could you sell your house if you wanted? 
11. Do you pay rent? 
12. Do you pay taxes? 
13. How are decision made to fix infrastructure? 
14. What happens when electricity stops working? 
15. Where does the money come from to fix infrastructure? 
16. Does anyone make money from residents living here? 
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17. Are there any thefts in GM?  
18. Is it safe?  
19. Why is it safe or not safe? 
Geographical questions about GM 
20. How is GM different from other settlements in the area? 
21. How are these settlements different from others to the north of Colaba? 
22. Are there any connections between the settlements in Colaba? 
23. How is the relationship between GM and Geeta Nagar and Ambedkar Nagar? 
24. What are those two nagars like? 
25. How does it affect the settlement to be right beside Navy Nagar? 
26. Can you use their resources? Are there any benefits? Are their drawbacks? 
27. What is it like living so close to the sea? 
28. What is it like living so close to the World Trade Centre? 
29. What is it like living close to rich people in Cuffe Parade? 
Personal questions pertaining to group 
30. What is the name of the religious, community, or political group you belong to?  
31. How long have you been a member? 
32. How were you introduced to the group? 
33. Why did you decide to join? 
34. Do you have friend/family in the group? 
35. If so, who? 
36. What position do you hold in the group? 
37. Are you affiliated with other groups in or out of the settlement? 
Group questions 
38. When was the group started? 
39. How many members are there? 
40. Where do you meet? 
41. How often do you meet? 
42. What is the purpose of the group? 
43. Who controls the group/how are decisions made? 
44. Does the group work towards ameliorating Ganesh Murthi (GM)? 
45. Is the group affiliated with other groups? 
46. Would you introduce me to other members of the group? Especially prominent 
members? 
 
